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Abstract 
Rapid urbanisation in China has led to large scale land acquisition to support urban growth. As 
Chinese rural land is owned collectively and administered by the Villagers’ Committee (VC) of 
each village, rural residents are sometimes excluded from bargaining while governments forcefully 
acquire land, often with low compensation, compulsory acquisition and corruption among village 
leaders. These disadvantages have generated discontent in some villages in recent years. With land 
issues prompting 65 per cent of Chinese rural protests, as well as a host of similar protests around 
the world, the incidence and forms of rural protest have been a topic of considerable interest among 
scholars internationally. However, the distinct mechanisms of rural protest induced by land 
acquisition in China have not been studied thoroughly, as this research aims to do.  
 
The Wukan protest is a typical case of a rural protest linked to the transfer of village land to urban 
land. The village is located in Lufeng City at the Southern coastline of China. Resistance against 
land acquisition emerged there from 2009 and turned to protest on 21st September 2011 when 
villagers launched a demonstration. The protest ended three months later, on 21st December 2011. 
Due to the duration of the protest activities and the large number of people involved, the protest 
shares some similarities with a social movement. Using the Wukan protest as a case study, this 
thesis addresses three principal questions: How does local protest in rural China develop and evolve? 
How effective is local protest in bringing about socio-political change in rural areas? To what extent 
can local protests be understood as forming part of a broader rural social movement in China? By 
answering these questions, the causes, process of development and outcomes of rural protest in 
China will be better understood. Also, connections between rural protest and broader social 
movements will be explored. 
 
Social movement theory is applied to answer the research questions. It is argued that political 
opportunities, resources and strategies determine the trajectory of collective oppositional actions. 
The Political Process model of McAdam (1982), which incorporates these elements to analyse 
social movements, offers a framework for explaining the Wukan protest. McAdam regards 
conditions such as changing political opportunities that expand protesters’ power; well organised 
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indigenous organisational strength; and a process of cognitive liberation as three requisites for 
raising a social movement. This thesis borrows these concepts to explain the outburst of the Wukan 
protest. Moreover, conceptions of social movements proposed by theorists such as Tilly (2005) and 
Della Porta and Diani (2009) help to examine the similarities and distinctions between the Wukan 
protest and a social movement, as does the work of Kolb (2007) on the outcomes of social 
movements.  
 
Data were collected and analysed under the principle of interpretivism which focuses on how 
people make sense of their social reality and identifies the task of the researcher as that of 
understanding and interpreting their ideas, feelings and motives about a particular social 
phenomenon. In following this approach, I travelled to Wukan and stayed there for three months in 
2013 to undertake participant observation of villagers’ daily life and a VC meeting, and conduct 21 
semi-structured interviews with seven groups of interviewees. These primary data were 
supplemented with documentary data in the form of newspaper articles and documents issued by 
governments or provided by protesters. Data were analysed thematically to reveal the meanings and 
ideas of interviewees. 
 
By analyzing these data and using social movement theory as my analytical lens, I find three crucial 
elements for the emergence of collective action in Wukan. To begin with, people became angry 
about their current situation because they felt they had been deprived of their land – which the 
former village cadres sold without their consent – and of the benefits accrued from the land sale. 
These feelings of relative deprivation were amplified when villagers compared their situation with 
that of rural residents in other villages and with the former village cadres. Second, expanding access 
to Information and Communication Technologies, the process of urbanisation, the global financial 
crisis in 2008 and placatory attitudes from higher level governments toward the local protest 
constituted favourable political opportunities that facilitated the protest. Further, protest leaders 
were able to enroll more participants into the protest and expand its scope and influence due to three 
inter-related elements: the deployment of strategies that aroused villagers’ dissatisfaction towards, 
and increased their confidence in successfully overturning, former village cadres; the enrolment of 
indigenous organisations (including family committees and religious committees supported by 
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long-established associational networks); and the formation of mobilising groups which helped to 
mobilise more villagers to participate in the protest. These three elements were not proceeding 
alone, but interplayed to generate the dynamic process of protest.  
  
The Wukan villagers had some significant achievements as a result of the protest: some of the land 
was retrieved; investments were made in improving infrastructure in the village; new village leaders 
were selected by open election which was regarded by some as the first ever free, transparent and 
democratic election in China (Gene, 2012); and village democratic structures in the form of a 
Villagers’ Assembly and Villagers’ Representative Assembly were installed. However, the protest 
did not achieve substantive structural or political change in the village: around one half of claimed 
land is unlikely to be returned to the Wukan villagers; bribery and corruption among village 
officials continued as a practice, even after the open election; and the Villagers’ Assembly and 
Villagers’ Representative Assembly did not hold regular meetings as intended. This suggests that a 
protest aiming at local targets and with specific, local demands cannot alter the political and cultural 
institutions in a village which are founded on national systems of Chinese land ownership and 
political institutions. The containment of the protest within the village or, at most the county, 
suggests it cannot be regarded as a part of a social movement in rural China. Actually, the Wukan 
protest suggests that a social movement is unlikely to emerge in rural China – at least for the 
foreseeable future – because rural protesters have neither opportunity nor intention to oppose higher 
authorities.  
 
The importance of this research rests on five findings. First, this research finds that the changing 
local power dynamics provide political opportunities for the generation of rural protests, suggesting 
the phenomenon of rural protests in China is set to continue. Second, it shows that these protests, 
when motivated by land acquisition, are economically rather than politically or culturally targeted, 
meaning that the preservation of a peasant way of life is not the main priority, but rather a share in 
the wealth of China’s growth and development. Thirdly, it demonstrates that traditional resources 
including family clan and religious affiliation assist organisational strength which facilitates a 
protest. Fourthly, that there is a clear distinction between protest and a social movement, as evident 
in the Wukan case. While a social movement is collective action targeting central authorities for a 
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systematic change, protests aim at rectifying specific local demands or grievances and are confined 
to a local level of mobilisation. Finally, and not surprisingly, this latter kind of collective action will 
not lead to broader changes as a social movement is likely to do. 
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Chapter 1  
Protests by China’s ‘land-lost’ villagers 
1.1 Introduction  
Contemporary China is undergoing many changes which are prompting social consequences that 
warrant a deeper understanding. Rapid urbanisation is one of these. Due to rapid economic 
development, China’s cities have grown dramatically in area and population during the past three 
decades. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), the urban population rose 
from 302 million in 1990 to 771 million in 2015, and the area of land used for urban construction 
increased from 11,608 square kilometres (km²) to 51,584 square kilometres (km²) (NBSC, 2017). 
More than 50 per cent of the land needed to support urban development is converted from farmland 
(Ding & Lichtenberg, 2011; X. Li, 2011), with an estimate that more than 50 million rural villagers 
in peri-urban areas have lost their lands as a result of the process of urbanisation (X. Li, 2011). The 
conversion of cultivated lands to build urban environments has significant social, political and 
economic consequences for the displaced villagers. This thesis examines one prominent, 
controversial case of conversion of rural land to land for urban development in recent Chinese 
history with a particular focus on how the systems of land ownership and village representation 
interacted with rural people’s changing consciousness and other social changes to spark a landmark 
example of grassroots protest.  
State and non-state actors both have important roles in the process of land acquisition because of the 
unique land ownership and acquisition system in China whereby rural lands are owned collectively 
and administered on behalf of local people by Villagers’ Committees (VCs): the local organisation 
that administers village issues on behalf of all villagers. Rural village lands can be acquired 
compulsorily for urban development by municipal governments who pay compensation to the 
land-lost villagers in return for their land use rights. Municipal governments are enthusiastic about 
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transferring rural lands into urban construction lands because the land-transfer fees are a primary 
source of revenue (Guo, 2001; Zhang, 2000). VCs, on the other hand, unofficially act largely as 
administrative organs of municipal governments (O’Brien & Li, 2000; Wang & Yao, 2007; Yu, 
2003) and have little capacity to bargain effectively with governments. Accordingly, the 
compensation to villagers is often relatively low and may comprise no more than 10 per cent of the 
transfer fee received by the municipal governments (Chan, 2003; Ding, 2007; X. Li, 2011). 
Furthermore, there have been instances of corruption among village leaders, with examples of some 
village leaders transferring land to municipal governments for a very low compensation price 
without informing the villagers and retaining the compensation fees themselves (Zhang, 2000), or 
asking for high compensation fees and corruptly diverting a large portion of it for their personal 
benefit (Song, Wang, & Lei, 2016). 
Land acquisition exerts great impacts on the rural villagers who must seek alternative livelihoods 
after their land is lost. While many displaced rural villagers find employment as construction 
workers or establish businesses for the newly urbanising population, there remain others who, 
deprived of land-based livelihoods, become unemployed and must start a new life dependent on 
meagre compensation that they find too low to meet their basic living needs (Liu & Qu, 2010). 
Consequently, many scholars argue that land acquisition is likely to lead villagers into poverty 
because they have difficulty finding new jobs and, as rural residents, are not covered by social 
insurance after their land is lost (see later section) (Ding, 2007; Gu & Wu, 2010; X. Li, 2011).  
In combination, compulsory acquisition, low compensation, and corruption among village leaders 
have generated discontent in some villages in recent years. As a result, villagers have sought to 
mobilise and assert their rights by instituting lawsuits, signing petitions to the Central Government 
and voting against corrupt or ineffectual VC leaders in village elections (Guo, 2001; O’Brien, 2002; 
O’Brien & Li, 2004). When these attempts fail to gain the desired response, some villagers resort to 
more direct forms of protest, such as rallies and demonstrations, which have occasionally resulted in 
violence and arrest (Guo, 2001; O’Brien, 2009a).  
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Scholars observing the collective actions induced by the land issue in Chinese rural areas portray 
those actions as not politically motivated and not rebellions which would pose a threat to the 
Chinese regime (X. Chen, 2012; O’Brien, 2008a; Perry, 2002). Rather than a desire to change the 
political system, O’Brien and Li argue that it is a rising “rights consciousness” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, 
p128), defined as the awareness of existing rights and the willingness to assert rights, that is causing 
rural unrest. In contrast, Perry, another prominent scholar of Chinese rural unrest, suggests rural 
people are protesting because of a long tradition of “rules consciousness” (Perry, 2002, p53), 
meaning that savvy protesters frame their grievances in officially approved terms in order to 
negotiate a better bargain with the authoritarian state. As well as these general observations, there 
are studies of causes, opportunities and characteristics of Chinese rural unrest (Cai, 2010; Chung, 
Lai & Xia, 2006; He, 2009; Li, 2006). 
Few scholars, however, have explained the mechanisms or process by which rural unrest develops 
and escalates from simmering discontent to overt protest. What are the political, economic and 
cultural backgrounds of rural protest? How do those background conditions influence the process 
and outcomes of a protest? Why do some protests develop to a relatively large scale involving a 
large number of rural people while others remain small scale? By answering these questions, we can 
gain much knowledge of the pattern of Chinese rural unrest, the forces that mobilise rural people to 
participate in public protest, and the extent to which such collective mobilisations are likely to lead 
to broad scale social change in Chinese rural areas.  
This research examines the growing phenomenon of rural protests caused by land acquisition in 
China by tracking the progress of protest in one location – the village of Wukan – where grassroots 
unrest arose in 2011 and subsided for a time in 2012. The protest that occurred in this village was 
chosen as a case for analysing Chinese rural protest because of its duration and the large number of 
participants: as will be illustrated later in this chapter, it lasted for about half year with more than 
6,000 villagers involved in it. Moreover, one of the protesters’ demands was for an open election, 
which led to what was hailed as the “first real open election in rural China” (Moore, 2012) that 
“offered a democratic model for China” (Jacob & Jamil, 2012).  
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By analysing this protest, my aim in this thesis is to deepen understanding of the process of 
development, the characteristics, and the consequences of rural protest in China in response to rapid 
urbanisation. Drawing on the case study of Wukan village, this thesis answers the following 
questions:   
1. How can we explain the way local protest in rural China develops and evolves? 
2. How effective is local protest in bringing about socio-political change in rural areas? 
3. To what extent can local protests be understood as forming part of a broader rural social 
movement in China? 
This research intends to fill a gap in study on Chinese rural protests. While previous scholars have 
researched the causes (Li, 2006), political opportunities (Chan & Zhou, 2014; Jing, 1999) and 
characteristics (O’Brien, 2009a; O’Brien & Li, 2006) of Chinese rural protest, I will offer a 
systematic explanation of why rural protest emerges and how it develops. Choosing the Wukan 
protest as an example, this research will analyse the opportunities, resources and strategies for 
launching a protest. Also, by following the outcomes of the protest, the attitudes of higher levels of 
government towards, and their tactics for appeasing, rural protest can be revealed. Moreover, by 
situating this protest in the broader rural social movement literature, the distinction between protest 
and movement in the rural Chinese context, as well as the prerequisites of a social movement, will 
be illustrated. By applying social movement theory approaches, I suggest some supplements of the 
theories for applicability under Chinese circumstances. 
1.2 The context for rural protest in China 
To understand recent rural protest in China, it is necessary to appreciate that China has experienced 
huge transformations since 1978 when the Central Government implemented a “reform and 
opening-up” policy. This series of policies, led by Deng Xiaoping1, triggered changes in land use 
rights, rural economies, population distribution and village political institutions. The reforms 
abolished the people’s communes which were established by Mao Zedong2 to form a communist 
                                               
1 Deng Xiaoping was the paramount leader of China from 1978 to 1989.  
2 Mao Zedong was the founder of P.R.China. He governed the country from 1949 until his death in 1976.   
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society by sharing all properties among the commune members. Instead new policies permitted 
family-oriented agriculture which allowed peasants to retain a portion of their own produce for 
personal gain, allowed entrepreneurs to start private businesses and opened areas up to foreign 
investment in China. This policy greatly facilitated urbanisation, marketisation and industrialisation, 
and helped China enter a new era of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (Deng, 1982). 
Correspondingly, these changes exerted great influences on rural residents’ life and altered the 
relationship among rural residents, rural society, and the state. Notably they helped to facilitate the 
interflow between rural and urban areas (Bernstein & Lü, 2000; Wang, 2001).  
An urban-rural divide was evident before 1978. For instance, in those years, migration between 
rural and urban areas was tightly controlled and the alteration from rural to urban residence was 
virtually impossible. A key instrument for enforcing this policy was the household registration 
system (Hukou system) which divided Chinese people into rural residents and urban residents 
according to their place of habitation. Rural residents were largely exploited to support the urban 
residents. For instance, cultivation was the primary way for most rural residents to make their living 
but their income was quite low because a low grain price was fixed by the Central Government. In 
contrast, the prices set for industrial products were much higher than for agricultural products 
(Bernstein & Lü, 2000). This increased the disparity between city workers’ income and that of 
peasants. Similarly, urban residents were covered by government-run social insurance schemes 
(including unemployment insurance, work-related injury insurance, maternity insurance and 
medical insurance), while rural residents were excluded from these schemes (Liu, 2004).  
With the reform and opening-up policy since 1978, the household registration system became more 
flexible and migration between rural and urban areas was permitted (Cheng & Selden, 1994). In fact, 
migration from rural to urban areas has been encouraged since the reform and opening-up policy, by 
introducing marketisation into China which exacerbated the socio-economic gap between rural and 
urban areas (Wall, 1993). Attracted by the relatively higher income in urban areas, rural residents 
relocated into cities to find a job. This migration made a major contribution to Chinese urban 
population growth and rapid urbanisation (Zhang & Song, 2003). Chan and Hu’s (2003) analysis of 
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the national statistical data about urbanisation concluded that close to 60 per cent of the 157 million 
urban population increase in the 1990s was generated by rural-urban migration. 
Accompanying industrialisation and urbanisation, urban areas have sprawled quickly during the 
past three decades, thereby increasing the demand for land. The construction of factories needs land 
to be transferred from rural land to urban land. As well, expanding factories bring much more 
labour into cities, which, in turn, requires more housing to be constructed. In 1998, the Central 
Government implemented another broad economic reform, in which the real estate market was 
opened. From then on, the housing allotment system
3
 was abolished and commercial housing came 
upon the stage. Under these circumstances, cities were expanding at a rapid pace and land transfer 
from rural to urban land has intensified over the past two decades. According to the NBSC (2017), 
the urban acreage increased more than six times in the past two decades and X. Li (2011) estimates 
that about 1820 km² of farmland is lost every year due to urban sprawl.  
Associated with this urban spread, Chung and Unger have identified a “Guangdong model for 
urbanisation” (Chung & Unger, 2013, p33) whereby rural communities retain ownership of some 
village land, and gain substantial incomes from leasing factory buildings (this model is discussed 
further in Chapter Five). In large parts of China, the likelihood of such arrangements being put in 
place and the pattern of urban development that ensues is shaped by Chinese authorities (Chung & 
Unger, 2013) who have typically supported market formation and economic development through 
their land requisitioning power (Gu & Wu, 2010). Governments are empowered to acquire rural 
land compulsorily to “favour public interests” (Article 10, Constitution Law of P.R.C; Article 2, 
The Law of Land Administration of the People’s Republic of China – LLA). Since the public 
interest was decided by governments who were eager to facilitate land requisition and urban 
development, the exercise of this control was strongly influenced by politics and the Communist 
Party’s pursuit of urbanisation and reform of the urban economy (Ma, 2002). Generally, different 
levels of Chinese governments (from central to township) enthusiastically promoted urban growth 
and transfers from rural land into urban land, although the Central Government and provincial or 
                                               
3 Housing allotment system is also called welfare-oriented public housing distribution system. It existed in Chinese urban areas from 
1950s to 1998. In such system, urban residents’ houses were allocated by work units.  
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municipal governments had different interests. While provincial and municipal governments were 
regarded as being enthusiastic supporters of land transfer, the Central Government, which takes the 
whole country’s situation into consideration, had a more ambivalent attitude toward land transfer. 
On one hand, it was willing to facilitate urbanisation and urban sprawl because they are a means of 
economic development (Chan & Hu, 2003; Gu & Wu, 2010). On the other hand, the central Chinese 
state was concerned about the impacts of the urbanisation process on food security. These different 
priorities influenced the Central Government’s formulation of control policies in recent years. For 
instance, it protected some high yielding rural land by designating it basic farmland, thereby 
preventing this land from being transferred for construction purposes without its consent (Article 45, 
LLA). It also stipulated that other rural land transfers should be approved by central or provincial 
governments depending on the acreage being transferred (Article 45, LLA). Food security was the 
Central Government’s prominent consideration when restricting land transfer. However the Central 
Government’s concern was tempered when it realised that, although the area of farmland was 
decreasing, the grain production of a single unit of land has increased considerably in recent years 
due to agricultural technological progress. Recognising that farmland conversion did not threaten 
China’s food security much, it relaxed its control on land transfer (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2008).  
Despite the Central Government’s concerns about food security, the governments at the provincial 
and municipal levels have constantly promoted land conversion. The potential profit they can make 
is a motivating factor (Cao, Feng, & Tao, 2008; Ding, 2007; Li, Xu, & Li, 2010). This driver 
became more of an imperative with the tax revenue distribution reform carried out by the Central 
Government in 1998. As a result of that reform, the Central Government keeps about 60 per cent of 
total general tax revenue, while provincial governments and municipal governments retain about 20 
per cent each. At the same time, land transaction fees are allocated entirely to provincial and 
municipal governments. This leaves these governments to rely on selling land use rights to meet 
their revenue needs for governmental expenses (Ding, 2007; Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). 
Conversion of village farmland to urban uses was extremely profitable because the compensation to 
rural people has traditionally been quite low in comparison to the high transfer fees paid to 
governments by land development companies (Ding & Lichtenberg, 2011). Thus, land acquisition 
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with limited compensation to village collectives has been heavily carried out by governments to fuel 
urban development and finance infrastructure provision (Ding, 2007).  
1.2.1 China’s land ownership system 
China has a unique land ownership and tenure institution which has facilitated land transfer. In 
China, rural land and urban land are distinguished according to their usage. According to the LLA, 
land ownership and user rights are separated as well. Where all the urban lands are owned by the 
Central Government and managed by the Land Administrative Bureau, suburban and rural lands are 
collectively owned and supervised by a collective economic organisation (predominantly the VC). 
Urban lands can be released for development purposes such as to build factories, business areas and 
commercial residential buildings, however rural lands are released by the administrative 
organisation to rural people primarily to use for cultivation of crops or building houses, and in some 
limited areas, running business by township enterprises. To summarise, individuals (no matter 
whether rural or urban residents) do not have the ownership of land; they can only use land under 
collective ownership. Under such a public land ownership system, governments can acquire rural 
land from the relevant collective by signing a contract with the VC and paying compensation to 
villagers.  
Although the law guarantees compensation for land-using peasants, they cannot receive much 
money when land is requisitioned. According to the LLA, compensation fees should include land 
compensation fees, resettlement fees and compensation for crops on the land. But the combined 
total of land compensation fees and resettlement fees is capped at 30 times the average output value 
for the three years prior to the requisition (Article 47, LLA). In practice, as the grain price in China 
has been quite low and crops on the land are not valuable, peasants have not been well compensated 
when they lose their land, especially if the recent productivity of the land in question has been low 
(Chan, 2003).  
Moreover, villagers are excluded from the bargaining process during land acquisition (Yu, 2004). 
Villagers do not have the right to bargain with government officials because the collective 
9 
 
ownership system vests this right in the VC (Chan, 2003). Meanwhile, as the land transfer contract 
is signed between officials of the local governments
4
 and VC leaders, villagers’ land compensation 
amounts have sometimes been concealed from villagers by those involved in the negotiations 
(Zhang & Lu, 2011).  
1.2.2 Political institutions in China: the role of Villagers’ Committees 
VCs play an important role in the process of land acquisition, although in most rural protests which 
have been induced by land acquisition, the relevant VC has been accused by protesters of being 
“corrupt” and “not accountable to villagers” (Yu, 2007, p116). While the VC leader and members 
are stipulated as being elected by villagers, scholars have found village elections and 
accountabilities among elected VC leaders to be less representative than envisaged by the Organic 
Law of Villagers’ Committee (shortened as OLVC) (e.g. O’Brien & Li, 2000).  
The VC is stipulated to be a “mass organisation of self-government” (Article 2, OLVC), as distinct 
from a level of the Chinese government, as explained below. Although expected to help implement 
government policies, they represent an organisation in which “villagers manage their own affairs, 
educate themselves and serve their own needs and in which election is conducted, decision adopted, 
administration maintained and supervision exercised by democratic means” (Article 2, OLVC). In 
practice, VCs not only administer collective lands and other daily issues such as security and 
sanitation in a given village, but they also implement government decisions and assist government’s 
work, such as enforcing birth control policy
5
 and collecting agricultural taxes and fees to pass 
through to the relevant levels of government. 
According to the OLVC, each VC should report to the Villagers’ Assembly and to the Villagers’ 
Representative Assembly (shortened as VRA). The Villagers’ Assembly, which can be convened by 
                                               
4 References to local governments, relate to the municipal and township governments throughout the thesis.  
5 A Birth-control policy was implemented from 1980. From 1980 to 1999, the policy stipulated that rural people could have a second 
child if the first one was a girl, and urban residents could only have one child no matter what gender the first child was. From 1999 to 
2011, if wife and husband were the only child of each family, the couple could have two children. From 2011 to 2015, if wife or 
husband was the only child of her/his family, the couple could have two children. From 2015 to now, all couples are allowed to give 
birth to two children. The policy allowed many exceptions and ethnic minorities were exempt.  
10 
 
the VC, is constituted by all adult villagers (Article 21, OLVC). During the Assembly, villagers 
discuss the VC’s annual work report, appraise the VC members’ work, and revoke or change VC’s 
and VRA’s inappropriate decisions (Article 23, OLVC). More specifically, when matters that 
involve the interests of the villagers arise, the VC is expected to refer them to the Villagers’ 
Assembly for decision through discussion before dealing with them (Article 24, OLVC).  
To some extent, the VRA is a substitute for the Villagers’ Assembly because it is held to discuss 
and decide village issues which are authorised by the Villagers’ Assembly when it is inconvenient 
to hold the assembly (Article 25, OLVC). The VRA should be attended by VC members and more 
than four fifth of all villagers’ representatives (Article 25, OLVC). Those representatives are 
selected by villagers after discussion in the Villagers’ Assembly.  
Although not a part of government, the power system in the village is similar to each level of 
government. The Chinese regime includes four levels of authorities: central, provincial, municipal 
and township. At each level, there are three main branches of power – the legislature in the form of 
the People’s Congresses/Standing Committee of People’s Congresses (headed by the National 
People’s Congress), the executive or administrative arm in the form of the Government (headed by 
the State Council or Central People’s Government), and the governing party, the Chinese 
Communist Party (shortened as CCP), providing political leadership (headed by the Central Party 
committee with Party Branches at each level) (see Figure 1-1). The People’s Congress is stipulated 
as the organ of state power and its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the People's 
Congress (Constitution of the P.R.C). The People’s Congresses are authorised to legislate laws, vote 
for government leaders and examine government’s work plans. Thus, each level of government, as 
the administrative authority of a region, is responsible to each level’s People's Congress or, when 
the People's Congress is not in session, to its Standing Committee (Article 92, Constitution of the 
P.R.C). In addition to their responsibilities to the relevant People’s Congress, provincial, municipal 
and township governments have to obey commands of higher level governments. These 
arrangements are duplicated at the village level, with the Villagers’ Assembly’s responsibilities 
being similar to those of the People’s Congress, and the VC’s similar to governments’.  
11 
 
Communist Party Branches are a separate system within the regime and the Constitution of the CCP 
is the highest guideline. According to the Constitution of the CCP, the Party plays a “political, 
ideological and organisational leading” role in Chinese regime (General program, Constitution of 
the CCP). Each Branch level of the Party assists and guides the lower level Party Branch while also 
providing political leadership to government of the same level. In many cases, a government leader 
seves simultaneously as the deputy Party Secretary (Unger, 2012). Government is therefore 
executing the policy of both the People’s Congresses and that of the Party.  
It can be concluded that the Chinese regime is constituted by three power systems, and each system 
has organs at four or five levels. The relationships within each system and among the three systems 
are worth exploring in the context of this thesis. Briefly, at any level, the Party Branch provides 
leadership for the government which is responsible to the People’s Congress. Within each system, 
higher levels of the People’s Congress can guide and supervise lower level congresses, and higher 
level of government can command the lower level government, while the Party Branch can assist 
and guide lower level Party Branches and be instructed by higher branches (see Figure 1-1). The 
balance of power between the Party and the People’s Congresses is less clearly defined. Although 
the Party is deemed to have supremacy, in practice considerable overlap of membership and joint 
leadership roles has ensured close alignment between these two branches and also a further arm of 
power – the Armed Forces (People’s Liberation Army)  
 
Figure 1-1: Relationship among Chinese power institutions 
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However, the People’s Congress and its standing committee, with other people’s assemblies 
(including the Villagers’ Assemblies which, in theory, function outside of this system) are regarded 
as impotent in authoritarian China where the Communist Party has concentrated power and central 
or national authorities, especially the political leadership in congress and the Party, exercise 
ultimate control (Bian, Shu, & Logan, 2001; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; O’Brien, 2010). This is 
partly because the Villagers’ Assembly and VRA meet infrequently (less than annually) in most 
villages (O’Brien & Han, 2009). As well, village elections have been absent from many villages (Li, 
2008; Oi & Rozelle, 2000) where village cadres (including VC members and Party Branch 
members) are appointed by higher level officials. These appointments have reduced village cadres’ 
accountabilities toward villagers, thus facilitating corruption and malpractice during processes such 
as land acquisition and other VC functions (He, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015). In many cases, villagers 
become dissatisfied with the village cadres and began to protest against them when conditions are 
favourable. In this context of land ownership and village level politics, with unaccountable VCs 
handling land transfer decisions, the Wukan protest, which occurred during 2011 to 2012, appears 
typical of the kinds of rural protests that have been taking place across China against village cadres 
and their land selling behaviour.  
1.3 Wukan and the Protest 
The Wukan village of Lufeng City lies on the Southeast coastline of China beside Shanwei city 
which belongs to the Chaoshan area
6
 of Guangdong province, about 200 kilometres northwest of 
Hong Kong. The village covers an area of approximately 27 square kilometres and the population 
was about 13,000 in 2011 (Zhang, 2011). There are 47 family clans in this village, 13 of these are 
“big families” which make up more than 70 per cent of the population. Yang (2012) has tracked the 
history of the main family clans and found they immigrated to Wukan between 150 and 300 years 
ago, and expanded in recent decades because of good economic conditions. In the Chaoshan area, 
people regard a flourishing population as of equal importance to economic fortune, and they are 
eager to give birth – especially to sons, as much as possible (Huang & Huang, 2007). Wukan is a 
village that exemplifies this culture. The population is much larger than in other villages in Chinese 
                                               
6 Chaoshan area is a region located in the Southern coast of China, including Chaozhou city, Jieyang city and Shanwei city.  
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rural areas because Wukan villagers bear more babies. Each family gives birth to at least one boy 
and it is common to have three or four children in a family by violating the birth control policy 
which allows rural families to have at most two children per couple. Also, villagers are united 
closely under the family name as they originated from the same ancestor. Each family clan has a 
committee to take charge of worship of the ancestors and to coordinate family issues (Yang, 2012). 
This unique population situation exerts an important influence on the emergence and development 
of the Wukan protest, as will be discussed in the later chapters.  
Economically, a majority of villagers’ livelihoods are based in the village or in Lufeng city or other 
cities of the Pearl River Delta. Before the financial crisis in 2008, Wukan villagers ran more than 
300 clothing stores in the Pearl River Delta, with the annual turnover at 300 million yuan
7
 (about 
AU$46 million), and employed more than 3,000 villagers (Liu, 2012). Some other villagers have 
inherited their ancestors’ occupation of fishing. The village’s harbour is capable of accommodating 
more than 300 fishing-boats each seating between 4 and 12. There were about 130 fishing boats 
owned by Wukan villagers and more than 300 villagers working in the fishing industry in 2012. 
Thus, although it is classified as a rural village and villagers sometimes grow rice and/or peanuts on 
their land, farming is not the main means of livelihood in this village. As I show later in the thesis, 
the absence of farming as the economic mainstay of the town facilitated the sale of land use rights 
to individuals (for constructing houses) and land to the Township Government by former village 
cadres
8
 without informing the villagers or sharing the benefits with them.  
As I also outline, before 2008 when most villagers were making their living in other areas, they did 
not pay attention to land sales. However, with the surging land price during the recent decade and 
more villagers returning to the village after 2008 following the global financial crisis, the Wukan 
villagers became more aware of, and unhappy with, the land transactions. This initially commenced 
in 2009 when a young Wukanese villager, Hoo, began distributing leaflets to villagers’ homes, 
                                               
7 Yuan(元): Chinese monetary unit. Although the currency exchange rate between Chinese yuan and Australian dollars differs every 
day, I set the exchange rate at 0.17, which is similar to the rate in late 2011 when the transactions took place. Which means that 1 
Chinese yuan equals 0.17 Australian dollars, while 1 Australian dollar equals 6 Chinese yuan. 
8 In this thesis, although Wukan village has held two open elections (one in 2012 after the protest and the other one in 2015) and 
elected two sets of VC members, I refer to the Party Branch members and VC members who were overturned by protesters in 2011 
as the “former village cadres”, and the VC members and Party Branch members who were chosen in 2012 as “new village cadres”.  
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informing them of the land sales situation. Other young people joined Hoo via an on-line chat site 
and they formed an informal youth organisation, named the Warm-blooded Youth League of 
Wukan. From 2009 to 2011, the leader of the league organised 13 petitions to higher authorities, 
including the Municipal and Provincial Governments and the related land administrative 
departments of these governments, to express their anger at both the loss of their land and the 
conduct of the village leaders who had allowed the sale to take place without any consultation with 
villagers or award of suitable compensation. When they failed to receive a reply, they selected 
alternative methods to achieve their demands. 
They turned to open protest. The first manifestation of this was on 21st September 2011 when they 
heard that a stretch of village land had been sold to a real estate developer without villagers’ 
consent and construction started that day. About 3,000 villagers marched to the Municipal 
Government building and challenged the Mayor about the land ownership situation. When the 
Mayor insisted that the area was not sold, protesters returned to the village where they smashed the 
construction site and some other factories on the way, as well as the village authorities’ building in 
the village. The village leader of the time subsequently fled the village (Liu, 2012).  
The sabotage led to police being brought in on the second day. When the police were trying to 
arrest some of those responsible for the property destruction, villagers gathered to confront them. 
Eventually about 4,000 villagers joined in the conflict particularly as a rumour spread that a child 
was beaten to death (this proved to be untrue). The riot culminated with more than a hundred police 
personnel being held up in a police station for two days surrounded by angry villagers and their cars 
being overturned (Jacobs, 2011). After negotiation between the representatives of the villagers and 
township and municipal government officials, the villagers agreed to release the policemen from the 
besieged police station (Zhang, 2011). In return, the officials promised the villagers that, within two 
months they would respond to their group petition of 21st September 2011 and deal with the 
“illegal” land acquisition and alleged corruption of the former village leaders (Zhang, 2011). 
As the former village leaders vacated their position from 21st September 2011 (the date of the first 
mass demonstration), the township government asked the Wukan villagers to establish an interim 
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administrative organisation which could represent villagers and communicate with the government 
(Li, 2012). Villagers held an election on 29th September 2011 to form a temporary organisation 
which they named the Provisional Directory to promote villagers’ interests and to manage daily 
issues in the village. Both democratic voting and family clan representation were combined in this 
election. Firstly, 117 villagers’ representatives were chosen according to family clan numbers and 
proportion in the village. Secondly, 38 of the village’s main family clans each selected one person 
to be a candidate for the Directory. The 117 villagers’ representatives elected 13 persons to be 
members of the Provisional Directory, half of whom were activists in the former resistance and 
protest. After that, the Directory became the command centre for follow-up protests and collective 
action in the village (Li, 2012). 
With the Provisional Directory in place, a second group demonstration was held on 21st November 
2011 with protests directed at local governments rather than village authorities. Although the 
Township and Municipal Party Branches and Governments dismissed the former village authorities 
(including the Party Branch and VC members), and recognised the protesters’ leadership 
organisation (the elected Provisional Directory) as the temporary authority in the village, protesters 
were of the view that these governments had not fulfilled their promise to the village within the 
specified two months. More than 4,000 villagers attended the demonstration, waving flags and 
banners which read “retrieve our land”, “overthrow the corrupted cadres” and “hold open election” 
(see Figure 1-2). 
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Figure 1-2: Demonstration on 21st November 2011 
Photo downloaded from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16198769 
In this demonstration, villagers also petitioned to hold an open election as an additional demand 
alongside retrieve land because they realised they had not voted for any VC leader since the 
promulgation of OLVC. Villagers claimed that VC members were appointed by the village Party 
Branch Secretary, Shaw, who was the main target of the initial protest and was accused by villagers 
of selling Wukan’s land without villagers’ consent (Liu, 2012).  
Unlike the first demonstration march which featured disturbances and property destruction, this 
demonstration proceeded in an orderly and peaceful manner. This scene was recorded by several 
media agencies, mainly from Hong Kong and abroad, who were invited by protesters beforehand 
(Gene, 2012; Li, 2012; Zhang, 2011; 2012). As a result of this media reporting, the Wukan protest 
attracted more domestic and overseas attention. Until then it was an ordinary localised collective 
action, just like most of the other thousands of rural protests induced by land acquisition (Yu, 
2011). 
However, the local governments did not compromise after the second mass demonstration and an 
open confrontation between the villagers and governments was triggered. On 3rd December 2011, 
the Municipal Government announced that the group’s petition activity was unlawful, and the 
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Provisional Directory was an illegal organisation. Accordingly, the government detained five 
activists on 9th December 2011 (Jacobs, 2011). The villagers responded by marching to the 
Municipal Government where they clashed with police in front of the government building. The 
next day, barricades were put up in the main road of Wukan by both the villagers and police to 
prevent mutual access. Transportation and access to the village became very difficult but foreign 
media managed to enter the village and send their reports back (Zhang, 2011).  
The relationship between villagers and local governments deteriorated further when, on 11th 
December, one of the five detained activists was pronounced dead in the detention centre (Moore, 
2011a). Villagers claimed that the activist had been beaten to death. Meanwhile, rumours that two 
more of the detained activists were also dead spread through the village; this in turn sparked the 
anger of the whole village. Villagers assembled every day to mourn and to show their determination 
for revenge (Zhang, 2011). The whole cross-section of villagers, including students and teachers, 
businessmen/women, fishermen/women and others stopped their work and joined the strike in the 
village. Villagers assembled in the public square where they had started their group petition while 
activists and protest leaders made speeches to inspire participants (Moore, 2011b). The Municipal 
Government’s response was to treat the villagers’ actions as a rebellion and try to quell it by force. 
It sent large numbers of police to maintain blocks on the main road to the village. Villagers heard 
that two groups of army troops were deployed from the neighbouring city to surround the village 
although this was denied by governmental officials. 
During this crisis, scholars such as Professor Yu Jianrong from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science
9
 and Professor Zhu Jiangang from Sun Yat-Sen University
10
 organised some discussion 
meetings and suggested that the Provincial Government should deal with this protest directly (Liu, 
2012). They argued that this protest was not a rebellion aimed at the local government authorities, 
but a rural protest induced by land acquisition. Reports and recommendations were submitted to the 
Governor of Guangdong Province and finally he accepted the suggestions for provincial 
government intervention (Liu, 2012).  
                                               
9 Chinese Academy of Social Science is China’s highest academic organisation of social science.  
10 Sun Yat-Sen University is a leading university of Guangdong Province.  
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A turnaround point came on 21st December 2011, when the Provincial Government sent a working 
team, led by the Vice-Governor of Guangdong Province to resolve this issue. The Vice-Governor 
reportedly met with the protest leader and reached an agreement with him (Moore, 2012). The 
working team made concessions to villagers, including legitimising the Provisional Directory, 
releasing the detained activists, promising a thorough investigation of the land sales situation and 
returning to the village the lands that were in government hands (Moore, 2012). Also, the 
Government announced that the former VC was installed via an illegal procedure and allowed 
villagers to elect a new VC (Moore, 2012). In response, the villagers ceased their protests and 
confrontation with the Municipal Government.   
The following days were filled with efforts to organise the VC election. Protesters, mainly those 
who had been the activist leaders throughout, worked to guarantee an open and fair election. An 
Electoral Committee was formed by villagers to arrange the coming village election for villagers’ 
representatives and VC members with 11 Electoral Committee members voted in (Li, 2012). A 
week later, on the 11th February 2012, the election for the VRA was held, and 109 representatives 
were elected by secret ballot.  
There was more attention paid to the village election for VC members. After more than one month’s 
preparation, the high profile election was held on 3rd and 4th March 2012. More than 81 per cent of 
eligible voters turned out to vote, with most claiming this was the first time they had voted for their 
VC members. Seven villagers were elected as VC members, all of whom had been activists in the 
protest. Outsiders, from journalists to volunteers and scholars, witnessed this election (see Figure 
1-3). It was hailed as the most open and democratic election in rural China, and was treated as the 
beginning of Chinese rural democracy (Gene 2012; Moore 2012). In a complementary move, the 
Party Branch members were also replaced. Lam, who was the leader during the protest and elected 
to be the VC chairman, was appointed to be the leader of the village Party Branch by the township 
and municipal level authority before the VC election: an issue I will analyse in detail in Chapter 
Five.  
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Beginning from individual resistance which developed into large scale protest and ended with 
higher level government intervention, the Provincial Government, local governments (including the 
Municipal and Township ones), village cadres (including VC leaders and Party Branch leaders) and 
everyday villagers played important roles in the protest. Moreover, the process of protest was 
recorded by several media providing relevant data for this research. As I outline in Chapter Four 
(Methods), this facilitated my study of the Wukan protest as presented in this thesis.  
 
 Figure 1-3: Wukan election recorded by media 
Photo downloaded from 
https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/earthbound-china/wukan-election-photos  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
In discussing and answering my research questions, the structure of this thesis is as follows: 
Following this introductory chapter, the next chapter presents a review of the literature related to 
studies of protests both in China and internationally. Concepts of resistance, protest, and social 
movement are explained in detail to distinguish different forms and levels of collective action. 
Research about other forms of collective action, such as student protests and workers’ protests, and 
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about rural protests in other countries is also reviewed to place the Chinese rural protests in an 
international context. Most importantly, scholarship around grievances which prompt Chinese rural 
protest and conditions under which protests are facilitated is explored.  
The third chapter presents the theoretical framework of my analysis, applying a social movement 
theory lens. Since social movement theory is a broad framework containing disparate ideas and foci, 
two specific theoretical approaches to understanding social movements are applied to the Wukan 
protest: Tilly’s Polity model (Tilly, 1978) which illustrates the power distribution in a country 
between the polity (or establishment) and challengers; and McAdam’s Political Process model 
(McAdam, 1982) which explains the political opportunities for generating a protest. However, I also 
draw on social movement theory beyond these two models to explain the reasons which led 
villagers to protest, and the resources and strategies they employed to escalate to a mass protest. For 
instance, relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), resource mobilisation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a) and 
framing concepts (Snow, 2004) are utilised to understand the emergence of the Wukan protest. 
These concepts are woven in to supplement and strengthen the Political Process model as outlined 
in Chapter Three. Moreover, concepts about social movements and outcomes of social movements 
will be introduced, to understand the distinctions between movement and protest.  
In the fourth chapter I outline the field methods adopted for conducting the research and the 
assumptions underpinning my approach. Generally, this research was guided by an interpretivist 
framework that seeks to understand a phenomenon – why it occurred and how it unfolded – 
according to the meanings and realities as perceived by those who experienced it (Douglas, 1970). 
More specifically, qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, and document collection, were applied to collect data. The data were analysed using a 
thematic approach that was both deductive in the sense that it was guided by my research questions 
and theoretical framework, but simultaneously inductive in that the voices and experiences of the 
protest participants were prioritised as core themes. The chapter also details how research rigour 
and ethics were attended to throughout the process of collecting and analysing data in order to 
guarantee the validity of the research.  
21 
 
The fifth chapter explains the emergence and gradual escalation of the Wukan protest with the help 
of the Political Process model and other social movement concepts. Causes, opportunities, resources 
and strategies of the Wukan protest are considered. In exploring the reasons for the protest, Gurr’s 
(1970) relative deprivation theory is employed to show how villagers’ grievances about land 
acquisition grew over time with the increasing feeling of being deprived, which seemed to be the 
fundamental cause of the Wukan protest. But villagers’ grievances did not automatically lead to a 
mass protest. Instead, there were three favourable conditions that facilitated the mobilisation of 
villagers into a mass protest. These were: first, favourable political opportunities whereby 
challengers’ power grew and threatened the polity at the village level. Second was the presence of 
indigenous organisations and related established social networks in the village. The third set of 
conditions was the adoption of effective strategies for mobilising villagers. These three 
prerequisites were aligned with McAdam’s Political Process model (McAdam, 1982). Abundant 
data including interview quotes and documentary records support the explanation of what occurred 
in Wukan in accordance with these theoretical concepts. 
In the sixth chapter, I present the consequences of the Wukan protest, which offer an opportunity to 
observe Chinese governments’ attitudes and strategies for dealing with rural protest. As a result of 
their relatively successful rural protest, the Wukan villagers achieved some of the goals of their 
collective action. Notably, they changed the political leadership in the village by electing new VC 
members. Also they elicited the Provincial Government’s promise that some of their land would be 
retrieved, and secured some government investment in improved infrastructure in the village. In this 
chapter, I not only describe the outcomes of the Wukan protest, but also suggest the mechanisms 
which led to these outcomes.  
However, there remain some problems in the village after the protest. Firstly, not all land that the 
villagers demanded could be retrieved. Secondly, the political order did not change along with the 
transformation of political leadership. Problems such as ongoing intervention by the Party Branch 
and bribery of village cadres continued in Wukan village after the protest and open election and 
further arrests and protests have ensued. In the latter part of the sixth chapter, I suggest the reasons 
for the persistence of those problems. I regard the localisation of protest targets and actions as one 
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cause of those problems, because a single protest cannot change the Chinese political and land 
ownership institutions which underpin the problems in Wukan. This is relevant to the final research 
question since, for all its similarities to a social movement, the Wukan protest differs in significant 
ways, which I outline.  
In the concluding, seventh, chapter, I draw together the former six chapters and summarise the 
answers to my three research questions by outlining five key findings that contribute to knowledge. 
Finally, further questions suggested by this research and directions for future work are proposed. 
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Chapter 2  
Chinese rural protest and the broader context 
2.1 Introduction  
Increasingly, opposition to authorities for unfair treatment or denial of rights have attracted scholars’ 
attention, including those who have studied those contentions in the Chinese context. Some studies 
explore the specific and general issues provoking unrest (Cao et al., 2008; Guo, 2001) while others 
have identified the conditions under which unrest eventuates (Li, 2006) and the means and 
resources (Otsuka, 2009) rural people use to express their dissatisfaction. As a way of positioning 
this thesis vis-à-vis previous research, literature on Chinese rural protest and other protests such as 
labour protest, student protest and environmental protest, along with rural protest occurring in other 
countries is reviewed in this chapter. By comparing the Wukan experience with different kinds of 
protest previously identified, the characteristics of rural protest can be determined in this and the 
following conceptual chapter. Moreover, by following the outcomes of these protests, governments’ 
attitudes toward protest are better understood. These insights provide the opportunity to explain the 
Wukan protest, while also identifying gaps in knowledge. 
The first section of this chapter illustrates the concepts relating to rural protest. More specifically, 
the terms resistance, protest and social movement broadly refer to public opposition directed at 
authorities, but they are differentiated from each other in my thesis. Detailed distinctions will be 
clarified in the next part following this introduction. After that, in the second section of this chapter, 
literature on collective protest action in China is reviewed. Borrowing and adapting a framework 
from Perry (2001), those forms of Chinese protest are divided, according to different targets and 
aims, into three categories: economically motivated, nationalistically inspired and politically 
involved.  
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A review on rural protest is the third section. Rural protests in China are usually economically 
motivated (Li, 2006; O’Brien, 2008a), and induced by grievances about unfavourable policies such 
as tax and fee collections, unpopular projects and land acquisition which are viewed as 
economically disadvantageous to rural people. Opposition to land issues has been the primary cause 
of rural unrest in China after 2006 when the Central Government abolished agricultural tax and fees. 
Thus, literature about rural unrest against taxes and fees will be reviewed first, followed by studies 
of protest about land acquisition. Then, literature on the Wukan protest, which exhibited some 
characteristics in common with other Chinese rural protest, will be reviewed. 
The fourth section of this chapter places Chinese rural protest into the context of broader processes 
of land acquisition, rural protest and the assertion of citizens’ rights internationally. In doing so, it 
reviews research that examines these related events to ascertain their relevance to the contemporary 
phenomenon of rural protest in China. Also, by comparing the Chinese experience of rural protest 
with that of other countries, the distinct characteristics of Chinese rural protest can be identified.  
2.2 Protest as a confrontational form of resistance 
A number of terms, such as resist, protest, disturbance, popular contention and popular agitation are 
used to describe actions that express dissatisfaction with policies and practices. The subtle 
distinctions implied by different terms highlight significant characteristics such as how ‘public’ they 
are; how moderate; and how spontaneous versus coordinated. As with other articles relating to 
Chinese protest (Cai, 2008; Jing, 1999; O’Brien & Li, 2006), “resistance”, “protest” and 
“movement” are the key terms in my thesis.  
Resistance, as defined by Hollander and Einwohner (2004), is an action taken in opposition to 
power or inequality and can take a range of forms, which are either covert or overt. The “everyday 
resistance” described by Scott (1987) in relation to peasants in Southeast Asia is a typical kind of 
covert resistance. Scott (1987) observed delaying tactics such as foot-dragging, arson, sabotage, 
desertion, pilfering and feigned ignorance, and argued those actions were evidence of peasants 
resisting the land owners or authorities in a passive way. However, the perpetrators of those actions 
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were not recognised by the targets and the actors could not be punished (Scott, 1987). In contrast, 
the forms of resistance studied in my thesis are overt ones, meaning that they are recognised as such 
by both the target and observers.  
“Rightful resistance”, which was proposed by O’Brien and Li (O’Brien, 1996; 2012; O’Brien & Li, 
2006), is a kind of overt resistance that can be found specifically in China. In those actions, Chinese 
peasants usually employ laws, policies and other officially promoted values which are established 
by higher level governments (central and provincial ones) to “defy ‘disloyal’ political and economic 
elites who fail to live up to some professed ideal or who have not implemented some beneficial 
measure” (O’Brien, 1996, p33). In most such cases, peasants resist local governments or officials 
with the help of higher level governments’ stipulations. This is the reason why that resistance is 
defined as “rightful” (O’Brien, 1996, p33). 
The word “protest” is used by researchers such as He (2009), Jin (2011), Perry (2002), and Walker 
(2006). Protests are collective actions which involve actors applying more intense methods such as 
demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades of roads and railroads and clashes between protesters and police 
(X. Chen, 2012; Deng & Yang, 2013; Jin, 2011). Unlike resistance in which actors sometimes 
employ some institutional ways (such as petitioning, litigation and group negotiation) to claim their 
demands, protest occurs when institutional ways of resisting fail to redress problems (Li, 2006). 
Thus in the Chinese academic sphere, protest refers to oppositional actions that employ more severe 
methods than other resistant actions. Following this concept, “protest” in my thesis refers to public 
opposition to powerful organisations (include government or big companies) during which intense 
measures are applied. More specifically in Wukan’s case, the period from 21st June 2009 to 20th 
September 2011 is treated as “resistance” when activists expressed their oppositions by sending out 
leaflets or holding small group petitions to governments, and the Wukan “protest” began on the 21st 
September 2011 when the first large group demonstration commenced. The protest ended on the 
21st December 2011 when protesters finished open confrontation with governments. 
“Social Movement”, which hints at widely spread opposing actions, is another concept related to 
contentious events. According to Tilly (1983, p462), social movements are “organised, sustained, 
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self-conscious challenges, which implies shared identity among participants”. The distinction 
between protest and social movement is discussed in later chapters dealing with Research Question 
Three. But, according to other scholars studying Chinese collective actions, protests can also be 
organised (Yu, 2003), self-conscious (Walker, 2008), and based on a sense of shared identity among 
participants (He & Xue, 2014), meaning that they meet some of Tilly’s requirements of being a 
movement. However, few of these scholars employ the term “movement” because they regard those 
actions as neither sustained nor widely spread (Li & O’Brien, 2008; O’Brien, 2009a). In this thesis, 
I avoid describing Chinese rural protests as a form of movement and, indeed, in Chapter Six raise 
the question of whether rural protest in Wukan forms part of an emerging rural social movement in 
China.  
2.3 Protests in China 
Perry (2001) proposes that there are three types of protest in China: economically motivated actions 
by hard-pressed workers and farmers; nationalistically inspired demonstrations by patriotic students; 
and religiously rooted resistance by zealous believers. In this chapter, I borrow this classification 
from Perry with some alteration in that I divide grassroots protest into three kinds: economically 
motivated, nationalistically inspired and politically involved. In Perry’s classification, Falun Gong 
is the main example of religiously rooted resistance by zealous believers. Falun Gong is a Chinese 
spiritual practice that combines meditation and qigong exercises. It also refers to the group who are 
following this practice. The cult-like new religious movement (Chan, 2004) with the number of 
adherents reaching 100 million in 1999 (Kahn, 1999), was seen to pose a threat to the CCP’s 
dominant ideology based on atheism (Chan, 2004; Tong, 2009). Even more, a demonstration 
involving more than 10,000 Falun Gong adherents on 25th April 1999 asking for freedom to 
practice Falun Gong was described in a Politburo meeting
11
 in mid-June of that year as “the most 
serious political incident since June 4th 1989”12 (Tong, 2009, p9). Later, in October, 1999, Falun 
Gong was declared by the Chinese authorities to be a “heretical organisation” that threatened social 
stability, and the organisation was suppressed (Standing Committee, 1999; Thomas, 2000). Thus, I 
                                               
11 Politburo is short for “Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee”, and is a group of 25 people who oversee the CCP.  
12 Refers to the Tiananmen Square protest. 
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would like to classify this event as a politically involved protest in the same category as the 
Tiananmen Square protest. “Political” in this definition refers to politics at a national scale, while 
“political” in “political opportunity” and “political order” refers to different levels, from village to 
state.  
Labour protests are typical of economically motivated protest. Although sometimes aiming for 
rights and better working conditions, worker protesters are often demanding a secure livelihood 
supported by better economic conditions (Perry, 2001). During the early 2000s in China, labour 
protests were mainly launched by laid-off workers (Chen, 2003). Since 1997 when the Central 
Government began enterprise restructuring, state-owned enterprises were either converted into 
shareholding companies or went bankrupt. Many employees who used to have a permanent position 
in those enterprises ended up being laid-off workers who launched some protests to oppose this 
misfortune. Chen (2000) maintains that workers would not hold collective action unless there was a 
subsistence crisis, such as workers having incomes far below local minimum wages, or if the assets 
of enterprises that workers depend on for a living were being stripped by corrupt managers for their 
own benefit. However, research has shown that although some of the affected workers received 
compensation after the protest allaying some of their subsistence anxiety, in most cases it is not 
possible to reverse the imperatives of market-driven reform (Chen, 2003).  
Besides laid-off workers protesting, protests have been undertaken by current workers. With the 
process of marketisation, private factories sprang up in mega-cities and the coastline areas of China. 
More than 281 million rural peasants moved into those areas and became migrant workers in 2016 
(NBSC, 2017). Abuses and rights violations of these workers increased in the past years, including 
arduous work with low pay, long hours, wage default, unsafe work settings, denial of labour 
contracts, exclusion from public health care, social insurance and social assistance, poor educational 
chances for children, exorbitant fees and fines, and discrimination from urban residents and officials 
(Wong, 2011). In the face of these disadvantages, Wong (2011) maintains that younger, less 
educated and former peasants secure help from relatives, friends and fellow villagers, while those 
who are older, better educated and formerly students adopt institutionalised strategies such as 
seeking legal assistance.  
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But social support and legal measures of resistance fall far short of providing the necessary 
protection for workers (Chan, Ngai, & Chan, 2010), which has led them to collective actions 
demanding more secure livelihoods such as more payment and better working conditions 
(Cunningham & Wasserstrom, 2011). Radical measures such as strikes, street actions and public 
demonstrations have been increasingly used by workers (Nang & Ngai, 2009). Moreover, Chan et al. 
(2010) found a new class consciousness forming within migrant workers in the labour protest in 
Shenzhen in 2007 as did Butollo and Brink (2012) in Guangzhou in 2010 because protesters linked 
with workers from other factories in the same community and in the same business group. However, 
these protests were still limited to a specific scale instead of developing into cross-sector protests 
(Cunningham & Wasserstrom, 2011). Butollo and Brink (2012) explain the reasons for these 
limitations: industrial structures are fragmented in China and independent organisations such as 
worker’s unions are banned by the Government.  
Nationalistically inspired protest is the second kind of collective action in China. These protests 
mainly express opposition toward foreign countries, such as the United States of America in 1999 
because it bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and Japan in 2005 because of a number of 
issues including the approval of new Japanese text book and the former Prime Minister’s 
worshipping at the Imperial Shrine of Yasukuni where war criminals who launched the 
Sino-Japanese wars are enshrined. These collective actions are claimed to be supported or 
controlled by the Chinese Government. According to Perry (2001), the Central Government overtly 
encouraged protests against the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. He (2007) 
argues that although there is little evidence to prove the anti-Japanese nationalism protests were 
orchestrated by the Government, Chinese popular nationalism is deeply rooted in the state’s history 
propaganda which fuels mistrust and exacerbates a perception of mutual threat in the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. 
Weiss (2013) explicitly illustrates the Chinese state’s attitude toward nationalist protest in China. 
She explains that anti-foreign protests are being utilised by the Chinese Government: on one hand, 
the Central Government allows protesters to hold nationalist protests to demonstrate their domestic 
anger against foreign counties and their support for Chinese foreign policy, while, on the other hand, 
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it will suppress protests against another country when it is seeking to maintain a friendly 
relationship with that country. Similarly, Zhao (2005) suggests China’s pragmatic leaders still 
maintain their authoritarian power and prevent nationalism from getting out of hand. 
The third kind of protest in China is politically involved protests. Falun Gong adherents’ 
demonstrations and the Tiananmen Square protest were two large scale protests of this kind. Since it 
had extensive devout believers and was perceived as posing threats to the political legitimacy of the 
Communist Party (Potter, 2003), Falun Gong was repressed resolutely by the Central Government, 
even if human rights critics and agencies, such as the US Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, criticised the Chinese Government’s actions for threatening human rights (Keith & Lin, 
2003). Potter (2003) regards the repression on Falun Gong as a sign that the Communist Party has 
permitted only limited freedom of religious belief and regards organised religion as a political 
challenge.  
Also aimed at the political system, the Tiananmen Square protests were led by students asking for a 
democratic government and a free society, and occurred in hundreds of cities across China. The 
protests involved about one million participants, but ended with military repression. According to 
Wright (1999), the protest expressed widespread hope and anticipation of Chinese democracy, yet 
the brutal end of this wave of political protest quelled that hope. After analysing the protest, Wright 
(1999) concluded that the closed political environment and the lack of an institutional means of 
negotiation, alongside the fact that the media was dominated by the Party-state, meant that the 
opportunities for achieving political reform by protesting were limited, and student protests which 
aimed to achieve national political reform were highly likely to be suppressed. Also, by its reaction 
to the student movement, the Chinese Communist Party showed its resolute attitude that any protest 
or organisation which posed a threat to its political control would not be tolerated (Wright, 1999).  
Crane (1994) considered the lack of an oppositional collective identity against the Communist Party 
to be another reason for the failure of the students’ protests. Crane (1994) analysed the student 
protests that occurred in Nanjing City during 1988 to 1989. He pointed out that, in that case, the 
protest leaders tried to foster a collective identity for students as a mobilising strategy, but the 
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efforts finally failed because of the complexities of the Chinese context. He argues that because of 
the tightly controlled public life in China, formal groups such as unions and student associations 
were dominated by the state, affording little space for autonomous groups. Thus, non-Party 
interpersonal networks were limited and provided little basis to develop an alternative collective 
identity. However, he predicted that once a collective identity was established, the movement would 
make a crucial difference to China’s democratic progress (Crane, 1994).  
Environmental issues have also triggered protests in China. However, unlike other collective actions 
which are referred to as a form of “protest”, environmental protesting actions are mainly viewed as 
“(part of) movements” in China (Brettell, 2003; Lin, 2007; Otsuka, 2009; Stalley & Yang, 2006). 
This is partly because there exists a trend of “environmentalism” in China (Ho, 2001, p894) as 
people’s consciousness of protecting the environment is awakened and the establishment of 
environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (shortened as NGOs) spreads (Stalley & Yang, 
2006). But after examining the actions of NGOs, Otsuka (2009) believes that environmental 
movements in China have had limited opportunities and few resources to take public action. He 
points out that, although the state has made some concessions about the establishment, actions and 
existence of environmental NGOs, official supervision of them is still rigid. Thus, the actions of 
Chinese environmental NGOs are usually not about opposing the government, but educating 
citizens. More broadly, this observation is supported by Lin (2007) who asserts that NGOs in China 
dare not counter the higher level governments (central and provincial) and instead just aim to raise 
environmental consciousness, promote cultural change and solve environmental problems at the 
grass-roots level. Additionally, environmental protests that do seek to oppose governments do so 
through a focus on specific, localised projects, such as dam building (Lin, 2007) and refuse or waste 
processing plants (Van Rooij, 2010). Because of this specific, grass-roots level focus, although 
Chinese environmental protests have spread widely in China, some scholars do not regard them as a 
social movement (Stalley & Yang, 2006).  
Concluding from this literature, one can establish that most protests in China have been 
economically motivated, mobilised around specific demands, targeted at local governments or 
officials, and largely of limited scale because of the lack of autonomous mobilising organisations. 
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Conversely, with the help of professional organisations, some nationalist protests, politically 
involved protests and environmental protests have developed into national scale action. These 
widely spread protests have faced diverse treatments from Chinese governments, depending on the 
different aims of each protest. Generally speaking, the Central Government will repress politically 
involved protest that is aimed at the central authority, but encourage nationalistically inspired 
demonstrations (Perry, 2001).  
But governments at different levels may have distinct intentions while confronting economically 
motivated protests. According to Cai (2010), both central and local governments may adopt one of 
the following modes of response to deal with popular resistance: 1) concessions (i.e., meet 
protesters’ demands); 2) concession with discipline (i.e., protesters’ demands are met, but some or 
all participants are punished); 3) tolerance (i.e., protesters’ demands are ignored, but the 
government also tolerates their actions); and 4) repression (i.e., protesters’ demands are ignored, 
and some or all participants are punished). Generally, governments calculate the costs and benefits 
before responding to collective actions, but the Central Government pays more attention to regime 
legitimacy while local government officials emphasise economic and political performance to 
pursue higher positions (Cai, 2010). Thus, while local governments are likely to suppress collective 
actions and try to ensure smooth economic development and political stability, the Central 
Government has tolerated large-scale mass incidents when they are not targeted at the regime (Tong 
& Lei, 2010). 
Protests can influence policy implementation and even change policies of different levels of 
government. O’Brien and Li (2005) suggest popular agitation will alert concerned officials to poor 
policy implementation and may prompt them to take corrective steps. However, O’Brien and Li 
(2005) and Cai (2010) agree that it is hard to assess the impact of people’s resistance on policy 
changes because many different factors or intervening variables may combine to shape the changes. 
Nevertheless, after analysing the impact of popular contention on policy adjustment by examining 
the pressures faced by the government as well as the costs it is willing to pay to bring an end to 
social grievances and popular resistance, Cai (2010) insists some policies can be changed by local 
protests.  
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2.3.1 Guanxi as a characteristic of Chinese protest 
Guanxi, literally meaning “relationship” or “personal connection” – which hints that “social 
exchanges between persons who participate in long-term relationships” (Barbalet, 2015, p1039) – is 
deemed to be important when analysing Chinese protests (Kipnis, 1997; Wang & Woods, 2013; Xie 
& Mol, 2006). It represents a type of non-Party interpersonal relationship despite the tight control 
on formal groupings (Crane 1994). Qi (2017) explains how Guanxi influences the generation, 
formation and outcomes of protest actions. Firstly, she point out that political leaders, along with 
judicial leaders, heads of the Department of Propaganda and managers of leading state-owned local 
newspapers and TV stations are united by a Guanxi network, which is the power holder’s network. 
Within this network, local elites are more likely to engage in corruption by exchanging resources 
they own. In this way a Guanxi network can become a focus of grievances for challengers to the 
elite or “polity”. While citizens feel a sense of discontent with this phenomenon, officials, who are 
not part of the power holders’ network are aware that there are risks associated with reporting such 
corruption and are thus reluctant to respond to public dissatisfaction. This unresponsiveness to the 
public’s grievances and complaints can lead discontented citizens toward collective actions. 
Secondly, Guanxi plays an important part in mobilising protesters. As formal channels such as civic 
organisations for expressing discontent are banned in China, Chinese people are more likely to 
initiate and structure collective actions through informal networks (Qi, 2017). Guanxi networks are 
typically drawn on by protest leaders, whether urban protesters or rural activists (Qi, 2017). Lastly, 
based on a review of a number of cases, Qi (2017) concludes that protesters have a higher rate of 
success if they have some connections with higher level government officials or media reporters. Qi 
(2017) points out that in protests, information about central government policies and the misconduct 
of officials is provided through the activists’ strong Guanxi ties with select village cadres. Xie and 
Mol (2006) report a case where Guanxi networks provide sensitive and confidential information, 
which is crucial for the success of an environmental protest.  
Guanxi networks are also employed by governments to suppress collective actions via “relational 
repression” (Deng & O’Brien, 2013, p534). Deng and O’Brien (2013) suggest that local 
governments will exert pressure on protesters’ relatives, friends and other native-place connections 
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to persuade and discourage protesters from participating in collective action. They observed the 
phenomenon of Chinese local officials investigating activists’ social ties in Dongyang County of 
Zhejiang Province, and then assembling a work team of government or public sector actors to enrol 
in those social ties and demobilise the protest (Qi, 2017). If unsuccessful in manipulating through 
the social networks, they are subject to punishment including suspension of salary, removal from 
office and prosecution (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). By using this so-called “soft” (Deng & O’Brien, 
2013, p533) way of repressing collective action, the duration and scope of popular actions can be 
limited. Thus, Guanxi cannot be ignored while analysing rural protest in China. 
2.4 Rural protests as a kind of economically motivated protest 
Initial studies of China’s rural disturbances mainly focused on peasants’ opposition to taxes and 
levies which they considered to be exorbitant (Bernstein, 2004; Li & O’Brien, 1996). Before 2006 
when peasants had to pay the agricultural tax
13
 and levies, the general tax rate was 15.5 per cent of 
each year’s income, but sub-national governments were also mandated to collect some additional 
local levies. The Central Government legislated that the total amount of tax and levies should not 
exceed 25 per cent of the average annual income of each family in each province. However, the 
amount has often exceeded these limits and led to unrest. Peasants regarded as excessive the 
financial pressure imposed on them by the local governments (both municipal and township) and 
this resulted in resistance and protests targeted at local governments or officials (Bernstein, 2004; Li 
& O’Brien, 1996). 
Peasants have been shown to resist exorbitant tax and levies in various ways. For instance, they 
have refused to pay tax or levies until the cadres fulfil the government’s service obligations 
associated with the collection of tax and levies stipulated in favourable national policies (Li & 
O’Brien, 1996). They have also lodged individual or collective petitions to a higher level 
government accusing the local cadres of corruption, or they have complained to the media as a way 
of putting additional pressure on local cadres (Li & O’Brien, 1996). In a review of peasant unrest in 
                                               
13 Agricultural tax rate was formulated by the Central Government and levies were stipulated by provincial or municipal 
governments.  
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China, Bernstein (2004) points to the deployment of resistance and more forcible protests to oppose 
the financial burdens of tax levies. He observes that peasants’ strategies range from delaying and 
postponing payment, to demonstrations, sit-ins and blockages of roads and railroads, and even 
detaining and beating local cadres. Protest leaders regard their peaceful collective actions (such as 
demonstrations and sit-ins) to be legal, although collective actions sometimes turn violent because 
participants’ emotions get out of control when confronting local cadres (Bernstein, 2004).  
Although sometimes collective, scholars note that rural unrest against tax and levies is generally 
village scale due to limited organising capability. Li and O’Brien (1996) followed various forms of 
resistance in the Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces and found that some resistance leaders would 
mobilise villagers to join their actions, but that defiance was contained within individual villages 
and did not link up with other dissatisfied villages. Similarly, Bernstein (2004) noted that most of 
the rural unrest induced by collection of tax and levies was locally-based. Scholars regard the lack 
of mobilising organisations that link villages as the main reason. On one hand, professional 
organisations for initiating collective action are banned by the Chinese Government. On the other 
hand, it is hard for rural residents to form mobilising groups partly because the ban on organisations 
(Li & O’Brien, 2008). Without those organisations or groups, protests against taxes and levies have 
generally been weakly organised and limited on local scale (Bernstein & Lü, 2000).  
Even in the less common case of well-organised rural protests about taxes and levies which have 
spread across villages and towns, there were local targets rather than a more central focus. The case 
of H County in Hunan Province is such an instance of organised, public resistance (Bernstein, 2004; 
Yu, 2003). A stable, informal, mobilising and communicating network was established during the 
protests, which mobilised peasants from different towns within a county to participate in the 
collective actions (including petitioning to higher level governments, demonstrating in front of 
township governments and conflicting with township and municipal government officials). Thus, 
this protest was regarded to be a well-organised one. Yu (2003) analysed the case in detail. He 
suggests that this well-organised collective action was consistent with central policies and targeted 
the grassroots cadres and opposed them directly to protest against unpopular local policies and 
practices, instead of confronting higher authorities. Nevertheless the organised protest had 
35 
 
characteristics which made it a widespread action. Firstly, the protest leaders were strong-willed and 
popular among the peasants. Secondly, these leaders had established a political organisation (named 
the Peasants’ Association) among villagers and achieved unity further afield within the whole 
county organise (Yu, 2003). These characteristics of leadership and mobilising organisations were 
not so evident in other cases of protest that remained localised.  
As well as opposing local officials rather than central ones, peasants’ demands are often specific 
and narrow: they prinmarily want relief from oppressive burdens (Bernstein, 2004; Li & O’Brien, 
1996). They are not opposing the Central Government, but asking for its policies to be fully and 
fairly implemented at the local level (Bernstein, 2004; Li & O’Brien, 1996; Yu, 2004). Interviewees 
in Bernstein’s cases claimed they were acting legally in the name of the Central Government and 
were only opposing local officials who were grossly violating policies. Most of the protest leaders 
understood the Central Government’s policies as supporting their interests. Also, invoking the 
favourable policies which were stipulated by the Central Government to defy the local cadres was 
their main strategy in the actions (Bernstein, 2004; Li & O’Brien, 1996). As outlined earlier, this 
has been observed by O’Brien who describe as “rightful resistance” the process whereby peasants 
defy what they judge as improper behaviour by political and economic elites by “the innovative use 
of laws, policies, and other officially promoted values” (O’Brien, 1996, p33). Similar to other 
economically motivated protests such as labour protest, rural protesters usually attract the Central 
Government’s sympathy and tolerance although local officials would suppress them at the first 
appearance.  
2.4.1 Rural protest induced by land issues 
In the last two decades, land alienation has become another prominent trigger for rural protest. With 
the marketisation of real estate and rapid urbanisation from the late 1990s (Chan & Hu, 2003; Lu & 
Chen, 2004), land became much more valuable than before and Chinese local governments began to 
compulsorily acquire land from rural people (Chen, 2007). Meanwhile, the agricultural tax and 
levies were abolished by the Central Government from 2006. Thus, peasants and other rural 
residents faced a new set of challenges to their livelihoods and basis for survival in the form of land 
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seizures that had a more profound impact than tax and fee abuses. Consequently they took overt 
collective, and more assertive opposing actions in protest (Walker, 2008). Reflecting on this new 
phenomenon, researchers thus turned their attention to this new wave of rural unrest that is now 
mainly against land acquisition.  
Recently, land acquisition occurs more frequently to allow for the construction and expansion of 
cities and related industries. But the construction of large-scale infrastructure such as dams has also 
induced some rural opposition. As the water levels of a river rise significantly after a dam is built, 
dam building projects have resulted in many peasants losing their land (Beattie, 2002; Jing, 1996; 
1999). Although relocated before the dam building, residents (largely rural people) alongside the 
river have faced long-term risks of becoming poorer and also been threatened with landlessness, 
food insecurity, joblessness, and social marginalisation (Murphy & Gleick, 2009). These forms of 
disadvantage, along with local government corruption which led to significant resettlement funds 
ending up in the pocket of government officials rather than being passed on to the displaced 
villagers, have been the main triggers for local protests against dam building (Beattie, 2002). 
Beattie (2002) studied protests against the Three Gorges Dam project which commenced in 1998 
and has since displaced over a million people by flooding more than 1,000 villages as well as some 
towns and cities. He observed that this prompted both urban-based environmental protests and rural 
protests in the early 2000s. However, in contrast to environmental protests which have focused on 
the detrimental impacts on ecosystems, rural protests have focused around issues of equity for 
resettled people. Protesters have complained that local governments have made promises (e.g. about 
compensation) but not fulfilled them, while official corruption such as embezzlement of 
resettlement funds has also been alleged and thus local officials became the main targets of protest 
(Beattie, 2002).  
Local governments have been criticised and the target of protest in the process of land acquisition 
for urban expansion as well. According to scholars, local governments play a key role in promoting 
urban development and land acquisition. For instance, Cao et al. (2008) explored the land transition 
system and economic situation in China in 2005, and asserted that local governments have strong 
incentives to lease land at a very low price to attract more manufacturing companies which will 
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generate local Gross Domestic Product and employment. Accordingly, local governments will 
acquire communally-held village land at a low price by paying relatively little compensation to the 
peasants who previously had collective rights to that land
14
 (Cao et al., 2008). Ding and 
Lichtenberg (2011) likewise maintain that local governments have been eager to convert land from 
communally-owned rural land to local-government-controlled urban land because it is beneficial to 
economic development to do so. However, Ding and Lichtenberg (2011), and some other scholars, 
also argue that local governments have sought to profit from land conversion and collect money for 
government expenditure or private gain by selling land use rights to companies at a high price but 
paying rural residents low compensation (Ding, 2007; X. Li, 2011; X. Li et al., 2010). 
The low compensation to villagers for their loss of land rights is one of the main reasons for rural 
protest (X. Li, 2011). Yu (2007) has estimated that 65 per cent of cases of rural protest have 
involved land-lost peasants specifically wanting to retrieve their lands or asking for more 
compensation. In analysing the land tenure system and current laws and rules of compensation in 
China, Chan (2003) found that the compensation system lacks uniform standards and transparent 
procedures, and thus cannot protect peasants from administrative abuses such as granting only low 
compensation. Guo (2001), who followed a protest in the village of Baiyan in Yunnan Province, 
explains that, once deprived of their land, villagers felt insecure because of the meagre 
compensation as well as the lack of alternative employment opportunities. This insecurity about 
inadequate compensation is supported by Zhang and Lu’s (2011) analysis of the function of 
compensation in rebuilding land-lost peasants’ long term livelihoods. They assert that inadequate 
compensation exposes peasants to the risk of future impoverishment (Zhang & Lu, 2011). Thus, a 
number of studies have found that low compensation increases peasants’ feeling of dissatisfaction 
and the likelihood of protest.  
The forcible measures used in land acquisition have been another cause for villagers’ protest (Guo, 
2001; Yu, 2011). Yu (2011) regards compulsory acquisition as the focus of rural protest related to 
land acquisition. He points out that the procedures of compulsory acquisition, exacerbated by low 
compensation and forcible evictions, violate rural residents’ rights. In addition, such situations 
                                               
14The unique land conversion system is described in the Introduction chapter.  
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exhibit the lack of a just judicial system in which rural people can seek retribution or fairer 
outcomes via institutional ways. Thus, villagers in the past have resorted to protests (Yu, 2011). The 
case of Baiyan village is an example of this, with villagers becoming outraged when township 
government officials entered the village late at night banging on doors and forcing the reluctant 
householders to accept compensation payments (Guo, 2001). 
Yu is not the only person to criticise the inadequacy of the legal and judicial system in relation to 
land acquisition. Zhao (2009) analysed the relationship between land acquisition and rural protest 
from the perspective of legal consideration. He noted that the vague definition of “public interest” 
and the ambiguous nature of collective land ownership are two flaws of legal regulations which 
have enabled local governments’ abuse of land acquisition (Zhao, 2009). Moreover, as the judicial 
system was partly under the control of the administration and government officials could intervene 
in trials, some illegal land grabbing avoided penalty because of administrative intervention (Zhao, 
2009). Thus Zhao has concluded that fundamental reform to China’s legal and political system is 
required to effectively prevent further conflicts over land in the near future (Zhao, 2009).  
Local cadres’ corrupt behaviour, low compensation, forcible measures and the lack of legal ways to 
address dissatisfaction have contributed to protests in opposition to land acquisition. Open conflicts 
are especially likely to happen when rural residents confront developers who hire many workers to 
develop the land acquired from local governments (Guo, 2001). Moreover, in some cases, local 
government is involved in the conflicts and police are convened to repress the protests which 
further stimulates rural people’s anger and precipitates sometimes violent clashes with police and 
government officials (Lin, 2010; Zhao, 2009).  
2.4.2 The Wukan protest reviewed 
The Wukan protest was a typical case in which villagers conflicted with local cadres. It has been 
explored by many other scholars seeking to understand the phenomenon of Chinese rural protest (Y. 
Chen, 2012; Hess, 2015), which they have done from four main perspectives: the role of the media 
in reporting the protest and its impact on how the protest played out (Hess, 2015; Masterson, 2015); 
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the factors influencing the emergence and development of the protest (Hou, 2012; Lu, Zheng, & 
Wang, 2017); the ways various levels of government have dealt with the protest (Fu, 2014); and the 
state-society relationships revealed in the protest (He & Xue, 2014). 
Due to its frequent involvement during the protest, social media such as Sina Micro-blog (similar to 
Twitter in other countries) is claimed to have played a vital role in the protest. Liu (2014) asserts 
that by skipping censorship and communicating with outsiders via Micro-blog, the Wukan 
protesters not only expressed their discontent, anger, and appeals toward the local Governments, but 
also received information about governments’ changing responses such as suppression and 
compromise. Those exchanges of information, altered the trajectory of the protest. Thus, Liu (2014) 
concludes that the rapid development of new Information and Communication Technologies, and 
the ubiquity of the internet, is influencing the dynamics of contentious politics in China. Masterson 
(2015) is another scholar who has explored the role of social media in Chinese politics. He argues 
that social media offers opportunities for governments to connect with society; gauge citizens’ 
opinions in the public domain; and have citizens voice their anger online rather than in the streets. It 
also allows citizens to access outside information and communicate with other citizens, thereby 
facilitating unity and collective action, which finally prompts the Chinese governments to take 
action, including to reverse unpopular decisions and policies.  
Making a similar point about the traditional media, Hess (2015) suggests that the Wukan protest 
may represent a watershed in terms of the tactics applied by claimants because of the way protesters 
called upon global audiences for help. He believes that appealing directly to foreign media can help 
claimants increase their leverage over local officials and prompt interventions from higher levels of 
government. Likewise, population mobility can also assist in securing information from outside in 
the event of local protests. Lu and his colleagues (2017) noticed that the rural migration that 
accompanied rapid urbanisation brought great changes to popular resistance in rural China. They 
argue that returned migrants act as conduits for transmission of information and ideology and 
sometimes directly participate in or even lead rural resistance because political consciousness and 
action orientations have been developed among them during their urban sojourn. 
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Besides information, other elements have been identified as influencing the process of the Wukan 
protest’s development, such as religious groups and traditions. Hou (2013) considers the divine 
immortal Zhenxiu and the religious rite of casting Gua
15
 to have had a powerful influence on the 
Wukan protest. By worshipping the immortal and casting an auspicious holy Gua, Hou (2013) 
suggests that protesters were convinced that the protest would be successful, and this strengthened 
protesters’ solidarity and enthusiasm for participating in the protest. Another cultural element that 
helped establish collective identity is the clan system in the village. He and Xue (2014) argue that 
urban expansion and land grabs have weakened collective identity in Chinese rural society because 
many rural residents have since left to become city dwellers. But in the Wukan case, kinship 
networks played a critical role in reconstituting the collective identity which helped to generate a 
communal resistance that is judged to have successfully reclaimed governing power and social 
order (He & Xue, 2014).  
As outlined in Chapter One the Wukan protest ended with concession when the Provincial 
Government agreed to support open elections in the village and return some land. The open election 
initially kindled outside observers’ confidence in Chinese grassroots democracy. For example, Zhu 
(2012) suggests that the Wukan case demonstrates that Chinese people are ready for democracy, 
while Jacob and Jamil (2012) regard the election as offering a democratic model for China. 
However, Hua, Hou and Deng (2016) deem the self-governance that resulted from the election was 
not necessarily a harbinger of the emergence of bottom-up civil society but an assertion of 
top-down control and that elections such as that which appeared in Wukan will not easily be 
established in other villages. By intervening and solving this protest, rather than demonstrating the 
potential for local democracy, the Central Government demonstrated its capability of controlling 
local governments, fighting local corruption, and stabilising its authority (Hua et al., 2016).  
2.5 Chinese rural protest in a broader context 
In attempting to make sense of the recent phenomenon of protest in rural China as villagers seek to 
                                               
15 Gua have two sides, one is plain and the other is curved. Different arrangements of these two sides when two Gua are cast 
together have different meanings. Villagers treat these meanings to be expressed by the immortals. The most auspicious one is holy 
Gua – one plain and one curved, which means the immortal is very glad and the event will goes smoothly. 
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exert their rights and resist the acquisition of their land, it is important to embed these events in a 
wider context and to show how they relate to broader processes of rural protest and the assertion of 
rural citizens’ rights internationally. Indeed, as in China, land issues have triggered rural unrest 
elsewhere. Researchers have commonly employed the terms “land grab/grabbing” in describing 
both compulsory and market land acquisition in developing countries (see Borras et al., 2011; 
Borras & Franco, 2012; De Schutter, 2011; Hall, 2011; Schneider, 2011). This reflects the way such 
transactions frequently lack free, prior and informed consent by land-users, and is carried out 
corruptly without proper democratic participation (Borras et al., 2011). According to the World 
Bank (2011), 45 million hectares of land were acquired in 2010 around the world, of which 70 per 
cent was in Africa. Unlike land acquisition in China which is enacted by the Chinese state for urban 
development, these lands are largely acquired by foreign investors to produce food for consumption 
within the country or biofuels for export (Hall & Lobina, 2012). Indeed, China is one of the major 
investors acquiring lands in other countries (Hall, 2011) in an attempt to ease its food security 
concerns caused by the conversion of Chinese rural lands into urban areas. 
Like their colleagues studying Chinese land acquisition, researchers examining international 
examples of land grabbing have mainly observed the harmful consequences of the process by rural 
populations. By examining the phenomenon in Kenya (Klopp, 2000), South Africa (Hall, 2011), 
Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2000) and other developing counties (Greco, 2013), scholars argue that land 
grabs are a major threat to the lives and livelihoods of the rural poor because land means social 
status and a lifeline for poor rural households (Borras et al., 2011). Just like China, concerns over 
poverty, landlessness, food insecurity and environmental degradation have also sparked rural 
protests in these countries as a reaction to global land grabs (Safransky & Wolford, 2011). 
However, most scholars insist popular resistance induced by land in Africa is weak and hard to 
notice because in many colonised countries there were traditionally large holdings run by a 
dominant white minority (Allan, 2012). But after following the transformation of what she viewed 
as covert peasant resistance (involving trespassing, un-authorised utilisation of privately owned land, 
and refusal to recognise large landowners' property rights) into open political protest such as protest 
marches, Korovkin (2000) argued that the rise of indigenous organisations in the context of 
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capitalist expansion and political democratisation have driven those public protests. Greco (2013) 
agrees and notices a tendency to redistribute land to medium-and small-scale black farmers, 
suggesting that struggle and resistance over lands are increasing in Africa.  
Also induced by land grabs, protesters in Indonesia have demonstrated publicly for their land rights 
and asked for land grabbing to cease as they regard the expropriation of people's rights over land as 
a real form of deprivation (Lucas & Warren, 2003). Professional organisations such as the Pasundan 
Peasant Union and the Bengkulu Peasant Union were established and have played important roles in 
mobilising peasants to participate in collective actions, including land occupations, mass 
demonstrations and negotiation with the government (Anugrah, 2015). Finally, these actions have 
successfully achieved land redistribution in the West Java Province and led to some laws on 
agrarian reforms both at the local and national levels. As actions were sustained, organised and 
connected with some transnational movements, this series of action is called a “movement” by 
scholars (Anugrah, 2015; Lee-Peluso, Afiff, & Rachman, 2008).  
While peasant movements relating to land in Indonesia have developed to a provincial level of 
action, some rural movements spread nationally even internationally. Via Campesina is a typical one. 
This movement was initially fostered in Brazil where peasants held several protests during the past 
decades to oppose the global trade in local agricultural produce. Welch (2006) explains that from 
the 1940s, Brazil began a process of great agrarian transformations associated with deregulated 
global trade. From then on, greater foreign investment and involvement of transnational 
corporations in Brazilian agriculture, and other characteristics of globalisation, led to the loss of 
millions of farm livelihoods which, in turn, prompted peasant protests over the years. Since 1993 
when Via Campesina was founded, the movement has spread beyond Brazil and brings together 
organisations of peasants, small and medium-scale farmers, rural women, farm workers and 
indigenous agrarian communities in Asia, the Americas, Western Europe and Eastern Europe 
(Desmarais, 2002). Desmarais (2002) has explored the formation, consolidation and function of Via 
Campesina, and asserts that it uses “organisation, cooperation and community” to redefine rural 
development and to build an alternative model based on gender, ethnic and economic equity, and 
environmental sustainability (Desmarais, 2002, p91). However, this movement has not reached 
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China, partly because the Chinese economy has been sheltered from globalisation to a large extent, 
thereby protecting peasants from exposure to its detrimental effects (Miyat, Minot, & Hu, 2009).  
While rural protests in the Global South have focused on issues including land rights and agrarian 
reform and modernisation, rural protesters in the Global North have mainly mobilised around the 
degradation of rural environments or rural life and rural identity (Almeida & Stearns, 1998; Larsen, 
2008; Reed, 2004; Woods, 1998). Protesters aim at agricultural issues only infrequently because in 
the industrially developed countries, farmers’ organisations are well developed and powerful and 
can thus exert pressure on governments via institutional ways (Landsberger, 1974). Even more, 
environmentalism has, to a considerable extent, become institutionalised (Rootes, 2003). 
Environmental protection agencies have been established and have been accorded increasing 
powers, while national ministries of the environment have been formed and are no longer consigned 
to the peripheries of government (Rootes, 2003).  
Rural residents in developed countries have also launched protests to protect rural life and rural 
identity. Woods (1998), for example, has followed a rural conflict in southwest England against the 
ban on the hunting of wild animals with houndHe notes that those protesting against the ban are 
conservative, largely agricultural elites who traditionally dominated local power and engage in 
recreational hunting, and that what they are protesting is the threat to what they see as their 
traditional rural way of life (Woods, 1998). More generally, Woods (2003) points out that disputes 
over the legality of hunting and field sports, or of housing and road developments, are expressions 
of rural people’s demands to preserve their traditional rural lifestyle and culture (Woods, 2003). 
Moreover, he suggests that protesters are defending a distinctly rural identity rather than a set of 
material interests (Woods, 2003). Reed (2004) similarly found evidence of protesters’ pursuit of 
traditional rural life in the rural protest movement in the UK from 1996 to 2001. However, he 
concluded that the movement failed to become established because it failed to form a shared sense 
of collective identity amongst those living in rural areas (Reed, 2004). 
Nonetheless, this sort of action is rare in China because while rural life is linked to a privileged 
lifestyle and freedom in some Western countries, rural life in China has traditionally been associated 
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with poverty as a result of the Central Government’s discrimination against rural areas in the past 
(Walker, 2008; Zhao, 2009). In China, rural people are eager to earn their living in cities and 
transfer to urban resident status because of the huge income gap between those cultivating crops 
and those undertaking other forms of work in the city (Lu & Chen, 2004; Zhang & Song, 2003). 
Thus, although there is frequently opposition to land acquisition, protests for the protection and 
preservation of rural identity and traditional rural life have barely emerged in China.  
It can be concluded from the above that there are both similarities and differences between rural 
protest in China and in other countries. In terms of similarities, both the loss of land and unpopular 
projects have been common causes of rural unrest. Like China, land struggle induced by changes of 
land ownership and use rights has appeared in other countries. Secondly, scholars agree that 
political opportunities vary in different periods, which partly determines the emergence and result 
of rural protests. However, there are some obvious differences. First, the causes for rural unrest are 
different, especially between countries of the Global North and China. For instance, protests for 
rural identities and rural life have been absent in Chinese society, as are any movements against 
globalisation. Second, rural protests in China are localised and small scale while the recent wave of 
rural protests and campaigns in other countries appear to be a part of social movement or new social 
movement, which suggests they are spreading nationally even internationally. Take Via Campesina 
as an example. It has members throughout the world in 69 counties and has carried out several 
campaigns for agrarian reform and other concerns (Desmarais, 2002; Welch, 2006). It is thus 
regarded as a social movement.  
2.6 Conclusion  
The general consensus in the range of studies profiled in this chapter is that rural unrest in China 
has some distinctive characteristics in comparison with many other protests, whether in China or 
abroad. Firstly, Chinese rural unrest has specific aims linked to substantive interests and benefits, a 
feature which it appears to share in common with workers’ protest in China (O’Brien, 2002; Yu, 
2007) while it contrasts with students holding protests that have previously targeted political change 
and democratic improvement (Wright, 1999). This has been suggested as the reason why the Central 
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Gvernment shows a more tolerant attitude toward worker protests and rural unrest than it does to 
students agitating for political change and posing a threat to the political regime (Bernstein & Lü, 
2003; O’Brien, 2009a).  
Secondly, Chinese rural collective actions tend to protest against the injustice or impropriety of 
local governments or local cadres. This adoption of local governments as the target of rural unrest 
can be contrasted with labour protests which have mainly opposed corporate enterprises; the student 
protests targeting the Central Government; and the anti-globalisation movement objecting to 
transnational corporations and inequitable global trade relations. Moreover, most Chinese rural 
participants have expressed their support for, reliance and dependence on, the Central Government 
(Guo, 2001; Yu, 2003). Indeed, sometimes they undertake collective actions in order to call the 
attention of higher-level leaders to particular grievances in anticipation of support for their cause 
(Bernstein, 2004). 
Thirdly, Chinese rural unrest has been mostly parochial and weakly organised. Since rural residents 
have had specific locally-relevant aims, and their main targets have been local governments, their 
actions are often limited to a small region, usually within a county (O’Brien, 2002). Also, although 
Yu (2003) witnessed a well-organised rural protest in Hunan Province, scholars generally argue that 
rural collective action in China is weakly organised and lacks the resources and leadership for 
stronger organisation (Li & O’Brien, 1996; O’Brien, 2009a; Perry, 2002). 
In summary, protests in Chinese rural areas are induced by specific infringements on people’s rights 
such as collection of tax and levies or land acquisition and relocation. They typically occur at a 
local level, under a favourable political environment in which rural people focus on the 
shortcomings of local level governments while enlisting central government rules to support their 
cause. However, there are few thorough analysis about the developing process of a protest, which 
offers a gap for me to contribute to. Taking the Wukan protest as an example, I will explore the 
causes, opportunities and strategies of a Chinese rural protest by applying social movement theory. 
The conceptual framework that I used for this analysis is provided in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3  
Chinese rural collective action through a social 
movement theory lens 
3.1 Introduction 
As suggested in the first chapter, the Wukan protest is an ideal case for analysing rural protest in 
modern China because it shows a complete process progressing from individual resistance to mass 
protest which involved more than 6,000 villagers. My aim in studying this case is to probe why and 
how this protest developed; what outcome it brought; and whether the protest is indicative of any 
evolving rural social movement in China. Approaches of social movement theory offer me an 
opportunity to understand the mechanisms of both collective protests and social movements in order 
to address this latter question. Previous scholars of social movements have studied the emergence 
and the development process, as well as the outcomes of collective actions from the perspective of 
both personal emotions (Blumer, 1951; Gurr, 1970) and social structures (McAdam, McCarthy, & 
Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). These explanations not only help me to grasp the reasons for the Wukan 
protest, but also to comprehend the outcomes of the protest and the distinctions between the protest 
and a movement. In this chapter, I will introduce concepts and models that will be employed in the 
subsequent analysis chapters.  
Primarily, I will examine the opportunities, resources and strategies adopted by the protesters. As I 
outline later, opportunities do not merely arise at the local level in terms of new spaces being 
created for protest to take place, but also emerge at the broader, structural level when the political 
background becomes favourable to the generation of a protest. By “resources” I refer to the 
knowledge, connections, information and other such assets that protesters draw on to mobilise 
others and enrol them into their campaign. “Strategies” are the repertoire of tactics deployed to 
convince people of the value of the protest and to enhance its effectiveness. By exploring these 
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elements, the influencing factors of both the process and outcomes of the protest will be revealed.  
Enquiries about these issues are not unique to the Wukan protest. Indeed, four main approaches of 
social movement theory (collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, political opportunity and 
framing theory) have investigated social movements to offer interpretations for similar cases. These 
concepts from social movement theory can be drawn on to explain the Wukan protest without 
necessarily assuming that the protest also constitutes a social movement. Indeed, the characteristics 
of a social movement will be discussed in the final section of this chapter, providing the criteria to 
later consider the question of whether the Wukan protest can be seen as a part of broader rural social 
movement in China.  
In this chapter, I begin by briefly outlining the evolution of social movement theory, identifying 
four approaches of the theory to explain the personal reasons for participating in collective action, 
the resources, and opportunities required for launching a collective action, and the strategies applied 
to mobilise protesters and express outrage. However, these theories in isolation do not allow me to 
fully explain the Wukan protest so I turn to the Political Process model which was proposed by 
McAdam (1982) in his analysis of the black civil rights movement in America, and which 
represents a synthesis and development of the four approaches to social movement theory that I will 
outline.  
In recognising the multiple interconnected factors identified by the four approaches to social 
movement theory, McAdam’s model provides a systematic way for me to understand the Wukan 
protest. The history and background of the model in terms of its evolution from earlier social 
movement theories are explained, as well as the core features of the model itself. According to 
McAdam, when a grievance exists, three separate but interconnected factors are necessary for 
collective action to take place. These are political opportunities, indigenous organisations, and 
cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1982). Political opportunities will be discussed first. As explained 
above, these incorporate both the resources available to people in forming collective action and the 
possibilities of challenging authority which may be afforded, particularly as a result of changing 
political contexts. The role of indigenous organisations, meaning existing local organisations and 
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associated social networks which provide the human and financial resources needed for mass 
protest, will be expounded as the second factor. Then I will elaborate on the concept of “cognitive 
liberation” (McAdam, 1982, p43), which relates to the process of generating a protest, including the 
strategies used by activists or protest leaders to mobilise people by giving them new ways of 
thinking about, and understanding, their situation.  
The third part of the chapter will critically examine the Political Process model noting both the 
range of applications it suits and its limitations. This will begin with a review of the way McAdam’s 
work has been picked up by subsequent scholars in China and other countries. However, although 
the Political Process model is a useful theory for me to understand the emergence of protest, it has 
been criticised (Gamson, 1995; Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). I note key points of the critique and show 
later that there are features of rural protest that the model does not address.  
The final part of this chapter focuses on the key elements of social movements as a distinctive form 
of protest. According to Tilly (2005), collective actions can be understood as social movements 
when they involve collective campaigns that target authorities; when campaigners employ modern 
repertoires; and when participants display their worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment. 
However, drawing from Tilly’s (2005) examination of the history of social movements, social 
movements also appear to involve protest actions that spread across the national scale and target 
institutional issues. Under such conditions, a successful social movement will bring institutional 
achievements, such as a change in the composition of political agendas of the content of policy 
proposals; the adoption of new legislation; and/or a change in the provision of public or collective 
goods (Kolb, 2007). It is against these criteria of a social movement that the Wukan protest is 
analysed in Chapter Six to consider whether the protest is a sign of an emerging rural social 
movement or whether it is simply a local protest with specific local targets and aims.  
3.2 Social movement theory: history, development and perspectives 
My broad conceptual framework for the first research question is McAdam’s Political Process 
model (McAdam, 1982), which is a part of the broad body of work known as social movement 
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theory. Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises seeking to establish a new 
political and social order (Blumer, 1951). They have their inception in a condition of unrest and 
derive their motive power on one hand, from dissatisfaction with the current form of life and, on the 
other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new system of living (Blumer, 1951). From these 
definitions and through the historical development of the theory, we find that it is not only applied 
to study social movements as specific forms of collective action, but also other instances of 
purposeful, rational and organised collective action.  
This draws attention to the difference between the broader concept of collective action and social 
movements. Collective action, which consists of many people acting together in pursuit of common 
interests (Tilly, 1978), is a common phenomenon in modern society. It can take many forms: 
peaceful or violent, brief or sustained, institutionalised or disruptive (Tarrow, 1998). But, unlike 
institutional collective actions such as elections, the collective action studied in social movement 
theory is “contentious” (Tarrow, 1998, p3), whereby people who lack regular access to 
policy-making institutions take action to protest about their situation or to claim new demands in a 
way that challenges others or authorities. When these actions confront the authorities (usually, but 
not always, governments), they are also defined as “contentious politics” (Tarrow, 1998, p2). Tilly 
explains that they are “contentious in the sense that the claims or demands being made conflict with 
someone’s else interests, and political in the sense that the government is an element of the action, 
whether as claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the contention” (Tilly, 
2005, p11). This contentious politics is actually a kind of non-institutional political behaviour 
(Turner & Killian, 1957).  
Social movements, defined by Tarrow (1998, p2) as “sequences of contentious politics that are 
based on underlying social networks… which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges 
against powerful opponents”, are a specific example of a unified group engaging in collective action 
which challenges authorities. Although sustaining collective action may involve additional 
prerequisites such as “campaign”; “application of modern repertoires”; and the display of 
worthiness of the cause unity of the collectivity, a large number of campaigners and commitments 
among participants (Tilly, 2005, p5), scholars have emphasised the resources, opportunities and 
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strategies required to initiate all forms of contentious politics (Tarrow, 1998). Hence it is possible to 
explore the Wukan protest using some of the theories and concepts of social movement theory 
without presuming that Wukan is indicative of a broader rural social movement sweeping across 
China.  
By reviewing the evolution of social movement theory, we can gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the factors that are critical to the emergence of collective actions such as individual motives, 
resources for mobilisation, political opportunities and strategies. This can be understood by 
examining four schools of social movement theory: collective behaviour theory, resource 
mobilisation theory, political opportunity theory, and framing theory.  
Turning to the first of these, early scholars mainly analysed collective actions from a micro 
perspective by exploring individual motives for participating in collective action, or engaging in 
“collective behaviour” (Blumer, 1951; Smelser, 1963; Turner & Killian, 1957). In one of the earliest 
studies of collective behaviour, enacted during the French Revolution in the late 1700s, Le Bon 
(1921) observed that individuals are usually rational and polite. However, in large gatherings, 
emotions are infectious among the crowd, which makes participants irrational and easily prompted 
to follow others in mob or collective actions (Le Bon, 1921). Thus, Le Bon gave insight into the 
role of emotions in triggering spontaneous eruptions of deviant or mob-like behaviour. Although 
later researchers applying collective behaviour theory did not agree with Le Bon’s claim that 
large-scale movements rendered individuals irrational, they adopted Le Bon’s psychological angle 
and observation that emotions are an important catalyst of collective action (see Blumer, 1951; Gurr, 
1970).      
In the 1950s Blumer (1951) introduced some sociological elements into Le Bon’s psychological 
analysis. Although recognising that emotions spread among people participating in collective action, 
Blumer pointed out that broader processes of social change were also influential factors because 
they could stimulate people’s emotional reactions (Blumer, 1951). This societal impact was 
subsequently stressed by Gurr (1970) who argued that people may feel deprived as a result of social 
change. Gurr (1970) focused on the anxiety, depression and feelings of deprivation that can be 
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provoked by changes such as urbanisation and industrialisation and which lead people to participate 
in collective action as a result. Gurr argued that this is most likely to occur when the changes 
experienced dramatically reduce people’s opportunities to fulfil their expectations in line with their 
perception of self-worth. Thus, unlike Le Bon who treated collective action as spontaneous 
eruptions, Blumer and Gurr saw it as a more reasoned response to strong feelings about the broader 
social context. What they all had in common, however, was a tendency to explore the catalyst of 
collective actions from the micro perspective of human emotions. Subsequently dubbed “classical 
theory” by later scholars (McAdam, 1982, p1), this body of research – especially Blumer and Gurr’s 
emphasis on the link between emotional responses to social change and collective protest – has 
provided valuable insights into the reasons for collective action. However critics of this approach 
have argued that these scholars were too focused on the impacts of individual motives and emotions 
and ignored the influence of other social elements (such as economic and political situations) on the 
generation of collective actions (Oberschall, 1973).  
This leads to the second body of work: resource mobilisation theory. Later scholars pointed out that 
grievances do not inevitably lead to collective action and that resources such as money, materials, 
people and technology are also crucial elements for generating successful collective action 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977b). They argued that with more funds and other resources, it is possible for 
groups to act as mobilising agents specifically with regard to mobilising more participants. 
Among valuable resources, McCarthy and Zald specifically argued that a mobilising organisation 
(which they named a “social movement organisation”) (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a, p1213) has a vital 
role in generating a social movement because it works to mobilise participants and collect resources. 
Writing in the 1970s, they regarded that the trend in America for social movements was 
professionalisation, which meant that the mobilising organisations were becoming formal 
organisations with paid staff dedicated to mobilising wider collective action (McCarthy & Zald, 
1977b). This is because, with more funding and material resources, mobilising organisations could 
recruit skilled professionals into paid jobs to mobilise more participants. Their observation has been 
validated by the development of social movement organisations (Davis et al, 2005), especially the 
blooming of advocacy NGOs (Doh & Guay, 2006; Fisher, 1997; Reilly, 1995).  
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The stress on resources and mobilising organisations is the important contribution of resource 
mobilisation theory to the analysis of the economic context and its impacts on the generation of a 
social movement (Della Porta & Diani, 2009). However, later scholars such as Tilly and McAdam 
criticised this model for being indifferent to political conditions, which are essential for most 
collective actions (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). 
In their emphasis on the significance of political conditions, Tilly and McAdam agreed with the 
power elite model which was previously proposed by Hunter (1953), Mills (1956) and others. Those 
scholars argued that political, economic and military power is controlled by elites rather than 
ordinary citizens. Tilly developed their argument into a “Polity model” (see Figure 3-1) in which he 
asserted that the American polity is a relatively closed one which is dominated by insiders (Tilly, 
1978, p52). Tilly characterised the polity as consisting of “government” and other “members” 
(usually big companies or financial groups) (Tilly, 1978, p53). Outsiders, who do not have regular 
access to the decision-making process, and whose interests may differ from those of the ruling elite, 
are likely to turn to collective action to bargain for their interests. As collective action will challenge 
the stability of the polity, the outsiders were called “challengers” (Tilly, 1978, p53). Generally, 
members were allied with government, but sometimes the relationship between government and 
members changes and some members ally with challengers. Re-alignments between members and 
challengers, as well as the government’s attitude toward collective oppositional action and its 
capacity to repress challengers, will influence the emergence and mobilisation of collective action 
(Tilly, 1978). Tilly's proposition, and the work of other researchers (McAdam, 1996; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996; Oberschall, 1978) who extended it and gave further insight into the political 
context and its impacts on the emergence of collective actions, are together recognised as “political 
opportunity theory” (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p1457), which is the third body of work.  
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Figure 3-1: Polity model (Tilly 1978, p53) 
Political opportunity theory analyses social movements in a structural way through reference to 
state-society relations and their influence on social movements. However, later scholars such as 
Snow and colleagues (1986) pointed out that relations between government, opposing groups and 
participants are not stable, but constantly changing. Among the factors shaping this change process 
are the strategies of protesters, activists or mobilising organisations who interpret issues and events 
in ways that motivate and facilitate widespread participation in collective actions. Those strategies 
are the main object of framing theory, the fourth body of social movement theory.  
Framing theory explains the psychological dynamics that take place when grievances and solutions 
are presented in a way that “encourages aggrieved people to turn to collective actions as a way to 
redress their problems” (Snow et al., 1986, p12). For social movement theorists, the concept of 
framing refers to “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of 
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the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996, p7). 
The framing process focuses on the variables identified as likely to motivate people to participate in 
collective action rather than remain passive bystanders (Valocchi, 2005). Thus, it is central to 
understanding the strategies that are adopted by activists or mobilising organisations. Those 
strategies include using slogans or catchphrases, linking with the media to disseminate information, 
and also attracting the attention of outsiders with the aim of eliciting broader sympathy for their 
cause (Johnston & Noakes, 2005). One purpose of framing is to link a particular interpretation of 
social circumstances to the direct interests or emotions of potential challengers so as to attract 
people’s attention and support (Zhao, 2006) and recruit more people into the collective action. 
Framing can also serve to avoid harsh repression from government by gauging the thresholds and 
limits of the government and portraying the issues within those boundaries or frames (Zhao, 2006).  
3.3 The Political Process model as a synthesis of social movement 
approaches 
The Political Process model, has synthesised collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, political 
process and framing theory and will be used for the analysis. The model was first proposed by 
McAdam in his book Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (1982) 
to explain the emergence of the black civil rights movement in America during the 1960s. In the era 
when the two approaches of resource mobilisation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977b) and political 
opportunity (Tarrow & Tollefson, 1994; Tilly, 1978) were the mainstream of social movement 
theory, McAdam’s model was an endorsement and development of these approaches. Following 
these works, McAdam argued that resources, especially existing social networks among participants, 
are important to generate a social movement. More broadly, he also proposed that the power 
relations between challengers and governments are subject to change and such changes can offer 
some opportunities for generating a social movement (McAdam, 1982). At the same time, McAdam 
also analysed individuals’ motives for participating in collective actions, drawing on more classic 
formulations of collective action and social movement theory, as outlined earlier. These three 
schools (classical, resource mobilisation and political opportunities) were brought together by 
McAdam to become three requisites for raising a social movement.  
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McAdam defined these three requisites as “expanding political opportunities, well organised 
indigenous organisational strength, and cognitive liberation” (McAdam, 1982, p33). In his 
exposition of these elements, McAdam discussed political opportunities and indigenous 
organisations before cognitive liberation because they are precursors to the formation of a social 
movement whereas cognitive liberation is more of a trigger. McAdam argued that they interact with 
each other and, in combination, promote the emergence of a social movement.  
Political opportunities, which refer to favourable political conditions for collective action, are the 
first element for launching a social movement in McAdam’s model. The concept of political 
opportunity is developed from Tilly (1978). Tilly argued that since there is a power imbalance 
between what he called polity “insiders” (including government and other political elites) and 
“outsiders” (Tilly, 1978, p5), it is essential for some polity insiders to be supportive of the outsiders 
if the latter are to be successful in raising opposing action (Tilly, 1978). The term “political 
opportunity” describes the degree to which the political climate allows collective action. This can 
occur in two ways. On one hand, governments can facilitate collective action by tolerating it, or 
failing to repress it (Tilly, 1978). On the other, the support of other members of the polity (such as 
business elites) can help to organise collective action by bringing both resources (such as financial 
funds) and power to the challengers (Tilly, 1978). McAdam applied these concepts of “members” 
and “challengers” (McAdam 1982, p141), suggesting that challengers, as outsiders to the polity or 
political system, do not have a regular way to redress their grievances. However, in his own study, 
McAdam did not see support from insiders or members of the polity as particularly significant. 
Indeed, by analysing the source of funding and other resources, McAdam identified that the 
majority of resources used in the US black rights movement during the 1960s were collected from 
the participants or challengers (McAdam, 1982). Thus, unlike Tilly, McAdam rejected the 
likelihood of supportive influence being provided by elite groups and instead saw political 
opportunity largely in terms of the government’s attitude toward collective action.  
Nevertheless, he extended the concept of political opportunity in another, significant way, 
identifying the increased power of aggrieved people as itself opening up further political 
opportunitieHe argued that any observed decrease in the power imbalance between aggrieved 
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people and government was not only due to the tolerant attitude of the government, but also due to 
resources gained among the aggrieved groups that empowered them. According to McAdam, 
resources can influence political power as well. His argument echoed McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) 
proposition that the more resources aggrieved groups accumulate, the more likely they are to launch 
collective action. In McAdam's model, the two concepts of “political opportunity” and “resources” 
are not separate, but interact with each other. For example, large-scale processes of industrialisation 
and urbanisation helped to alter the power relations between different groups in society by bringing 
more material resources and knowledge to African Americans. This worked to increase the political 
strength of African Americans and thus their bargaining position, thereby creating new 
opportunities for pursuing group goals. Moreover, their improved bargaining position increased the 
costs of repressing collective actions which further reduced the power discrepancy and opened 
opportunities for mobilising action.  
Insofar as Tilly and McAdams’s ideas apply to the Chinese context of my thesis, McAdam’s 
framework of political opportunity holds more meaning and utility. Tilly’s Polity model does not fit 
the Chinese situation well because the “members” of the polity or elites beyond the government and 
the CCP are hard to discern. Unlike in America, where other polity members are corporations, 
financial groups or other such actors, China does not have other political parties or independent 
mass media which hold power. Also, since marketisation and capitalist development only began in 
the early 1980s, and entrepreneurs have not been allowed to join the Communist Party since 2002, it 
is difficult to say that capitalists are members of the polity (Huang, 2008; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 
1988). This is supported by examining past protests in China where, aside from intellectuals and 
NGOs, few supporters within the Party have been found (see O’Brien, 2008a; Otsuka, 2009). Thus, 
it is difficult to calculate the elite’s effects on collective action. But, as Chinese governments 
(including central, provincial and local governments) have great power to suppress collective 
actions, their attitudes certainly influence the opportunities to generate and achieve change by a 
mass protest. Under conditions where governments, especially the national government, show 
sympathy toward rural protest, considerable opportunities for rural protesters are provided.  
In addition, the decreasing power discrepancy between protesters and authority can also come about 
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through an increase in the power of rural protesters themselves. By collecting more resources, such 
as gathering more participants and more financial support, they will gain a relatively favourable 
position. One reason for this is that the government will recognise the greater cost of repressing 
large numbers of people, suggesting the strategic value of demonstrating numbers (Tilly, 2005). As 
well, with more participants, personal relationships and social networks will begin to influence 
government leaders’ decisions via non-institutional means as Wang and Woods (2013) showed in 
Taiwan where Guanxi (meaning inter-personal relationships) influenced the development of 
environmental movements. They argue that movement leaders who maintained a positive personal 
relationship with officials via gifts or "Renqing" (meaning kindly mutual connection), were treated 
more “leniently” by authority (Wang & Woods, 2013, p202). In Chinese society, Guanxi and 
Renqing are traditional customs, which affect interpersonal relationships in a non-institutional way 
(Kipnis, 1997; Wang, 2007; Wang, Siu, & Barnes, 2008). Likewise, interpersonal relationships can 
exert influence on rural protest in China. Generally, rural residents who are better educated or have 
better economic conditions will have connections with local cadres. Their enrolment into collective 
actions will influence governments’ or, more specifically, local cadres’ attitude toward the collective 
action. While this may seem to support the claims of Tilly’s Polity model which says that 
alignments with members will increase challengers’ power, in China, even local rural elites cannot 
be understood as “members” of a polity. Although they have personal connections with local cadres, 
they cannot influence government decisions through routine means. Instead, they are better 
understood as a kind of resource which poses some impacts on political power patterns.  
Related to resources and to relationship networks, a second component of the Political Process 
model is the prominent role of mobilising organisations. McCarthy and Zald argue that within 
modern social movements, organising agents – otherwise called “social movement organisations” 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977a, p1219) – are extremely important. These organisations work to raise and 
manage funds, along with selecting, mobilising, training and replacing members (McCarthy & Zald, 
1977a). McAdam paid attention to the role of organisations, but he particularly emphasised 
“indigenous organisations”, which pointed to the well-connected social networks and existing 
organisations of the society that could be mobilised into action (McAdam, 1982, p33). In his study 
of the black civil rights movement, these pre-existing organisations were the black college, the 
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black church and the National Association of the Advancement of Coloured People. McAdam 
asserted that such organisations afforded four crucial resources for mobilising for collective action 
(McAdam, 1982).  
The first resource is members
16
. McAdam suggests that the participants of most social movements 
are recruited via established lines of interaction. The more closely a person is linked with members 
of an aggrieved organisation, the more likely he/she can be mobilised to participate in protests 
(Curtis & Zurcher, 1973). Additionally, individuals who are members of existing groups are more 
likely to become activists in the movement (Oberschall, 1973). Thus, a group of people who are 
already highly organised in local or indigenous organisations may be recruited together to join a 
movement (McAdam, 1982).  
Solidary incentives are the second resource brought by existing organisations. By “solidary 
incentives”, McAdam referred to the interpersonal rewards that provide the motivating force for 
participation in the group (McAdam, 1982, p45). These rewards, including praise from one’s peers 
or valued goods, as well as punishment via collective sanctioning of inactive participants. These 
work to incentivise participation and also help to reduce the presence of free-riders
17
 (Oberschall, 
1973). Moreover, a strong organisation generates a common identity which can unify participants 
and raise their commitment to a common cause and toward collective action (Tilly, 1978). The 
incentives to participate in group actions and an associated united structure of an existing 
organisation can transfer to the movement along with the participants.  
Thirdly, existing originations provide an effective communication network for participants. The 
network can connect like-minded people beyond local boundaries and spread information among 
them. This helps to recruit members into a movement, because the more embedded members are 
within the existing network, the more rapidly and enduringly they can be mobilised (Oberschall, 
1973). That is, an effective network helps to rally new participants in a movement as well.  
                                               
16 Members: although McAdam did not distinguish between members of existing organisations and of movements, “members” in my 
chapter refers to people who are members of existing organisations, as distinct from “participants” in a collective action who may not 
belong to an organisation, while I do not use the term “members” of a polity in Tilly’s sense instead referring to polity “insiders”. 
17 Free-riders: a term used by Olson who highlighted that many rational individuals will try to avoid paying for the collective action 
or personally participating but will want to share the achievements. 
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Finally, movement leaders frequently emerge from existing organisations. Earlier theorists pointed 
out the importance of leaders or organisers in the generation of a social movement (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977b; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978), and McAdam absorbed this element into the theory. He 
observed that most leaders of the organising agents of a movement had acquired prestige and 
organising skills in pre-existing organisations and these are valuable resources in movement 
mobilisation (McAdam, 1982).  
The third and final component in the emergence of collective action according to the Political 
Process model is “cognitive liberation” (McAdam, 1982, p33). This refers to the process whereby 
people’s consciousness about their collective concerns, and about the possibility of redress through 
protest, is roused and it helps explain why individuals may participate in collective action. McAdam 
used the term “liberation” to suggest that people who have been fatalistic and accepting of existing 
arrangements as inevitable begin to demand change (McAdam, 1982, p33). In doing so, he drew on 
the work of Piven and Cloward (1979) to identify the various steps of cognitive liberation. First, a 
large number of people who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of 
institutional arrangements come to believe that these arrangements are unjust and wrong (Piven & 
Cloward, 1979). McAdam argued that rising expectations and feelings of missing out would lead 
people to become upset about the authorities and the broader socio-economic context. As people’s 
expectations increase with social development, they try to realise their expectations. But if their 
ability to realise those aspirations remains low or becomes even lower, they will become more 
dissatisfied with society and the system. This is what Gurr called “relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970, 
p25). McAdam employed this concept to explain why people become aggrieved with the authorities, 
emphasising the comparative dimension of the concept: people’s feelings of being deprived are 
strengthened when they compare their situation to that of others and find that they are worse off. In 
his own study, he explained that African Americans became more dissatisfied with their 
occupational and economic situation after comparing themselves with white people in America 
during 1950s which ultimately lead to the black rights movement (McAdam, 1982). Thus, a sense 
of “relative deprivation” is a core reason for people’s discontent about the system.  
The second step of cognitive liberation is that aggrieved people begin to assert their rights and 
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demand change (Piven & Cloward, 1979). Once people feel the system is unjust, they seek to obtain 
what they feel is rightly theirs. However, the institutional means of bargaining for their interests are 
limited, as they are outsiders to the polity and lack regular access to decision-making processes or 
ways to address their grievances (McAdam, 1982). In the US case that McAdam examined, African 
Americans consistently found themselves barred from participation in a system of institutionalised 
politics that was generally unresponsive to their interests. As a result, insurgency became the only 
real avenue of political influence available to them (McAdam, 1982).  
The third step of cognitive liberation is that people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless 
come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot (Piven & Cloward, 1979). 
Well-connected networks among aggrieved people and the presence of organising agents and 
leaders play important roles during this process by encouraging people to be confident about their 
group solidarity and the favourable political opportunities for action. This illustrates the connection 
between cognitive liberation and both “political opportunity” and “indigenous organisations” 
described earlier. The method and strategies protest leaders or organising agents employ to mobilise 
people are studied in framing theory which was developed later than McAdam’s Political Process 
model, but which connects nicely to his work. Although McAdam did not discuss these strategies in 
great detail in his seminal study of the civil rights movement, subsequent scholars such as Snow and 
his colleagues have elaborated upon them in detail (Snow et al., 1986). They argue that mobilising 
organisations can align themselves with other potential participants by building a persuasive and 
coherent shared understanding of their circumstances (Snow et al., 1986). Also, the organising 
agents may amplify grievances among people to draw participants’ latent sentiments into sharper 
relief (Snow et al., 1986). Examination of these mobilising strategies is helpful for observing the 
dynamic process of contentious collective actions.  
In summary, under the concept of “cognitive liberation”, McAdam applied elements of classical 
theory (Gurr, 1970), the Polity model (Tilly, 1978) and Piven and Cloward’s (1979) arguments 
about cognitive liberation to explain the generation of collective action among people who demand 
change because they feel deprived in comparison to others. McAdam’s combination of these three 
theories is represented in Figure 3-2. It helps me to understand the emergence of the Wukan protest 
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by directing attention to the reasons for rising grievances among people and why aggrieved people 
turn to a sequence of collective political actions in a public campaign instead of more institutional 
and less confrontational ways of seeking redress. It also directs attention to the strategies used to 
mobilise people. In addition, it allows me to analyse the emergence of a protest or social movement 
from a micro perspective by exploring individuals’ motives for participating in collective action, as 
well as considering collective action through a macro lens by examining the effects of broader 
political structures. Finally, the theory points me in the direction of the resources required for 
collective action and strategies used by organising agents to mobilise more people and assert their 
claims. This comprehensive model helps me to answer my research questions about the Wukan 
protest by finding out the reasons, resources and strategies for the protest. Thus, I will employ this 
model in my analysis. 
 
Figure 3-2: The Political Process model of movement emergence (McAdam 1982, p51) 
The Political Process model has been applied to analyse diverse empirical cases, including local, 
national or trans-national collective actions all around the world. Some researchers advocate the 
value of this model for understanding contentious collective actions, while others have suggested 
further developing the model.  
Examples of scholar who have applied the model include Ayres (1997) who used the Political 
Process model to analyse the mobilisation against free trade in Canada in the 1980. He saw political 
instability in Canada during 1980s as the fundamental reason for the expansion of an anti-free trade 
movement because it created favourable political opportunities for opponents of free trade to speak 
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out; strengthened the authority of anti-free trade groups; and raised consciousness among 
participants (Ayres, 1998).  
The Political Process model has also been used to understand contentious collective action in China. 
As an authoritarian country where the government plays a crucial role in social life, the kinds of 
resources and political opportunities available to challengers of the polity are central features in any 
examination of the emergence of contentious collective actions in China. That is why Chinese 
scholars have endorsed McAdam’s model in their analysis. Yang (2015) applied this model and 
analysed the three key elements to explain the outbreak of labour protests in China in 2010 in which 
protesters rallied to ask for higher wage. As a result of his study, Yang (2015) identified four 
conditions under which a widespread protest would occur in China that specify the form of political 
opportunities, local organisations and leaders’ strategies relevant to the Chinese context. He 
suggested there would need to be: individual motivations for joining a protest; targets or aims that 
do not fundamentally threaten the CCP's political survival; some tightly-connected social networks; 
and wise protest initiators or leaders who know how to mobilise people and exploit political 
opportunities (Yang, 2015).  
In another study of Chinese labour protests, Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014) explored the political 
opportunities available to contenders from a social structure perspective and argued that a growing 
labour shortage, new labour laws which protect labour rights, and new media openness are 
economic and political opportunities for Chinese workers. These opportunities have sent “cognitive 
cues” (Elfstrom & Kuruvilla, 2014, p460) to workers that they have increased leverage, thus leading 
them to be more assertive in their demands.  
Some researchers have identified deficiencies in the Political Process model and propose some 
improvements. For instance, Pellow (2001) examined the state’s position in the United States and 
observed that as corporations grow bigger, their influence strengthens and the state’s policy-making 
authority is weakened. As a result, he concluded that, not only the political context, but also the 
economic conditions of a society should be considered in explaining the structural opportunities that 
favour social movement formation. Bob (2002), in following a transnational movement in Nigeria, 
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also sought to extend the concept of political context, pointing out that leadership within 
governments and political exchange were two factors neglected by the Political Process model. He 
argued that a political leader with strong leadership can shape a movement’s goals and strategies 
while engagement of local activists with powerful transnational NGOs reframes the movement’s 
priorities and agendas (Bob, 2002).  
Furthermore, Caren (2007) developed the Political Process model into a Political Process Theory by 
synthesising his own work with McAdam’s (McAdam, 1982) and Tilly’s (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 
2003). He argued that five elements – political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing 
processes, protest cycles, and contentious repertoires – constitute the core of contemporary Political 
Process Theory research (Caren, 2007). By adding the two elements (protest cycles which includes 
the decline or institutionalisation of a social movement and contentious repertoires which are 
similar to social movement repertoires that I will introduce later), Caren considered the theory to 
have more utility in explaining modular forms of protest and the historical dynamics of social 
movements.  
Despite its regular application as a comprehensive model since the 1990s, McAdam’s Political 
Process model has its theoretical critics. Scholars, such as Kurzman (1996) and Goodwin and Jasper 
(1999) regard the model as having overestimated the need for “political opportunities” for initiating 
collective action. They argue that in Western countries, where citizens share some political power 
and institutional opportunities, including elections, governments are not all-powerful and their 
attitudes toward collective action are not as important as described in the political process literature.  
Other researchers point out that the model leads to an overly rational analysis of participants’ 
actions and neglects the potential influence of emotions which people respond to before 
participating in collective action (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2004; Gould, 2009; Morris, 2000). 
In my mind, although McAdam did not emphasise emotions, this critique neglects his mention of 
them as integral to “cognitive liberation”. According to the Political Process model, the first step for 
liberating people’s consciousness is to incite their anger by raising their feelings of injustice. 
Moreover, McAdam noted that the collective identity brought about by indigenous organisations 
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helps to form strong bonds of solidarity. These feelings of anger, injustice, and collective identity 
are examples of emotions that I see as being considered in McAdam’s model.  
Another potential limitation of the Political Process model as articulated by McAdam relates to its 
capacity to reveal the role and strategies of mobilising agents. McAdam does not pay much 
attention to activists and mobilising agents as his notion of “indigenous organisations” emphasises 
the role of existing organisations and networks. McAdam’s (1982) work focused on the structural 
roots of the US Civil Rights Movement in specific organisations. The resultant lack of attention to 
the role of activists and leaders (including Martin Luther King, Jr.) in the development of the 
movement contrasts with other studies and has been argued by some as indicating that an extension 
of the Political Process model is required (Bob, 2002). Local organisations and networks are often, 
but not exclusively, the mobilising agents in collective actions. In my own research, the mobilising 
agents who played a vital role in the mobilisation process did not emerge only from indigenous 
organisations. It is therefore necessary to incorporate consideration of a range of mobilising agents 
beyond indigenous organisations into the Political Process model to enhance its utility in explaining 
the Wukan experience.  
Following studies such as those outlined above, I will analyse the political process of the emergence 
of mass protest in the Chinese rural village of Wukan in terms of how villagers with grievances 
were able to group together because of shifting political opportunities and by utilising the 
organisational resources and strategies of traditional and emerging social networks. I will examine 
the convergence of these factors and the role of leaders and activists in framing the issues, 
opportunities and resources in both rational and emotive ways to trigger, mobilise and sustain 
contentious collective action in this case.  
3.4 Understanding social movements as distinct from protests 
The Political Process model has utility to my thesis in increasing understanding of the resources and 
political opportunities available to the Wukanese villagers that enabled them to challenge what they 
saw as the unfair sale of their land, without any presumption that their actions form part of a social 
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movement. Yet, later in this thesis, I raise the question of whether the Wukan protest might indicate 
an emerging rural social movement in China. In addressing this question, I deploy other concepts 
proposed by social movement theorists that link more specifically to the form and features of social 
movements per se. One such scholar that I draw on is Tilly who offers an elaborate definition of a 
social movement. After analysing different forms of contentious collective actions in history, Tilly 
(2005) identified three elements necessary for any contentious collective action to be recognised as 
a social movement:  
1. A sustained, organised public effort making collective claims on target authorities; 
2. Employment of combination from among the following forms of political action: creation of 
special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, 
rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and 
pamphleteering; and  
3. Participants’ concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (Tilly, 2005, p5).  
The first element – actions that are public, sustained and organised – is called a “campaign” (Tilly, 
2005, p5). It links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, some object(s) of 
claims, and a public of some kind. Unlike routine collective actions, social movements are formed 
by “challengers” who are “outsiders” of a polity (Tilly, 1978, p53). These self-designated claimants 
initiate action in order to have their demands met. The object of their claims could be governmental 
officials or others whose actions (or failures to act) significantly affect the welfare of many people 
(Tilly, 2005).  
The second element is summarised as “social movement repertoire” (Tilly, 2005, p5). Compared 
with the confrontational collective actions (such as seizure of grain from their oppressors and the 
collective invasion of fields among angry peasants) the repertoires adopted by social movements are 
considered to be more gentle and performative (Tilly, 1986). Through the application of such 
repertoires, actors are able to reduce risks or consequences that arise from attending movements and 
attract attention, sympathy and support from outsiders. Although some repertoires (such as the 
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creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, statements to and in the 
public media, and pamphleteering) overlap with the repertoires of other political phenomena, such 
as trade union activity and electoral campaigns, the integration of these performances into sustained 
campaigns distinguish social movements from other varieties of political action (Tilly, 2005).  
The third element involves the adoption by movement members of strategies such as statements, 
slogans, or labels to display their “worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment”– otherwise known 
as “WUNC display” (Tarrow, 1998, p2). The WUNC representation can also be seen as an 
expression of collective identity, which, according to some scholars, is a necessary ingredient of a 
social movement (Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Collective identity is an 
individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, 
practice or institution (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Forming such an identity is a process by which 
social actors recognise themselves, and are recognised by other actors, as part of broader groupings, 
and develop emotional attachments to them (Della Porta & Diani, 2009). Showing they are worthy 
of respect, united, in large numbers and committed to the collective action, actors assert “that ‘we’ – 
the claimants – constitute a unified force to be reckoned with” (Tilly, 2005, p13). Thus, 
summarising from Tilly’s work, the term social movement refers to sustained, organised contentious 
collective action in which participants develop some collective identity through the display of 
worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment and engage in a repertoire of political actions.  
However, there is another condition of a social movement that is not introduced in the above three 
elements. That is, collective action should develop into a large scale swell of activity (mostly 
national or even international). In Tilly’s analysis, movements from the 19th century (such as 
movements in France, Belgium, and Great Britain) to contemporary social movements (such as the 
Kefiya Movement and 6th April Movement in Egypt, the Anti-Corruption Week movement in 
Bangladesh, and student movement in Chile), all spread widely to the national scale. Similarly, 
Della Porta and Diani (2009) point out that “traditionally, social movements have organised at the 
national level” (Della Porta & Diani, 2009, p1) and, further, that “today’s national protest is more 
often accompanied by transnational ones” (Della Porta & Diani, 2009, p1). This is evident in the 
global movement to combat climate change and the “occupy” movement opposing global corporate 
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greed (Halvorsen, 2012).  
Targeting at a general rather than a specific issue is a reason for a movement spreading nationally 
(Della Porta & Diani, 2009). Snow et al. (2008) assert that the goal of a social movement is to 
promote or prevent changes within existing institutional authority or patterns of cultural authority 
(such as systems of beliefs or practices reflective of those beliefs). People sharing beliefs will gather 
together to take action which extends the movement to a broader scale. Mobilising groups, whether 
as “indigenous organisations” (McAdam, 1982, p33), or “professional organisations” (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977a, p1213) that are specially established to realise the aim of a movement, facilitate this 
process (McAdam et al., 1996). However, the aims of protests can be limited and very specific in 
thematic concern, such as against a corrupt politician, a tax increase, or the establishment of a 
supermarket (Rucht, 1998). Protests on such limited and local issues are often contrasted with social 
movements as NIMBYism (not in my back yard) (Michaud, Carlisle, & Smith, 2008). 
Broadly-spread movements that target institutional or cultural authorities will bring larger impacts. 
Since the complexity of the social world does not allow for all types of outcomes to be explained by 
a single theory (Giugni, 1999), researchers have paid most attention to policy outcomes generated 
by social movements (Giugni, 2008). Kolb (2007) argues that a successful social movement may 
bring five types of substantive political outcomes:  
1. Agenda impact refers to the influence of social movement on the composition of the political 
agenda;  
2. Alternative impact refers to the extent to which movement are able to influence the content 
of policy proposals;  
3. Policy impact refers to the adoption of legislation or to other forms of binding political 
decisions caused by a social movement;  
4. Implementation impact refers to a movement’s influence in accelerating, stopping, or 
slowing down the implementation of public policies;  
5. Goods impact refers to the degree to which social movements influence the provision of 
collective or public goods (Kolb, 2007, p28). 
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Changing the composition of a political agenda, the content of a policy proposal and the adoption of 
legislation links to changes in political institutions. While polity insiders can achieve these goals via 
institutional ways, outsiders have to resort to contentious collective actions. However, not all 
actions can influence an institution, although achievements in these ways are what make the social 
movement a successful one (Kolb, 2007).  
Meanwhile, achieving some collective or public good is much harder. While collective goods are 
“those group-wise advantages or disadvantages from which non-participants in a challenge cannot 
be easily excluded” (Amenta & Young, 1999, p24), such as voting rights for excluded groups, 
public goods are those “necessarily shared more or less equally by all members of a society” 
(Breyman, 2001, p218) such as a clean environment and world peace. The establishment, 
modification or destruction of public and collective goods is often strongly affected by, or even the 
result of, state action, which is much more than the adoption of legislation and the subsequent levels 
of spending (Kolb, 2007). Without a social movement that targets institutional changes, those 
collective or public goods are difficult to realise. 
However, a protest that is locally based and targeted at a specific issue can also affect 
implementation of a policy or legislation. As outlined in Chapter Two, “rightful resistance” 
(O’Brien, 1996, p33) emerged in China as a kind of protest that helped to realise policies or laws 
that are promulgated by higher level governments (central or provincial). In those actions, resisters 
employ laws and/or policies issued by higher level governments to defy local political and 
economic elites who have not implemented some beneficial measures. Once their appeals are heard, 
those actions are likely to be received with tolerance and/or concessions by higher level 
governments who will urge lower level governments to implement those favourable policies (Cai, 
2010). However, in targeting specific issues and being limited to the local scale, these actions are 
not themselves a social movement.  
Thus, when evaluating whether a protest is (part of) a social movement, one needs to consider not 
only the repertoires applied and the collective identity fostered, but also the scale, aims and targets 
of the protest. Outcomes of a protest help to distinguish a protest from a social movement as well: 
69 
 
while a successful social movement brings institutional changes within the society, a protest may be 
successful in achieving specific goals but fail to achieve such systemic social changes.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, theory models and concepts relevant to answering the research questions are 
introduced. The Political Process model (McAdam, 1982), which synthesised social movement 
theory approaches such as classical theory, resource mobilisation theory, Political Process model 
theory and framing theory, helps to understand the emergence and development of the Wukan 
protest. It directs attention to the process whereby a group of people who are dissatisfied with the 
current order seek change via collective action. Favourable political opportunities, such as a 
reduced power discrepancy between challengers and the polity, and sympathetic attitudes from 
higher level governments, will facilitate the outburst of protest. Mobilising organisations, in the 
form of indigenous and newly formed organisations exploit those favourable opportunities and 
mobilise more people to participate the protest by raising their consciousness of their grievances 
and of the possibility for achieving a more just outcome.   
Key concepts from the literature on social movements help to distinguish a protest from a social 
movement and assist in examining the protest’s outcomes. A social movement is understood as a 
well-organised collective action which employs some modern repertoires and expresses participants’ 
sense of a common identity and goals. Moreover, it aims for institutional changes to the economy, 
society, politics and culture, and spreads beyond a local scale. These theoretical frameworks support 
my exploration of the research questions as I analyse data collected from fieldwork.  
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Chapter 4  
Methodology and the research process  
My research questions ask how the events of the Wukan protest unfolded and direct my attention to 
understanding the perspectives of participants in rural protests. Social movement theory also 
suggests that understanding any kind of protest requires investigation of the societal context, 
protesters’ emotions, and organisational structures of the social system. This influences my 
approach to collecting relevant data to answer my research questions. In this chapter, I explain the 
qualitative, case study methodology I employed as well as the methods I applied to collect and 
analyse my data. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the trustworthiness of the research and 
relevant ethical considerations.  
4.1 A qualitative approach  
Since I seek to interpret why and how villagers in Wukan expressed their grievances in a public 
protest, this research adopts an interpretivist approach. In contrast to positivists who regard social 
facts or social phenomena as “concrete realities exercising an external influence on people” 
(Durkheim, 1938, p14), interpretivists consider realities to be what people perceive and further 
argue that these perceptions are influenced by subjective elements including people’s ideas, feelings 
and motives (Douglas, 1970). From an interpretivist viewpoint, reality is multiple and relative 
(Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). It is always something we make or construct and thus depends on how 
we interpret it (Smith, 2008). As a result, the task of the sociologist is to try to understand, or 
interpret the motives and beliefs behind people’s actions on a personal level (Weber, 1978). So 
rather than trying to find out a definitive account of what happened and why in Wukan, my aim was 
to explore the meaning and messages that participants attached to the events – the “version” they 
have constructed, recognising that different people will have perceived events slightly differently.  
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This approach assumes that researchers can only understand a chosen social phenomenon from a 
specific perspective. The key for analysing that phenomenon is to understand people’s actions from 
their perspective. This means that researchers cannot be seeking a single version of an event, such 
as the Wukan protest, but need to recognise, and elicit, multiple understandings from different 
actors. The aim of my research is to present those different perspectives and to interpret them in 
order to make sense of what happened. And, of course, it is important to acknowledge that just as 
research participants bring their own meanings to the social world, so too does the researcher. In 
this sense, the account produced in the thesis is my own interpretation of what has gone on in 
Wukan based on what villagers have shared with me. 
The interpretivist approach guided me to adopt qualitative methods which are defined as “strategies 
for conducting inquiry that are aimed at discovering how human beings understand, experience, 
interpret, and produce the social world” (Sandelowski, 2004, p893). For such an enquiry, qualitative 
methods, such as participant observation and in-depth interviewing, yield rich and descriptive data. 
People’s own words, elicited through talking with them about their experiences, and observations of 
people’s behaviour comprise such data.  
Qualitative research also entails a particular approach to data analysis. The heart of qualitative 
analysis is to try to extract meaning from the words and text that constitute most qualitative data 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010). While analysing those data, researchers focus on understandings, 
experiences and interpretations of people’s actions. They also explore the contextual conditions 
(including social, cultural and environmental) in order to interpret the in-depth meanings of human 
actions.  
In qualitative research, by studying people’s lives in their real-world roles and accounting for 
real-world contextual conditions, scholars are trying to explain social behaviour and thinking (Yin, 
2015). Such qualitative research methods were applied in this research to narratives and texts from 
protest participants that are vital for understanding participants’ mentalities and the causes, process 
of evolution and outcomes of the rural protest that ensued.  
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4.2 Wukan: a case study 
The aim of this research is to explore the causes, process and outcomes of local protest in rural 
China, and to use this as a way of examining rural protest and social movements in China more 
broadly. In order to achieve those goals, I chose a protest as a case study. A case study is defined as 
an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social 
phenomenon (Feagin et al., 1991) which is normally “specific and complex” (Yin, 2013a, p321). 
This method is pertinent to descriptive questions of “what happened” or explanatory questions such 
as “how or why did something happen” (Yin, 2013a, p322). Since the conditions for how and why 
protests take place at different sites across rural China are both general (in terms of broader changes 
in Chinese rural society) and specific (in terms of the localised events that trigger a particular 
protest and the actors involved), a case study is a useful method for me to ask these kinds of 
questions in specific local contexts.  
Moreover, choosing a case to study can also help to reveal the relationship between the individual 
case and the population or the broader context (Gerring, 2006) – in this case, Chinese rural protests 
more widely. In order to achieve these goals, a case should be selected on the basis of its specific 
position within the larger population, either as a typical/representative, diverse, extreme, or deviant 
example (Gerring, 2006). Whereas typical cases are selected because they portray the features that 
are most common to all eligible cases (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011), extreme or deviant cases are those 
that are unusual or rare (Patton, 1990). In these instances, extreme or rare case studies are selected 
because of some outstanding successes or notable failures which can offer lessons about unusual 
conditions or extreme outcomes that are relevant to more typical situations (Patton, 2005).  
The Wukan protest was selected for study because it represents both a “typical” and an “extreme” 
case among Chinese rural protests. It is typical because, like 65 per cent of the collective actions 
that have occurred in rural China in the past decade or more, this protest was induced by a local 
issue – specifically the loss of land (Yu, 2007). On the other hand, however, there are elements of 
rarity or extremity in the Wukan case because it involved more protesters than the usual rural 
protests (at its peak there were 6,000 protesters) and the opposing actions lasted longer than usual 
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(for more than two years). Moreover, the protest had a far from usual ending in that it paved the 
way for the “first ever open grassroots election in China” (Restall, 2012) which aroused outsiders’ 
attention and hopes about increased Chinese rural grassroots democracy. Those characteristics made 
the protest an extreme one, and a case worthy of deep exploration so as to understand any lessons 
about the potential for social change and achievement of grassroots democracy in rural China. As 
Wright argues in Envisioning Real Utopias (2010, p10), one of the core tasks of the social scientist 
is “understanding the obstacles, possibilities, and dilemmas of transformation”.  
In practice, a case study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data 
sources (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991). To gain a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of 
the events that happened in Wukan, it was therefore valuable for me to go to the village and 
immerse myself in the life of the village so that I could interact directly with the relevant actors 
there, access materials and information that would otherwise be unavailable, and observe local 
village interactions.  
Aside from familiarising myself with the events in Wukan through a media review, preparation for 
fieldwork entailed finding a way to access the field site for research purposes. A good contact 
person is the first step in this process (Seidman, 2013). To make contact with people in Wukan, I 
requested help via the Sina Micro-blog which is an open online site/forum that was used by the 
Wukanese protesters themselves to rally support. Via the microblog I expressed my intention to 
examine the Wukan protest as a case to study Chinese rural protest and my wish to conduct 
fieldwork in the village. One person, who I refer to in this thesis as “Ching” replied to my message 
with considerable enthusiasm. She expressed her agreement with my plan and offered me 
accommodation during the fieldwork, explaining that “we Wukanese asked for outsiders’ help, we 
appreciated their assistance during the protest and we are inclined to help others as well”. 
4.3 Data gathering methods  
Observation, interviews, and the collection of related document were used to collect data during my 
fieldwork. I arrived at Wukan village on 27th June 2013, initially stayed in Ching’s work place and 
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then moved into her house upon invitation. Participant observation was the first way for me to elicit 
information because it took me some time to settle in and arrange interviews. During these early 
days I observed villagers’ daily lives. Data were recorded as field notes in Chinese and 
supplemented by photos.  
As I went to Wukan one and a half years after the protest, I was not directly observing the protest, 
but rather the explicit and tacit aspects of daily life and culture in the village. Data collected from 
observations of village life helped me to understand the traditional culture and recent changes, 
which were significant to probing the causes of the protest. Moreover, by observing the local power 
dynamics in the village, revealed for example in the VC meetings, I was able to explore the 
relationships between villagers and the VC and Party Branch members, thus becoming acquainted 
with the outcomes of the protest.  
As described by DeWalt and DeWalt (2010), participant observation is a method in which a 
researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as 
one of the means of learning aspects of their life routines and their culture. These can be “explicit” 
meaning “a level of knowledge people can communicate about with relative ease” (Spradley, 1980, 
p7), or “tacit” aspects of culture which are those largely outside their awareness or consciousness 
(DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010, p10) that may, however, be inferred by a close observer.  
There are some key elements to being a participant and an observer:  
Living in the context for an extended period of time, learning and using the local language, 
actively participating in a wide range of daily, routine, and extraordinary activities with people 
who are full participants in that context; using everyday conversation as an interview technique; 
recording observations in field notes; and finally using both tacit and explicit information in 
analysis and writing (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010, p36).  
All these strategies were employed during my fieldwork, except that all my interviews and casual 
chatting were done in Mandarin instead of using the specific dialect in Wukan, Teochew, which is 
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different from Mandarin and Cantonese (Yen, 2002). A three month stay in the village helped me to 
contact interviewees, observe villagers’ lives and get acquainted with their culture, but it was not 
enough for me to learn the dialect in the village. However, almost all villagers knew Mandarin 
which made our communication mutually comprehensible. Also, Ching helped me to understand the 
procedure of village events I observed were conducted in dialect, notably the Villagers’ Committee 
(VC) meeting, by translating the main points to me.  
DeWalt and DeWalt (2010) suggest that participant observation can be classified into four kinds 
according to the observer’s role and degree of participation: passive, moderate, active and complete 
participation. There were two roles that I deployed during my fieldwork: moderate participation and 
passive observation. Observation of informal interactions of villagers’ daily life, chatting with 
villagers and participating in their daily activities (such as playing mah-jongg, attending night 
schools, commemorating their ancestors and celebrating festivals to worship immortals) were the 
main way of conducting participant observation during my fieldwork. These constituted moderate 
participation, which means that I was identifiable as a researcher, but did not actively participate 
and only occasionally interacted with people in the situation (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010). During 
those observations, I distributed my business cards, identified myself as a PhD student who was 
studying in Australia and introduced myself to them first, and then observed their actions and 
sometimes had an informal conversation with them. Those observations offered me abundant data 
for understanding the rituals and culture in the village, thus helping me to explain the close 
connections among villagers and aspects of culture that played a role in the outburst of Wukan 
protest, as will be demonstrated in later chapters. 
Moreover, I attended a VC meeting with the VC leader’s permission. Initially I intended to observe 
all formal meetings (including the VC’s meeting, Villagers’ Representative Assembly and Villagers’ 
Assembly). However, both the Villagers’ Representative Assembly, which required attendance of 
half of the 108 representatives and the Villagers’ Assembly, which requires the attendance of half of 
the whole village population, were suspended for about one year coinciding with my time in the 
village. Even the VC meeting was not convening regularly, but depended on the amount of village 
affairs that needed discussion. Fortunately, there were several VC meetings during my stay in the 
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village, and the VC leader permitted me to observe one of them.  
Although called a “VC meeting”, the meeting in Wukan was an administrative meeting attended by 
both VC and Party Branch members. It was not easy for an outsider to observe or participate in 
because it was not public. I asked some VC members for their opinion of allowing me to observe 
the meeting and conduct interviews, and finally the VC leader, Lam, agreed to my request but 
simply for observation. Thus, I was undertaking “passive participation” on that occasion (DeWalt & 
DeWalt, 2010, p140). Passive participation exists when the researcher is “on the spot, but acts as a 
pure observer and does not interact with people but just plays the role as a spectator or bystander” 
(DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010, p140). When attending the VC meeting, I was introduced to the meeting 
attendees by the VC leader (Lam) as a “PhD student who wants to study the Wukan protest”, then 
settled to sit at the corner of a table to take notes. I observed the meeting without making any 
comments. By observing this meeting, I became acquainted with the power relations in the village 
which could be seen as a novel example of Chinese village democracy. 
Semi-structured interviewing was a second key method I used to collect data. The semi-structured 
nature of this method meant that I could retain some control over the content of the interview, but 
enable interviewees to elaborate on their stories or opinions and discuss related matters freely 
(Harrell & Bradley, 2009). Using this interview approach, I obtained considerable data about my 
prepared stimulus questions such as “how did the protest start and develop”, and also received a 
range of interviewees’ views on the protest and its outcomes.  
In order to gain a range of perspectives about the Wukan protest, I selected seven groups of people 
to interview. The first group comprised of protest participants or activists. These people were 
particularly significant to my research because they played a vital role in mobilising villagers and 
forming the protest. By interviewing them, I was able to gain knowledge about why the protest 
started and how villagers were mobilised. Villagers who did not participate in the protest provided 
some form of comparison group to the activists and their attitudes and responses are important to 
understand why half of the villagers did not participate in the protest. Third and fourth, I focused on 
two groups of village leaders: the former and newly-elected village cadres. By interviewing the 
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newly elected VC and Party Branch members, I obtained valuable information about the outcomes 
of this protest and the tensions that continued between the new VC members and the villagers even 
though the protest was hailed as a success for bringing a new era of rural democracy to Wukan. I 
tried to interview representatives of the Township and Municipal Governments as my fifth 
interviewee group, although most of them refused my interview invitation, which I will explain in 
detail later. Two analysts from outside Wukan who were acquainted with the protest and two 
journalists who reported on the protest during 2011 and 2012 were interviewed as well to examine 
the Wukan protest from outsiders’ perspective. These perspectives supplemented those of local 
people and enabled triangulation of accounts in some aspects, but also different interpretations of 
the protest by those inside and outside of the village. Although the group membership is not always 
distinguished in the following chapters, differentiation of the groups reminded me to collect data 
from diverse perspectives.  
This selection concentrated on those who were intimately involved in the sequence of events in 
Wukan and who were able to provide coherent accounts of the causes of the protest, the way it 
played out, and its subsequent consequences. Even those who did not participate vividly 
remembered the protests and gave me plenty of descriptive details as well as their perceptions and 
opinions in retrospect. Interviewees were primarily selected by purposive sampling, meaning that 
they were selected on the basis of their involvement and influence in the events and actions that are 
the focus of this research and their willingness to share their knowledge and experience (Tongco, 
2007). Thanks to the defined sampling frame, it was not hard for me to determine who to interview 
from three of the groups because the list of protest activists, old village cadres and new village 
cadres were available on the public record. 
After taking a short while to settle into the village, I sought to make contact with prospective 
participants. I contacted all of those in the categories identified above and received contrasting 
responses to my interview request: agreeing to an interview or rejecting my proposal. In general, 
new village cadres were glad to participate in interviews while the old village cadres were reluctant 
to be interviewed, presumably because they thought the protest was a dishonourable history and a 
shame for them. Eventually, I interviewed six members of the new VC (who were formerly protest 
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activists) and one former village cadre. From these contacts, I also reached journalists who 
published articles and outside supporters via snowball sampling as they had some personal 
connection with protest leaders or new village cadres. After communicating with them by email, 
two journalists and two outside helpers accepted my interview request without hesitation. Also, 
recruiting three villagers who did not participate in the protest was not a tough task as about 7,000 
people out of the total 13,000 Wukan villagers did not take part in the protest. I did not rush to 
ascertain these three interviewees in the beginning, but decided towards the end of my fieldwork 
period when I had spent more than two months with villagers and obtained the trust of some 
non-participating villagers. I chose three quite different individuals with whom I had become 
acquainted: one male who was not employed aged about 50, a female teacher aged about 20 and a 
female running a small business in the village aged about 30.  
Contacting and interviewing governmental officials was much harder. Although I did not encounter 
any obstruction from governments during my fieldwork, most officials in the Township and 
Municipal Governments rejected my interview request. They claimed that the Wukan village 
needed peace and did not want outsiders’ attention on the protest anymore. However, I did manage 
to interview one female official who worked as a member of the Propaganda Department of the 
Lufeng Municipal Government. The limited interviewing of governmental officials may lead to 
some skewing of interpretations during the data analysis because the protesters made various 
accusations against government authorities whereas there was little opportunity for governmental 
representatives to provide their account of the circumstances and respond to this censure. Given this 
kind of gap in the data collection, I paid attention to collecting data from other sources, such as Yi, 
one of the outside observers I interviewed. He had some personal connection with governmental 
officials and defended government’s decisions during the interview. Also, documentary data such as 
posters and statements issued by governments were collected to understand governments’ attitudes 
and strategies for dealing with the Wukan protest.  
I contacted interviewees by phone first (as their numbers were offered by my primary contact 
and/or other interviewees), and then conducted twenty-one interviews. The initial phone 
conversations were to outline details of the research, obtain consent and make arrangements about a 
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convenient time and place for the interview. Sixteen interviews were conducted face-to-face, while 
the remainder took place over the telephone. The interviewing locations were chosen according to 
interviewees’ convenience: in their house or their work place after working hours (especially for 
those new village leaders). The telephone interviews were conducted with those who were not in the 
village, including the journalists Ping and Lau; a scholar named Vane who was working in Beijing 
and assisted with the Wukan election; the outsider observer, Yi, who had close connection with 
municipal government officials; and the official of the Municipal Government, Ann. In total, six 
women and fifteen men were interviewed during the three months. The disparity in the number of 
male and female interviewees was in line with the gender situation in the protest. Although women 
actively participated the Wukan protest and some of them became activists during the protest, few 
of them turned into protest leaders and new VC members. In fact, only one woman was elected to 
be a member of the new VC. Moreover, the former village cadres did not include any women. This 
phenomenon might display the gender discrimination in rural China: a topic I do not explore in this 
thesis.  
Aliases, or pseudonyms, are used to protect the identity of participants while still portraying clan 
links and roles in Wukan social life and the protest itself. Interviewees’ group, aliases and details are 
summarised in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: Participants' aliases/ pseudonyms and information 
Interview group Participant’s code 
name 
Information  
 
 
Protest activists 
Hsing Male. One of the leaders of the “Youth League”. 
Bang  Male. An elected member of Electoral Committee. 
Ching  Female. Key informant. Bang’s daughter.  
Han Male. An elected member of Villagers’ Representative 
Assembly. 
Lien Male. An elected member of Villagers’ Representative 
Assembly. 
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New VC members 
who were elected 
by villagers 
Lam  Male. Leader of Provisional Directory. Elected to be the 
Chairman of new VC. Appointed to be the Party Branch 
Secretary by the township government. 
Nei Male. One of the leaders of Youth League. Vice-chairman 
of new VC. Son of Bang. 
Hoo Male. One of the leaders of Youth League. Another 
Vice-chairman of new VC. 
Yong  Male. Protest activist. Vice leader of Provisional 
Directory. The third Vice chairman of new VC. 
Sai Female. Protest activist. Member of new VC. 
Cheng  Male. Protest activist. Member of new VC. Hsing’s older 
brother. 
New Party Branch 
member 
Shen  Male. Appointed by the township government to be the 
Vice-secretary of Party Branch.  
Former VC 
member 
Chow  Male. Member of former Villagers’ Committee.  
Government 
official 
Ann  Female. Official of Propaganda Department of Lufeng 
municipal government 
 
Journalists  
 
Ping  Female. First to report on the Wukan protest and stayed in 
the village for one month during the protest.  
Lau  Male. A journalist who made two in-depth reports of 
Wukan protest. 
 
Outside observers  
Vane  Male. A leader of private think tank. Helped villagers 
with their open election.  
Yi Male. A blogger who was acquainted with Wukan’s 
situation. 
 
Non-participating 
villagers  
Lee Female. Runs a shop in the village.  
Kate Female. A teacher in the village.  
Kai Male. Unemployed. Relative of Shaw.  
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Other actors 
mentioned but not 
interviewed 
Shaw  Male. Former secretary of the Party Branch.  
Poo  Male. One of the leaders of Provisional Directory. Died 
on 11th December 2011 in detention.  
Yim  Male. Chairman of former VC.  
Wong  Male. Hong Kong businessman who was one of the 
targets of protests. 
Chang Male. An activist who featured in the recorded video of 
the first demonstration. 
Wu Male. A protest leader who withdrew from the protest not 
long after he was elected to be the leader of Provisional 
Directory.  
Each interview lasted about one hour, but I interviewed the new VC members Yong, Hoo, and Nei 
twice because they offered much more information, beginning with the Wukan protest and moving 
on to the challenges faced by the new VC. Before each interview, I introduced my research briefly 
as per the information sheet (see Appendices 1 and 2) and read consent forms (see Appendices 3 
and 4) to interviewees, and then began recording with their consent. Generally, I would start the 
interview by asking them to describe the process of the Wukan protest, and then guide the 
conversation without fixed question sequences. Interviewees, especially protest activists and new 
VC members, were quite open for the interviews. They offered me some materials related to the 
protest, including videos and paper documents. Videos which recorded the process of the protest 
were transcribed into texts. The texts and copies of documents provided were utilised as another 
kind of data resource: documentary material.  
Documentary analysis was another way for me to generate considerable information. Simply put, a 
document is a written text (Scott, 2014). There were many texts relevant to, or generated during, the 
protests, some being documents provided by my research participants. Other material included news 
reports about the protest and statements released by governments on official governmental websites 
(such as the official website of Lufeng Municipal Government: www.lufengshi.gov.cn).  
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Documentary data collected during the fieldwork could be divided into three kinds: paper 
documents, newspaper reports and a range of other online data. Firstly, paper documents were 
mainly provided by protest activists. Those documents included leaflets used to mobilise villagers 
during the protest; copies of land sale contracts which were signed by the former village leaders; 
and official documents released by governments to disperse the protest between 2011 and 2012. 
Secondly, as journalists, especially journalists from Hong Kong and abroad, gave detailed reports 
on the whole process of the Wukan protest as it developed from September 2011 to July 2013, news 
reports offered me a picture of the protest as observed at the time. Those reports, written in English 
or Chinese, were downloaded from the internet. Although the main source of media reports were 
from international and Hong Kong media, the reports from local media (such as newspapers in 
Lufeng City) were also valuable in helping me to grasp governmental attitudes toward the Wukan 
protest. Lastly, there was a considerable amount of other online data that gave valuable insights into 
the concerns and actions of various parties throughout the protest. Those data included protesters’ 
appeals in the public social media (such as Sina Micro-blog), governmental reports published online 
for dealing with the protest and so on.  
Although collected during my study period (2012 to 2017), those documentary data were mainly 
about the Wukan protest from 2011, when the resistance started, to 2012 when the protest ended. 
However, I continued reviewing media reports on Wukan right through to the end of my PhD 
research in order to get a sense of what happened in Wukan after the protest. I return to this in the 
concluding chapter. 
4.4 Data analysis  
Although data manipulation software such as Nvivo and Atlas Ti are widely used by qualitative 
researchers, for a number of reasons, I chose to analyse the data without that assistance. This is 
mainly because much of my data from various sources was collected in Chinese while my eventual 
written interpretations were in English. For instance the interviews were conducted in Chinese, and 
I transcribed those conversations in Chinese after I returned to Australia. The transcription process 
gave me considerable familiarity with the data and I was able to simultaneously assign initial 
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categories and codes. Similarly, documents, journalist reports and other data collected from the 
internet were mainly in Chinese. Rather than undertake the huge project of translating all those data 
into English, I only translated extracts crucial to the analysis that I wanted to report in English.  
The question of translation was a challenge for my analysis. Van Nes et al. (2010) argue that 
translation is an interpretive act during which meanings may get lost. Thus when researchers 
perform translation, we should translate not only the literal meaning of the word, but also how the 
word relates conceptually in the context (Gee, 2015). As a native Chinese speaker, I did not doubt 
my competence in understanding my data, and recognising the nuance of meaning in accounts in 
their original language, but I could be uncertain about the specific word’s English translation. Hence 
it made sense to conduct my analysis in Chinese for most insightful interpretation and only translate 
after the meanings and significance were clear. As my interviews and observations were done in 
Chinese, I added one more step before writing the thesis. This was to translate the meaningful 
extracts of those data which were relevant to my argument into English for use in the analysis 
chapters to illustrate key points. 
Thematic analysis is the main way I analysed this data. It is a kind of text analysis, meaning 
analysing the words, phrases or images of the text – whether interview transcripts, documents or 
field-notes – to reveal the meanings and ideas of interviewees (Holsti, 1969). Thematic analysis 
focuses on identifiable themes and patterns (Aronson, 1995). Pragmatically, there are several steps 
for processing thematic analysis: familiarising oneself with data; generating initial codes; searching 
for themes based on the initial coding; reviewing the themes; defining and labelling themes; and 
writing up the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). During my analysis, I familiarised myself with the 
data by transcribing the interview records into scripts. Then, I produced “a detailed and systematic 
recording of the themes and issues addressed in the interviews and the themes and interviews 
together under a reasonably exhaustive category system” (Burnard, 1991, p462). Here I understand 
themes and issues as certain types of content which could be fitted into specific categories 
representing, for instance, core concepts, consistent messages and interesting divergences.  
My main categories were sorted out according to my research questions such as the causes, forms, 
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strategies and outcomes of the protest. During analysis, transcripts and other texts were read 
through and notes were made on general themes emerging from the transcripts such as autocracy, 
the use of the internet or family clans. Then, categories were established according to my research 
questions, themes were classified into each category after another thorough read, and several sheets 
were established to display those categories. As mentioned, I did not limit my analysis to the 
interview data, but extended it to other data/texts such as official documents, data collected from 
websites and media reports, and my written field notes based on my observations of, and informal 
conversations, with villagers. In this way, I reviewed, defined and labelled the themes for my thesis.  
4.5 Ensuring the quality of this research 
Research rigour is another consideration when undertaking qualitative research. Scholars’ opinions 
vary on the characteristics of rigour and trustworthiness in qualitative research. Some regard 
reliability – which refers to “the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the 
same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions” (Hammersley, 
2013, p67) – and validity – which is “the degree to which an instrument measures what it is 
intended to measure” (Polit & Hungler, 1994, p656) – as essential for judging the research. But 
others consider these standards more suitable for quantitative research because in qualitative 
research, especially using an interpretivist perspective, it is deemed inconsistent to “capture” an 
objective “reality” which remains the same to different researchers when interpretivists reject the 
very notion of a single, objective reality (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003, p274). Guba (1981) has 
constructed alternative criteria to evaluate what she calls the trustworthiness of qualitative research: 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Although Lincoln (1995) proposed 19 
specific criteria for qualitative research as an extension of the four criteria, she suggested that these 
extra criteria might apply to specific kinds or classes or certain stage of research. Thus, I identified 
Guba’s four basic criteria to evaluate the trustworthiness of my research.  
The first, credibility, means that the phenomena under scrutiny have been accurately recorded and 
the results of the research are believable (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). It can be gauged by data 
triangulation or triangulation through multiple sources or multiple analysts. During my research, I 
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interviewed seven groups of people in order to get credible results. These different groups of people, 
including protesters, government officials, journalists, and outside observers gave various 
perceptions of how and why the protest happened. As different people have different perspectives 
on the protest, my aim was not to verify accounts against each other, but to gain a broad picture of 
the protest, taking into account multiple perspectives. Likewise, interview data were verified by 
comparing with observations and documents. However, there existed some inconsistencies between 
different interviewees’ accounts. For instance, the number of people involved in the first 
demonstration was 400 people in governmental reports but 3,000 people according to protesters. I 
note these differences in my later chapters to demonstrate the way different groups presented 
particular accounts of the protest in ways that justified their own actions and positions. Rather than 
unquestioningly adopting one account I present interpretations that are consistent with the range of 
accounts and seem likely to be accepted by many observers.  
Second, transferability refers to the degree to which the findings can be applicable in other contexts. 
It comes from a thick description that clearly portrays the unique and context-specific findings as 
well as aspects with wider applicability. I have sought to provide rich contextualised descriptions to 
help my readers understand why things work in that context differently or indeed which aspects of 
protest appear consistent across rural China according to the accounts provided by previous 
researchers. 
A third criterion of research quality is consistency, meaning that if the work were repeated in the 
same context with the same methods and participants, similar results would be obtained. This 
criterion is difficult to achieve in qualitative work, because the societal situation always changes, 
and insights and sensitivities differ between diverse researchers (Guba, 1981). Thus, Guba (1981, 
p81) proposes the alternative notion of “dependability”, a concept that embraces elements of the 
stability, reliability and trackability of research findings and explanations so that they are stable, 
reliable and traceable or trackable (Guba, 1981). To achieve dependability, a qualitative researcher 
should at least enable a future investigator to repeat the study (Shenton, 2004). In order to address 
the dependability issue, the processes adopted for the study have been reported in detail, thereby 
enabling a future researcher to repeat the work, if not necessarily to gain the same results (Shenton, 
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2004). 
Fourth, confirmability questions how the researcher keeps neutrality during the study and how the 
research findings are supported by the data collected (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). It needs to ensure as 
far as possible that the findings are the results of the experiences and ideas of the informants, rather 
than the characteristics and the preferences of the researcher (Shenton, 2004). Keeping these criteria 
in mind, I have quoted evidence from interview transcripts or document contents to substantiate my 
argument in the analysis chapters. I have also identified inconsistencies between accounts where 
they arise and sought to explain evidence that does not fit the overall story.  
4.6 An ethical approach to research 
Ethical issues are an important consideration for researchers (Bailey, 2006), especially when the 
research includes observational studies which often involve the development of close relationships 
in the field (Mason, 2002). The four main ethical issues that are relevant to this research are: 
avoiding deception; avoiding harm to the researcher and to participants; gaining informed consent; 
and maintaining confidentiality.  
Firstly, it was important that I continuously informed all villagers of my identity as a researcher and 
assured them that the research would do little harm to their lives, physically, or psychologically. I 
introduced myself to everyone I met and to as many groups as possible verbally, and distributed 
business cards to confirm my identity during my observation of the informal events. Moreover, I 
was introduced by the village leader Lam before observing the VC meeting.  
Secondly, I sought to ensure that participants would experience no emotional or physical harm as a 
result of this research or of talking to me or being written about by me. While some involved in the 
Wukan protest were imprisoned at the time of the protest, events had settled in the village by the 
time I arrived and there was no longer any violence or any threat of repercussions for those 
discussing the events. However, political tensions might still exist in the village as suggested by 
both the Township and Municipal officials refusing my request for interview. Also, as I outline in 
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Chapter Six, the current VC leader asked me to leave his house several minutes after I entered, most 
likely because of the imminent visit of a higher level official who would not want attention from 
outside. I made it clear to participants that anyone with concerns could easily avoid repercussions 
by refusing my interview request or terminating the interview if they felt uncomfortable. Since 
journalists and other outsiders have been frequent visitors to Wukan and the protest I focussed on 
had been appeased more than one year earlier, my academic investigation was regarded by 
participants as relatively harmless and was not expected to place political pressure on governments 
or to put villagers at risk. However, to protect participants, further, I also sought to protect their 
confidentiality by keeping individual data secure and using aliases in reports. Records of the 
interviews were transcribed and the data collected from field research were stored in a password 
protected computer which could be accessed only by me. 
In order to avoid the possible damage to social networks or relationships with others, confidentiality 
was maintained by replacing names with generic terms such as “villager” and “local official” during 
my conversations in the village. Also, during my data analysis and thesis writing, I use pseudonyms 
which are listed in Table 4-1 to protect interviewees and other villagers in the case. Those code 
names helped to guarantee people’s confidentiality, especially since my focus may be defined as a 
sensitive topic because it relates to political demands and to Chinese government. By fabricating 
those pseudonyms, I tried to avoid possible negative influences from other villagers or governments 
on people mentioned in this case. In some cases, however, people are easily identifiable by others in 
the village from the formal positions they hold (such as members of the VC). Where this might 
occur, I informed people of the possibility and discussed with them how this might be addressed 
(including reminding them not to share with me anything that might be private, confidential or 
potentially harmful).  
Thus, trying to maintain authenticity and to avoid possible harmful influences on research 
participants, this thesis presents a case study of Wukan village and the prominent protest that 
happened there. As popular methods of qualitative research, data for this case study were collected 
via observing, interviewing and collecting related documents. By examining the Wukan protest 
in-depth, the phenomenon of Chinese rural protest can be better understood in terms of conditions 
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for emergence, process of development, and outcomes. It is to these issues that I now turn.  
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Chapter 5  
The making of a village-wide public protest: An 
analysis of the Wukan protest 
5.1 Introduction 
As delineated in the introduction chapter, the oppositional action in Wukan developed from 
individual expressions of dissatisfaction about the sale of local lands into a village-wide public 
protest. Also, as introduced in the third chapter, I divided the Wukan situation into two stages: first 
is the resistance and second is protest. The first stage is from the 3rd April 2009 to the 20th 
September 2011 when a small group of young activists expressed their grievances and disseminated 
leaflets to gather protesters. The second stage began on the 21st September 2011, when the first 
group demonstration which involved about 3,000 villagers was held, and lasted until the 23rd 
December 2011 when protesters ended their conflict with local officials. In this chapter, I will 
analyse the reasons why villagers’ anger flared years after the village lands were sold, and the 
process by which the small group resistance developed into a mass public protest. 
The Political Process model, which incoporates some other schools of social movement theory 
(such as classical theory, resource mobilisation, political opportunity, and framing theory), is 
applied to understand the emergence of the Wukan protest and to answer my research questions. 
Specifically, my analysis of this case focusses on two main aspects. The first one is the reasons why 
villagers were angry with the land selling situation and thus took part in the mass protest against the 
village leaders who had sold the lands some years earlier. Secondly I explore the opportunities, 
resources and strategies used to form the public protest. 
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5.2 Mounting grievances about land acquisition 
Villagers’ anger toward land acquisition was a leading cause for the Wukan protest. Protesters 
claimed they received very little in the way of compensation except for 550 yuan (less than 
AUD$100) from the land selling. They asserted the land acquisition was illegal and demanded to 
retrieve their lands.  
This is not an isolated case in rural China. Yu (2007) estimates that in 65 per cent of cases of rural 
protest, peasants are aiming specifically at retrieving their lands or asking for more compensation. 
Scholars argue that the resentment about being deprived of their land (Guo, 2001), the growing 
consciousness of rights to livelihood and to express themselves (O’Brien, 2008a), and emerging 
questions about the legitimacy of grassroots authority when it violates villagers’ rights (Yu, 2007) 
are the causes of protests. Some of these reasons appeared in Wukan’s case as well. In this section, I 
analyse the reasons for villagers’ anger rising some years after the land was sold.  
In Wukan’s case, most lands were sold between 1992 and 2009, but the protest outburst occurred in 
2011. Moreover, in contrast to villagers in other areas who earn their livelihood by farming, 
residents of Wukan were not so dependent on their lands as most of them were employed in the 
fishing industry, were migrant workers in the cities or in business. Before analysing the reasons for 
rising discontent, I would like to introduce the land situation in the village.  
As in other rural areas in China (as outlined in Chapter One), land in Wukan is collectively owned 
and used by villagers. It is administered on their behalf by the Villagers’ Committee (a group of 
cadres who have usually been appointed by the Township or Municipal Governments). However, in 
the coastal village of Wukan, villagers abandoned cultivation of their lands decades ago for a 
variety of reasons including alternative livelihood options and poor soil quality.  
Bang, a 65 year old villager who spent most of his life in the village, related the land history to me: 
We did have lands for cultivating in the 1980s. The state carried out the land policy of contract 
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system since 1978. Although the average acreage was relatively small: about 1 mu
18
 [0.07 
hectare] per family, we could do some planting in the land. Sometimes rice, sometimes potato or 
peanuts. But Shaw [the former village leader] dredged the sediment to deepen the harbour, and 
placed the sediment onto our land in 1990. Generally, adjacent lands were salinised and 
productivity of the lands dropped. Then, most villagers abandoned cultivating their lands. 
The dredging of sea mud to dig a deeper harbour for ships as organised by the village leaders in 
1990 unfortunately resulted in the salinisation of the farming land. Therefore, the land had been left 
unplanted and neglected since the 1990s. However, at the time, this was not regarded as a disaster 
by villagers since many of them were originally earning their livelihoods from fishing and had been 
using their small plots of land for subsistence production. Since the 1980s when China started a 
market economy, many villagers had gone to the cities to work or conduct business which further 
reduced their reliance on agricultural production from the village lands. When asked what 
occupations they had in the past 20 years, Hoo, one of the protest leaders, answered: 
In the 1990s, many Wukanese went to other cities for trading clothes. That was a golden time for 
us. Some of them went to the most northerly area of China, some of them the far west. Of course, 
a large proportion of villagers stayed in the village and continued being fishermen [or 
fisherwomen].  
Given these alternatives, land was neglected by villagers and the village cadres at the time, who 
were the administrators of the land, began to sell the land. Initially, those deals were made between 
the former VC and local villagers who acquired some small areas to build new houses. The turning 
point of land selling came in 1992 with the establishment of the Wukan Harbour Industrial 
Development Company as a township enterprise which was stipulated to be owned by the whole 
village (Article 11, LLA), but whose corporate representative was Shaw, the former leader of 
Wukan’s Party Branch and the de facto leader of the village. In cooperation with the Donghai 
Township Government, the company started to purchase lands from the VC, and then sell the use 
                                               
18 mu (亩):Chinese unit of land area. One mu equals to 0.067 hectare. In other words, 15 mu equals to one hectare. 
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rights to other development companies at a higher price
19
. However, the Wukan Harbor Company 
was not the only one that bought lands from the VC: a hotel investment of Shenzhen Airline and 
several factories invested in by some local businessmen were also involved in the transactions. 
Moreover, the Donghai Economic Development Zone, an administrative organisation which 
belongs to Lufeng City (the encompassing municipality), had another main role in acquiring land 
from Wukan. Existing material of sale contracts signed by the former village leaders show that most 
land sales occurred over the time period from 1993 to 2009.  
In summary, villagers in Wukan did not pay much attention to the village land, thus facilitating 
more than a decade of land transactions between former village leaders and buyers, including 
outside developers. However, villagers’ awareness of the sales and expectations about benefiting 
from the land increased after 2009. Their expectations rose with the incremental land value and with 
comparisons made with former village leaders or villagers in other areas who were seen to benefit 
from land sales far more than the Wukanese villagers had generally done.   
The rising land value in recent years was the first element stimulating villagers’ expectations. Land 
prices have surged more than 20 times within the past 30 years: a sales contract signed by the 
Wukan VC and the Donghai Economic Development Zone in 1993 shows that the price for 
acquiring 1.26 million square metres (about 126 hectares) was 6.7 million yuan (AU$1.15m), that is, 
5.32 yuan per square metre (less than AU$1 per square metre). In contrast, the standard price of 
land issued by the Guangdong Government in Lufeng City in 2010 shows that the land price surged 
to 70 yuan per square metre (about AU$11 per square metre) for the minimum, and 468 yuan per 
square metre (about AU$78 per square metre) for the maximum. Villagers noticed this value growth 
and they referred to the land value several times during interviews. Lee, a villager in Wukan, 
expressed her rising awareness of the potential to benefit financially from the land: 
We talked much about the land selling between 2009 and 2011. They [other villagers] said that a 
piece of land will be sold to a big real estate company and we were likely to get several thousand 
                                               
19
 According to Chinese law, township enterprises cannot be the subject of acquiring and selling use rights of village land, but can 
only use village land for construction (as an exception of village land usage) and lease that land to other enterprises. However, due to 
administrative disorders, village-owned township enterprises were sometimes involved in land transactions.  
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yuan for each villager. We were excited about it. If they [the former village leaders] shared those 
several thousand yuan, we would be really happy about it. But they did not. Thus we were 
dissatisfied with them.  
As that comment illustrates, Lee and other villagers became discontented because they did not 
benefit from the land selling. The comparison with others who did benefit increased their feeling of 
grievance. In addition, villagers who worked outside Wukan also noticed the discrepancy between 
themselves and residents of other villages in the Pearl River Delta where the “Guangdong model of 
urbanisation” (Chung & Unger, 2013, p33) had been adopted.  
This model of urbanisation is associated with the Guangdong Province (where Wukan is situated), 
although it has also been applied in other parts of China. In these areas, rural communities retain 
collective ownership of much of their land and villagers are allowed to retain their housing sites 
while the villages are encompassed by urban land (Chung & Unger, 2013). Rural communities, in 
the name of township enterprises, are permitted to use rural land as construction land (Article 11, 
LLA) and to build factory buildings on the village land for production, or more often for leasing to 
entrepreneurs. Alternatively, villagers build multi-storey apartment buildings, on their housing sites 
for leasing (Chung & Unger, 2013). Thus in those villages, villagers earn from both the collectively 
owned enterprises and the leasing of household apartments (Chung & Unger, 2013).  
The Wukan villagers who worked in those areas learned from this model and began to re-evaluate 
their land and potential ways of using it. They started to regard their land as a valuable resource, 
particularly since Wukan sits beside Lufeng city and the coastline, both of which offer a great 
opportunity for development. However, their lands did not bring benefits for them. Nei, an activist 
in the protest, who worked in another city in the Pearl River Delta for several years, said that: 
We did not know what the land could bring to us in the early days. But while I was working in 
another city, I found the villages were developed very well, and those villagers could get much 
money from leasing or selling land. We have valuable land as well in Wukan, but most of our 
villagers were still living under a poor financial condition. That’s unfair.  
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Last but not least, villagers’ anticipation about benefiting from their land and their sense of injustice 
increased with the disproportionate wealth observed among the former village leaders. Most 
conspicuously, the luxurious mansions built by some former VC members and Party Branch 
members were a very obvious contrast to other small houses in the village (see Figure 5-1). Ching, a 
female activist in the protest, showed those mansions to me and expressed her suspicions of the 
former village cadres: 
You can see those mansions in the central village; some of them were built by the former village 
cadres. [Others were built by successful business men who earned their money outside]. But 
where did their money come from? By selling our land and corruptly retaining those earnings.  
 
Figure 5-1: Comparison between a former villager leader’s house and other villagers’ homes 
In addition, according to interviewees’ descriptions, the then village leaders led an extravagant life. 
Cheng depicted that lifestyle for me: 
They [the former village leaders] usually have dinners in a ritzy restaurant, smoking exclusive 
cigarettes and drinking high-end liquor.  
As a result, villagers became convinced their land had been sold for high profits and that the former 
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cadres had benefited a great deal from this. As collective owners of the land, the villagers were 
eager to obtain what they saw as their share of the profits. It is this fact that raised their expectations 
in recent years. However, villagers were unable to obtain what they anticipated. They attempted to 
do so, but failed. They had neither an opportunity to bargain with the former village cadres nor an 
effective method to complain.  
The former village leaders were described as being autocratic which prevented villagers from being 
able to bargain with them about the land selling. Interviewees claimed that there had been no open 
election and that the leaders of the Party Branch and VC had remained in their positions for more 
than 40 years. Meanwhile, the local Villagers’ Assembly had not been held in recent years. 
Moreover, most interviewees claimed they had no idea about when and how the lands were sold. 
When asked about the land selling situation, Nei said that:  
We didn’t know when and at what price those lands were sold in the past days. We only saw the 
lands were fenced in recent years, but didn’t know what they would be used for. They [the 
former village cadres] did not publicise the land selling information to us… because they treated 
the land as their own! 
The lack of public discussion of village issues had not been crucial for villagers until this point. 
However, their desire to bargain with former village leaders grew after they realised the land’s value. 
Some (mostly young) villagers proposed arguing with the former leaders but were persuaded not to 
do so by the elders. Cheng, one of the activists, explained the reason: 
[The village leader] Shaw was very influential in the village. In the past days, no one dared to 
oppose Shaw. Some people did, and then were beaten. I intended to argue with him about the 
land selling, but my parents discouraged me. They were afraid to provoke Shaw.  
Having been denied the opportunity to ask for benefits within the village, some of the villagers 
attempted to resolve this problem by taking the issue to higher level authorities. Hoo, one of the 
village’s leading activists in opposing the land sales listed 13 petitions for me. They went to four 
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levels of governments: the Township, Municipal, Prefecture-level and Provincial Governments. 
They submitted their letter-petitions to the Letter and Visit Bureau of each level to express their 
dissatisfaction toward the former village cadres. However, they did not receive any replies. When 
asked of the results of those petitions, Hoo said: 
Yes each time they treated us politely, and some cadres told us they will handle this problem. But 
we still get no valid reply. Each government forwarded our letter to the lower level government, 
and finally those letters went to Shaw! Actually, we got nothing except Shaw’s threat.  
After the last petition letter on the 14th March 2011, villagers abandoned petitions as a means of 
expressing their dissatisfaction and instead turned to collective action.  
Gurr (1970) has proposed a “relative deprivation” theory to explain why people become angry 
about particular issues and organise collective action. He argues that a feeling of deprivation is a 
vital reason for protests. And he notes that subjective feelings of being deprived, relative to others, 
are often of greater importance to people than actual material loss (Gurr, 1970, p37). Thus, relative 
deprivation can be defined as “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value 
capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, p37). In Wukan’s case, we can observe how rising expectations of 
benefitting from the land occurred as a result of increasing land value and comparisons with former 
leaders or villagers in other areas. However, villagers’ abilities to achieve their expectations 
remained limited because they had no open way to bargain with former village leaders or to receive 
a response when complaining to higher authorities. This fits Gurr’s definition of “aspirational 
deprivation” in which value expectations rise while capabilities remain the same, thereby increasing 
the sense of deprivation (Gurr, 1970, p51). Thus, it is this discrepancy between expectation and 
capabilities that deepened the Wukan villagers’ feeling of being deprived and ultimately led to the 
open protest. This also echoes Guo’s (2001) argument that feelings of being deprived have been the 
main driving force of the resistance observed among rural people in China more broadly. However, 
whereas Guo suggests that perceptions of deprivation among rural people have risen because 
compensation from land acquisition has been too low for villagers to live on and the loss of land 
deprived them of livelihood and welfare, the Wukan villagers’ sense of deprivation arose from 
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changing opinions about land value. These grievances, according to some scholars (Gurr, 1970; 
Merton, 1968; Walker & Smith, 2002), are the main reason for the outburst of collective action. 
However, collective action does not occur simply because people feel angry or deprived. In addition, 
the process by which collective action occurs is influenced by several other elements.  
5.3 The process of collective action 
As analysed in the previous part of this chapter, villagers’ level of discontent grew in recent years. 
For some other scholars, such as McCarthy and Zald (1977a), collective actions cannot take place 
without additional conditions in place especially if social resources (such as time, money, and skills) 
are insufficient for mobilisation. In addition, McAdam (1982) argues that the political status of the 
aggrieved groups in society is important in the forming of collective actions. That is, a changing 
balance of power between those who are inside the polity and challengers (who are outsiders to the 
polity) is vital for the emergence of contentious political action by large groups (McAdam, 1982). 
He focused on the conditions that favour collective mobilisation and proposed a Political Process 
model to explain the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement in America pointing out that besides 
a sense of dissatisfaction about an issue or set of issues, some elements such as political 
opportunities and organisational strength are important for collective action and social movements 
to develop (McAdam, 1982).  
As outlined in Chapter Three, the Political Process model (McAdam, 1982) presents a trajectory of 
successful collective action whereby political opportunities and indigenous organisations are 
utilised by aggrieved masses to initiate collective protest. McAdam argues that political opportunity, 
which can be created through a changing relationship between the powerful groups and ordinary 
citizens, is a basis of an emerging social movement. It refers to a space for collective action created, 
for instance, where there is a change in the degree of power inequality between local people and 
their ruling elite. Another factor is a strong indigenous organisation which refers to the existence of 
local organisations and networks that can be used to facilitate collective action and mobilise 
protesters. In addition, what McAdam (1982, p48) terms “cognitive liberation” among potential 
participants is another crucial element involving rising insurgent consciousness among the 
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aggrieved people.  
As will be shown, these elements appeared in Wukan’s case as individual anxieties evolved into a 
collective protest. McAdam’s Political Process model is particularly helpful to understanding 
Wukan’s case considering the following two aspects: first, the conditions under which the collective 
action emerged; and second, how the villagers were mobilised to attend the protest.  
5.3.1 Expanding political opportunities 
Expanding political opportunities are the first element revealed in the process of the Wukan protest. 
Following Tilly (1978), McAdam sees collective action as involving two key groups. First, the 
powerful groups who are the insiders forming the polity (whose interests are recognised as valid by 
others in authority); and second, the “challengers” who are outside the polity and lack routine 
access to important decisions and decision-making processes.  
Changes in power relations between these two groups provide new opportunities for political action 
(McAdam, 1982). Broad social change processes, such as wars, industrialisation, international 
political realignments or concerted political pressure from international actors, economic crisis, and 
widespread demographic shifts, are likely to cause these dynamics to shift, thereby expanding 
political opportunity to change the political status quo (McAdam, 1982). Expanding political 
opportunities were observed in Wukan’s case and help to account for the emergence of collective 
protest in the village. These opportunities arose through several social change processes, which 
directly led to changing political dynamics and power relations between the villagers and the former 
village leaders and created space for new forms of political action.  
The first contributing factor was the expanding access to Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). These technologies, such as cell phones, email and the World Wide Web, 
changed the ways in which activists communicated, collaborated and demonstrated (Garrett, 2006). 
Melucci (1996) points out that information is the central resource of contemporary movements and 
that expanding access to information will change power relations in a society. In addition, Zheng 
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and Wu (2005) assert that the internet is capable of increasing an individual’s freedom to access 
information, and some social groups use the internet to influence state politics and policy practices. 
Likewise, scholars have cited the important roles the new technologies play in current collective 
actions all around the world, such as in the Middle East (Stepanova, 2011), Egypt (Tufekci & 
Wilson, 2012) as well as China itself (Diamond, 2010). 
Wukan’s villagers have been exposed to these technologies in recent years. Smart mobile phones 
are common in this village, which facilitated communication significantly and gave access to more 
information. In addition, internet access via computers expanded as well. According to the statistical 
report about China’s developing internet in 2013, 60 per cent of residents in Guangdong had access 
to the internet via a computer. The expanding access to these technologies enhanced villagers’ 
abilities and changed the power structure. Firstly, it equipped villagers with more knowledge about 
law and rights. Activists searched on the internet for more information about their rights with regard 
to land ownership. The laws which are published by the Central Government could be easily found 
on the internet, and the activists selected advantageous articles to support their demands. 
Sun: you mentioned you are familiar with internet, what did you get from that? 
Hsing: I searched for information about the land acquisition rules on the internet, got much 
knowledge and passed that on to other villagers. For example, I learned from the internet that we 
are the master of the collectively owned lands, because we are members of the collectivity.  
Secondly, villagers used the internet to release messages to outsiders, which attracted broad 
attention and sympathy both from international media and readers. Activists of the protest, 
especially the younger ones who are familiar with the internet, registered numerous accounts and 
published a large number of posts during the protest. Hsing, an activist who was particularly active 
during the protest, was proud of his role in sending information during the protest, which attracted 
outside attention:  
During the hard days of protest, message posting was banned by the Government, we tried every 
way to send our information out….and finally we attracted the media’s attention and got much 
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help from them…which was a crucial element for our success.  
Last but not least, communication technologies (such as online-chatting software, mobile phones 
and email) smoothed communications among villagers. These communications bonded villagers 
together and formed a stronger group for challenging the former political structure in the village 
(which will be illustrated in section 5.3.2, “Indigenous organisations”).  
Scholars agree that ICTs promote contentious politics because they facilitate the exchange of 
information, help to inform public opinion and attract new members (Adams & Roscigno, 2005). 
More specifically, Garrett and Edwards (2007) suggest that the use of ICTs reduces participation 
costs, promotes the formation of collective identity and creates community, all of which strengthen 
protest mobilising organisations and strategies. Meanwhile, others suggest that ICTs, in 
combination with globalisation, influence national-level political opportunity structures, because the 
technology reduce a state’s capacity to repress resistance (Ayres, 1999; Scott & Street, 2000). 
However, in the Chinese political situation, rigid content censorship means that Chinese citizens do 
not have the free speech that underpins information exchange and cognitive liberation associated 
with political protest movements (Wang & Hong, 2010). While criticism of the Chinese state, its 
leaders, and its policies are not censored, the online publication of any topic connected to collective 
action is prohibited without permission (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; 2014). Discussions touching 
on forbidden topics will be banned, new content cannot be published on the offending sites and 
existing content will be deleted (Bamman, O'Connor, & Smith, 2012). Thus, Huang and Yip (2012) 
conclude that the internet’s influence has been exaggerated in China and its capacity for 
mobilisation at the early stage of a protest is limited in the Chinese context.  
Nevertheless, the Wukan protesters had strategies for utilising ICTs to mobilise a protest under such 
an authoritarian context. As outlined above, their tactics included sharing information among 
villagers to raise their grievances about former village cadres and inviting outside media to report 
on their situation. However they avoided publicising their protest gatherings on open websites and 
when the chatroom of the Warm-Blooded Youth League was closed down, new forums were opened. 
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After the second demonstration, when the relationship between local governments and villagers had 
deteriorated, all information about the “Wukan protest” was prohibited on the internet. As a result, 
villagers could not send out messages about the protest to outsiders and most of the content about 
the protest was deleted. At that stage, the protesters tried to avoid censorship by ruses such as 
releasing messages in the name of “Wukan20” or “鸟崁21” or “WK22” instead of “乌坎” (collected 
from Hsing’s Weibo). By eluding the censorship and continuously sending out information about 
villagers’ demands and their circumstances, the Wukan protesters received more attention from 
outsiders, which brought pressure on governments and expanded protesters’ opportunities to oppose 
government decisions.  
The second contributing factor is urbanisation. Hsing (2010) points out that rapid metropolitan 
growth has made land a focal point of local politics, reshaped state power and radically altered 
state-society-market relations. In his view, at the rural fringe, when peasants lose their land and 
homes, they are relocated to separate locations and their mobilising capacity for protest is 
undermined. However, this contrasts with Wukan where villagers were united to oppose land selling. 
This is because the Wukan villagers, though deprived of their land, were not relocated to different 
areas as their homes were not acquired and their fishing livelihoods remained largely intact. As 
villagers remained in place, their social networks were not destroyed which meant that urbanisation 
enhanced, rather than diminished, their capacities to unite for a public protest. In the meantime, 
while the former leaders’ power strengthened during the decades when they controlled the land 
resource and made deals with the Township and Municipal Governments or developers, villagers’ 
resources were developing as well. Many villagers moved to the cities for work so they learned 
about how democracy worked in those areas and became more aware of citizens’ rights. As well, 
villagers’ wealth increased during their time working in cities which meant that they had adequate 
financial resources to participate in the protest. Yong used himself as an example:  
                                               
20 “Wukan” is the Pinyin spelling of “乌坎”. 
21 “鸟崁” is slightly converted from “乌坎” by adding some strokes. Although the pronunciation has changed by adding those 
strokes, readers were readily able to understand the meaning of this word because the word itself does not have specific meaning.  
22 “WK” is initials and abbreviation of “乌坎” in Pinyin.  
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I was doing business in Shenzhen and Dongguan for several years during which time I earned 
some money. I used to have one business department in Guangzhou, one in Shenzhen, two shops 
in Dongguan, and some investments in other cities. I disposed of my business after the financial 
crisis in 2008, came back home and built my house in the village. My economic condition is not 
bad thus I can do something in the political field.  
As well as Yong, other protesters indicated a similar story. Particularly, most activists were working 
in cities before the protest. Their return to the village enlarged villagers’ abilities and resources. 
Third, the global financial crisis in 2008 changed the power structure directly. Scholars have 
witnessed the financial collapse of many factories in coastal cities in China and the trend of 
migrant-workers and business people to return to their hometowns (Chan, 2010; Huang et al., 2011; 
Schüller & Zhou, 2009). This was true for the Wukan villagers. During the financial crisis, many 
villagers lost their jobs or businesses in the cities and returned to Wukan. Yong was one of them. He 
emphasised the role of the financial crisis during his interview:  
Villagers did not protest against land selling until 2008, that’s because most of the activists did 
not notice it before the financial crisis. The protest would not be successful if it just depended on 
the villagers who stayed in the village. They did not have much ambition. But after 2008 when 
the financial crisis happened, it was not easy to do business, thus some of the villagers who once 
earned their living in other cities came back. I was one of them. I wouldn’t have come back if the 
business was good. I think Hoo [another participant] experienced a similar story to me.  
It is these villagers, with the knowledge, resources and experiences acquired in the cities, who 
began to resist and protest against the former village leaders. As Yong describes, there was a general 
perception that villagers who chose to stay in rural villages rather than seek their fortune in the city 
were lacking ambition, and, accordingly, the requisite skills and ability to organise any kind of 
protest against land acquisition and entrenched village leaders. Instead, it was commonly felt by 
participants that the opportunity to initiate collective action only arose when more capable workers 
returned from the cities following the economic downturn of the financial crisis.  
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Thus, several social processes have changed the power status in the village. Challengers’ power was 
enhanced in recent years from three perspectives: their access to information expanded, their 
communication strengthened, and their ranks were boosted by returning villagers with increased 
knowledge and experiences as well as wealth. When more villagers turned their eyes back on the 
village after the global financial crisis in 2008, the discrepancy in political power between former 
village leaders and villagers diminished further.  
However, a changing power structure within the village is not the only dimension of political 
opportunity. More broadly, political changes within the state played an indirect role in the 
emergence of collective actions. Tarrow (1998) concludes in his survey of the modern history of 
contentious politics that collective actions are facilitated or constrained by four dimensions of 
political opportunities: increasing access to the current polity, shifting political alignments, conflicts 
within or among current elites (or the polity), and cooperation with the elites to make influential 
allies. These four factors reveal the impacts of the prevailing regime. Similarly, political shifts 
facilitated protest Wukan’s protest as well.  
One specific political change at the macro level that reveals these factors at work is the grassroots 
election policy. In 1998, the Central Government issued the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees 
(OLVC), which stipulated that the VC be the administrative organisation of village issues and 
village assets, and VC members should be elected by villagers (Article 1, OLVC). Village elections 
were introduced to rural areas at that same time. According to scholars, the Central Government 
introduced these democratic processes into rural areas in order to reduce local discontent (O’Brien 
& Li, 2000; Oi, 1999). They argued that village elections help governments to establish legitimacy 
in rural areas and to deal with rural people’s troubles (Guo & Bernstein, 2004; O’Brien & Li, 2000; 
Oi, 1999). However, local governments, especially township governments (the direct administrators 
of villages), prefer VC members to be nominated rather than elected because they believe that 
nominated village leaders are more likely to obey governments (Guo & Bernstein, 2004; Oi, 1999). 
Thus, local government officials may promise to promote open elections, but sometimes fail to do it 
in practice (O’Brien & Li, 2000). Such practices provide an example of Tarrow’s (1998) shifting 
political alignments and villagers’ changing access to central government allies. In the early days, 
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villagers were not so concerned about exercising this kind of political participation because public 
assets were rare in the past and there was little interest for them in the activities of Villagers’ 
Committees with respect to administering collective assets (Oi & Rozelle, 2000). Thus, village 
elections remained uncommon in rural China despite the law being issued for more than a decade 
(Schubert & Chen, 2007; Tan, 2004).  
However, in Wukan, as elsewhere, villagers’ attitudes toward VCs have changed in recent years. 
Rapid urbanisation and the accompanying land acquisition brought an increased land value from the 
early 2000s. As the VC is the administrative organisation of rural land, local governments (both 
township and municipal governments) have to sign contracts with VCs before the land can be 
acquired and transferred into urban land. Also, the price for land acquisition is negotiated between 
VCs and local governments. Thus, villagers began to pay more attention to the operations and 
processes of the VC, especially those living in areas at the urban periphery where land is most likely 
to be acquired. There was more attention paid to village elections and there were reports of bribery 
taking place in the village election (Cai, 2003; Manion, 2006). As a result of urbanisation and 
expanding access to information, villagers in Wukan not only became more aware of their electoral 
rights, but also sought to exercise them. New avenues were available for villagers to pursue their 
interests through Villagers’ Committees and township governments. In contrast to the former days 
when few villagers questioned village leaders’ legitimacy, Wukan villagers from 2009 began to 
accuse the former village leaders of undemocratic – and even illegal – activities. Protesters stressed 
the illegality of the former village leaders during the interviews. Hsing, who was an activist during 
the protest, said that: 
Shaw has occupied his position as the leader of the Party Branch for 41 years. Yim has been the 
leader of the VC for almost 40 years as well. Who could do that for such a long time? They did 
not hold open elections in the past…there were some elections, but they just invited some 
relatives or friends to vote…that’s not an open election…we regarded the VC as illegal, thus the 
contracts signed by the former VC leader were illegal as well. So we want to get our land back. 
Protesters found a legal way to assert their demands. As the electoral right was formulated explicitly 
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by the Central Government, it is legitimate to claim that. Thus, protesters raised two demands 
during their protest: retrieve land and open election. Although the demand for open election aimed 
to change the political leadership in the village (which will be illustrated in the next chapter), it was 
partly a strategy to retrieve land. Thus, for challengers, the policy of village elections provided 
another political opportunity for them to organise the protest.  
5.3.2 Indigenous organisation/established associational network 
A conducive political environment affords the opportunity for successful contentious action. Those 
opportunities could be exploited with sufficient organisational resources to unite aggrieved groups 
for collective action (McAdam, 1982). Thus, McAdam (1982) suggests that the presence and 
mobilisation of indigenous organisations are crucial elements in the emergence of social movements. 
The concept of indigenous organisations refers not only to already-established and formalised 
groups, institutions and organisations, but, also, importantly, to the social networks and connections 
– or Guanxi – between members that underpin these groups. Freeman (1973), for example, argues 
that the generation of a social movement is ultimately dependent on the presence of an indigenous 
infrastructure which can link members of the aggrieved population into an organised campaign of 
mass political action. Echoing Freeman, Oberschall (1973) asserts that without existing networks, 
aggrieved populations would only produce short-term and localised outbursts. Those interpersonal 
networks play a remarkable role in Chinese collective action (Brunner et al., 1990; Wang & Woods, 
2013; Xie & Mol, 2006). To be specific, Xie and Mol (2006) argue that Guanxi (the Chinese term 
for interpersonal ties) facilitates the formation of protest networks, as it helps to recruit members 
and maintain internal solidarity. Similarly, Wang and Woods (2013) note that Guanxi has a positive 
influence on rural activism because the emotional ties will increase the solidary power and sense of 
unity among activists.  
Tight interpersonal networks are characteristic of the south-east coastal area of Chaozhou-Shantou 
(or Chaoshan area) where Wukan is located. As recognised by many scholars, there is a kind of 
unique culture in this area (Huang, 2002; Q. Li, 2011; Zheng, 2008). According to Q. Li (2011), for 
example, the Chaoshanese have particular living styles, behavioural patterns, folk habits and a 
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common dialect. This unique culture was shaped under the impacts of Confucian traditions and 
marine conditions (as these areas adjoin the sea coast). Q. Li argues that, influenced by Confucian 
traditions, the Chaoshanese greatly honour their ancestors; maintain tight connections within the 
family clan who share the same ancestor; emphasise etiquette during their daily life (especially rules 
about family relations); and unite when facing external challenges. Also, they have a long history of 
doing business overseas, which has bestowed on the Chaoshanese a reputation for being courageous 
and adventurous (Q. Li, 2011). This cultural background helps us to understand the strong local 
networks that played a part in the Wukan protest.  
Wukan is located in the Chaoshan area and is a typical village with Chaoshan culture. The listed 
cultural characteristics can be seen in villagers’ daily life and this unique culture generated an 
associational network, which was crucial for mobilisation during the Wukan protest. Specifically, 
the network was knitted by two things: family clans and religious beliefs.  
Family members (who share the same family name) are bonded tightly. They are connected by 
kinship. Most families keep a copy of their genealogical chart on which every member is recorded. 
Moreover, some wealthier villagers built ancestral temples in the village to commemorate and 
enshrine their ancestors. Villagers have a clear understanding of their family clan obligations to 
attend family events such as weddings and funerals. Further, they discuss family issues (such as 
building an ancestor temple or amending the genealogical chart) together under the organisation of 
a family committee. Those committees are formed by enthusiastic and capable villagers whose 
leaders are often prestigious elder males. Committee members voluntarily convene meetings of 
family members when there is any family issue. Small meetings are held by notifying members 
personally. A large assembly of kin will be announced by striking gongs that each family clan has 
for convening members. Bang introduced the notion of the gongs to me, saying that, “each of our 
family clans has a gong. We ring it when we need to call our family members together”. During the 
family meetings, members will reach agreement to help family members with organising wedding 
ceremonies or funerals, or mediate conflicts within the family clan. While explaining the culture in 
Wukan, Bang stressed the tight family ties among villagers: 
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We have 47 families in Wukan according to the surname. Each family clan has a committee for 
organising family issues. For example, when my son was married last year, I held a wedding 
ceremony in the village with the help of the X [his surname] clan committee. Most of my family 
members showed up in this ceremony. The committee [for the family clan] helped me with 
cooking and serving guests. They helped me a lot. Of course, if the other family members need 
help, I will give a hand as well.  
While family members are linked by clan, religious beliefs also create connections between 
different clans. As pointed out by Q. Li (2011), religious beliefs are multiple in the Chaoshan area. 
Wukan has 14 temples, each of which consecrates an immortal, including images from Buddhism 
and Taoism. However, religious beliefs are not limited to widespread religions. Another celestial 
being is worshipped by villagers as well and the Zhenxiu immortal is particular only to Wukan. As 
Bang explained to me, this unique relationship with their immortal, Zhenxiu, is what gives Wukan 
its particular sense of identity and affinity among villagers: 
Sun: you mentioned that the Wukanese united during the protest, what’s the reason for that? 
Bang: We Wukanese are different from others, different from Donghaiese
23
. We worship our 
unique immortal [Zhenxiu immortal]. We were living on fishing which needs much cooperation. 
Thus we are unified.  
Hou (2012) has looked into this religious belief and explained that the prototype of this immortal 
was a highly skilled doctor who lived more than 200 years ago. He saved many lives and spent his 
later years in Wukan where villagers assume he became an immortal after his death (Hou, 2012). 
Wukan villagers revere him and build shrines for him in their houses. The celebration of Zhenxiu 
immortal’s birthday (which is on 7th July of the Chinese Lunar calendar) is the biggest festival in 
Wukan (See Figure 5-2). Villagers decorate the stages which were named for immortals, and hire 
theatrical troupes to perform on the stages. Also, they offer food and drink to worship the immortal 
in the temple (see Figure 5-3). These rites, along with other ceremonies for other immortals, are 
held by religious committees, which have existed for more than a hundred years in Wukan. Each of 
                                               
23 Donghai is the township that includes Wukan. 
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seven sub-village groups has a committee, with members selected by divination in the temples. 
There is a higher committee for the whole of Wukan for mediating between the sub-committees and 
organising rites all around the village. Members are nominated by themselves or others and then 
selected by divination as well. Hou (2012) interviewed Maode Hung, the director of the Wukan 
Religious Committee (as the highest committee) and quotes Hung describing the selection process: 
Firstly, villagers recommend the candidates. Those candidates should meet several conditions: 
prestigious, very responsible, capable, and having descendants. Then, we will select six persons 
for our committee [from the whole of Wukan]: one director, two vice directors and three 
ordinary members. The selection should be done in the Huaguang Temple (where the Zhenxiu 
immortal lives). Normally, we will choose these six persons out of 20 candidates. The specific 
way for selecting is divining by casting two wooden pieces. They will cast the wooden pieces 
several times. The one who gets the most holy Gua will be the director, the second and third one 
will be vice directors, and the same for choosing the other three members (quoted in Hou, 2012, 
p120). 
 
Figure 5-2: Zhenxiu Immortal’s birthday ceremony 
The Wukan Religious Committee takes charge of religious issues which binds villagers closely. 
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Besides administration of temples and fetes, the most important issue for the Religious Committee 
are birthday celebrations for some of the immortals. Villagers, especially wealthier ones, will make 
financial donations. The fund is managed by the committee and it publishes the detailed accounts on 
the wall. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Worship in the temple 
Underpinned by a sense of collective identity, fostered largely by tight kinship networks and 
religious beliefs, the two indigenous organisations in Wukan – the family clans and the Wukan 
Religious Committee – facilitated the emergence of Wukan protest. Specifically, they provided 
three crucial resources for the protest: protesters, communication networks and leaders.  
Firstly, most protesters were recruited via the established structures. Although discontent about land 
selling was growing in the years leading up to 2011, most villagers stayed quiet instead of 
participating in the resistance activities organised by some activists. These activists individually 
consulted a select group about a group petition in the village on 21st September 2011 and about 
fifty villagers confirmed they would come. But on that day, the activists struck the family clan 
gongs and attracted more than 3,000 villagers to join the assembly. “It is the first time, on the 21st 
110 
 
September 2011, that the gongs called for villagers of all families”, said Yong.  
After being convened by the gongs, villagers decided to hold a mass demonstration against the 
Municipal Government. According to the video which recorded the events of that day (this video 
was uploaded onto YouTube), the activist Chang informed villagers that the land was sold illegally 
and asked villagers to “seek an explanation” from the Municipal Government. Most of them made 
the decision to participate in the collective action right at that time and decided to attend the group 
petitioning of the Municipal Government. This echoes what Oberschall (1973, p89) terms “bloc 
recruitment” meaning that mobilisation occurs as results of recruiting blocs of people who are 
already highly organised. In Wukan’s case, as villagers were highly connected in family clans, they 
were more likely to act simultaneously when facing a contentious issue.  
Furthermore, villagers’ resolve in attending the protest was confirmed by the performance of 
religious rites before the group demonstration. Villagers divined in Zhenxiu immortal’s temple and 
got three holy Gua which were interpreted to be the immortal’s support for this demonstration and 
to augur well for its success. Also, activists fetched the flag that represents Zhenxiu immortal to 
encourage villagers. Maode Hung explained this more: 
In the history of Wukan, we would request for the flag only under emergent [sic] situation, such 
as fighting with other villages…I heard from elders that it’s miraculous that if we brought the 
flag during the fighting, we would barely lose the fight. This is the magical power of Zhenxiu 
immortal. We believe in him very much (quoted in Hou, 2012, p123). 
Likewise, the organisers of the protest held the rites and brought the flag with them during the 
second public demonstration. Such actions strengthened participants’ confidence about a successful 
protest. Bang stressed these rites during the interview: 
We divined and requested the flag before our demonstration. Protesters’ morale was inspired 
largely by these rites because first, we got three holy Gua which means the immortal would 
support our action; and second, we had the flag with us, and we treat it as the immortal.  
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This illustrates that participants were inspired by the divination and the appearance of the 
immortal’s flag, which encouraged their willingness to join the protest. Thus, the religious beliefs in 
the village contributed to the recruitment of protesters.  
Meanwhile, the unity generated by the collective identity that existed in the village was most 
notably revealed when the protest activities turned violent and people were hurt during the course of 
their clashes with police. When the police went to the village on the 22nd September 2011 (the day 
after the first mass demonstration) to detain some villagers who had smashed the construction site, 
villagers picketed the roads to stop them. As shown on the video footage of the event, villagers 
became angry and clashed with the police troops later, because “they heard a rumour that a child 
was beaten to death by the policemen” (Hsing). Similarly, villagers got angry after Poo’s death in 
detention (after the second group demonstration). They attended the daily memorial meeting for 
Poo and blocked the road to avoid police returning and detaining more villagers. Han explained the 
reason for villagers’ high emotions: 
We have close connections with our family members, if one of us is under threat, the others will 
protect them. Also, we were united in the village. We blocked the road in order to prevent more 
detentions after five activists were detained….we got entirely angry after Poo’s death. We joined 
the assembly voluntarily every day because we treat him as our hero. 
In Wukan’s case, some participants attended the protest, not because they had rationally calculated 
how they might benefit from the action, but because they felt morally bound to act as a “Wukanese” 
to protect their companions in the village. Thus, the collective identity, generated by the dense 
networks in the village and fostered by the two indigenous organisations, helped to bolster the 
numbers for the Wukan protest. This phenomenon of collective identity overriding rational 
decision-making has similarly been observed by Polletta and Jasper (2001).  
Besides providing large numbers of united protesters, the organisations provided an effective 
communication network for the protesters. As each family maintained close connection with their 
family committee, it was convenient for villagers to discuss the issue with their family members. 
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Family meetings, which were organised by family committees, played an important role in 
communicating among family members. Yong recalled the family committees’ functions during the 
protest: 
The situation became serious after 23rd September 2011, when villagers clashed with police who 
came to the village to detain the protest activists. Several villagers were hurt in that conflict… 
some family committees called their family members to donate to those who hurt. Then we held 
meetings, mobilised our family members to donate to them. Also, we called the family members 
outside of the village and asked for their help.  
However, the family committees were not the only means for villagers to communicate about the 
protest. Villagers kept in touch with each other via frequent mutual visits. I witnessed those visits 
during my days in Wukan: each family has a tea set and the host will serve everyone who comes to 
his/her house, and they will talk about daily issues casually with tea. These contacts are ordinary for 
Wukan villagers as they are familiar with each other. Thus, the communication network is efficient 
in the village, which facilitated the spread of dissatisfaction and information about the protest.  
Thirdly, these organisations helped to select the leaders for the protest. In McAdam’s view (1982), 
recognised leaders of established organisations, with their prestige and organising skills, normally 
became leaders of the incipient movement. The scene was different in Wukan where protest leaders 
were not those of the family clans and religious committees, although kinship and religious 
networks did play a part in the selection process. After the first mass demonstration on 21st 
September 2011, the former village cadres left the village. Protesters elected a Provisional Directory 
on 29th September and it became the group leaders of the protest. This election was held on the 
basis of family clan: in family meetings each family committee nominated one to five members 
(according to family population) to be candidates in the election and finally 13 villagers were 
elected to be members of the Provisional Directory. Bang mentioned the process of nomination 
while recalling the genesis of the Provisional Directory: 
We have 47 family clans in our village, with populations from less than one hundred to more 
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than one thousand. In order to pursue justice, every family clan could nominate 1-5 persons to 
attend the election.  
As members were selected by each family clan, the Provisional Directory was regarded as 
legitimate by villagers. Thus, the indigenous organisation helped to establish the leadership in the 
protest.  
These two indigenous organisations and the corresponding interpersonal networks provide the 
necessary resources for the protest, but this alone will not trigger collective action without 
organising groups. Two organising groups developed in Wukan during the course of the protest and 
played a crucial role for the generation of the Wukan protest. These two groups are the 
“Warm-blooded Youth League” and the “Provisional Directory”. They emerged at different stages 
of the Wukan events: the “Warm-blooded Youth League” was formed in 2009 and mainly served to 
mobilise villagers to attend the protest. The “Provisional Directory” was formed after the first 
public group petition and it was the directing organisation for the protest thereafter. Both of these 
were vital organisations which contributed to the protest in four respects: they recruited protesters, 
offered solidary incentives for participants, established an efficient communication network and 
provided recognised leaders. 
The Warm-blooded Youth League is the name of an online chat room in which young Wukanese 
communicated about the land selling and other issues. It did not have rigid rules for attendance and 
exit. It was registered by the leading activist, Hoo, who was the first to send out leaflets informing 
villagers that they had been unfairly treated in the sale of their land on 3rd April 2009. In the leaflet, 
Hoo listed the lands that had been sold and accused the former village leaders of corruption. He 
called villagers to retrieve their land and join his online chat room for further discussion. In the 
beginning fewer than 100 villagers joined this chat room, but the group expanded to more than 
1,000 villagers after the first public group petition. Most of members were young villagers who 
were familiar with online chatting software. The discussion topics in the chat room were clear: 
retrieve village land and share the benefits from that land. Most activists emerged from this 
organisation. They endeavoured to mobilise more villagers and organise group petitions. When it 
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was still at the stage of small group resistance before the village-wide protest, the Youth league 
played an important part in the years leading up to the collective protest due to the following 
reasons.  
First, it offered a place for frequent and fast communication among the potential participants. As it 
was an online chatting room, participants could discuss anytime and anywhere, regardless of their 
physical location. Members shared evidence about land selling in the online forum. Some of them 
shared documents about agreements that had been reached between former village cadres and 
governments or developers which were obtained through their personal networks or Guanxi (such 
as friendships with government officials). Others collected published government documents about 
land acquisition in Wukan. Also, workers from outside Wukan provided information on land 
acquisition experiences in other villages in the chat room. This communication network facilitated 
the distribution of information among young villagers, which aggravated their discontent with the 
former village cadres. 
Second, discussions and shared knowledge strengthened members’ incentives to participate in the 
collective protest. The shared information about the management of land in other villages aroused 
villagers’ awareness of the possibility of benefiting from land. Meanwhile, with exposure to more 
material about land selling, they became convinced that the former village leaders had sold the land 
illegally and corruptly. Thus, they determined to retrieve land and overturn the former village 
leaders. When asked why they organised a group petition, Nei answered: 
I met so many contemporary villagers who have a similar goal in the online chatting room. We 
were talking about the land selling situation every day. Also, we informed others about the unjust 
doings of the former village cadres. You know what, the more we talked about it, and the more 
people took part in the discussion, the more we felt it was urgent to solve this problem. 
Meanwhile, we felt much safer as we had so many companions. We were in the same group. 
Nei’s reference to “companions” and “group” reveals how chat room members developed feelings 
of “solidarity” and a sense that they could depend on each other. This feeling strengthened their 
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incentives for attending the protest. McAdam (1982) explains that members in organisations with 
solidary incentives are more likely to attend mass protests because they will treat participation as 
synonymous with organisational membership.  
Third, activists in the early forms of resistance were recruited almost entirely from the Youth 
League. Hoo, Cheng and Nei were the three most prominent members. In the early stage of 
resistance (that is, from early 2009 to the first public demonstration on 21st September 2011), this 
was the group that organised and delivered several group letter petitions to higher levels of 
government. They were also the main force during the second stage of protest which involved 
mobilising villagers to mass demonstration. McAdam explains that, “the more integrated the person 
is into the challenging community, the more readily he/she can be mobilised for participation in 
protest activities” (McAdam, 1982, p44). To those activists, protest was a long-awaited action to 
challenge the entrenched elite as they joined the Youth League and discussed ways to express their 
grievances for more than two years.  
Lastly, some recognised leaders emerged in the Youth League. From observing the development 
trajectory of the Wukan protest, Hoo could be seen as the leader of the Youth League and the sub 
leader of villagers in the protest. As the founder of the chat room, Hoo was often distinguished by 
villagers for his courage and persistence in the Wukan events. Hsing, for example, said he was 
attracted to the early resistance because of Hoo: 
He’s really brave. He was not afraid of anything. He dared to argue with the former village 
cadres and government official. He put his name to be the first one on the petition letter. Stood 
up to be the first one while we were petitioning. What’s more, he did not give up even when we 
failed to receive a reply from the higher level governments after our petition. He is really the 
backbone of us. 
Protest leaders in other cases have been mostly middle-aged people who are “articulate and 
well-versed” (W. Zhang, 2015, p370) or elders who are experienced and have well-established 
reputations (Li & O'Brien, 2008). Wukan did have some mature protesters of this kind – Yong, Poo 
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and Lam. However, in Wukan, more young people engaged in the protests and became protest 
leaders because they were ambitious about changing the current situation in the village and believed 
they were capable of doing so. They were among the first to mobilise. In the first instance, their 
feelings of “relative deprivation” (Gurr, 1970, p37) were aggravated when they received more 
information about village land sales. As outlined earlier, young protesters witnessed villagers in 
other villages of the Pearl River Delta benefitting from the sale of their land. Also, their 
understanding of “illegal” land sales and the former village leaders’ actions in these illegal sales 
increased when they received relevant messages in the online chat-room. Additionally, when asked 
why they were so concerned about the land sales, almost all young protest leaders who were 
interviewed linked their concerns about village land with a need for housing resources, because they 
were “living with parents and brothers in the crowded house” (Hoo) and were worried that “we 
don’t have enough land for our descendants to build houses” (Ching). Perceiving these bleak 
prospects for the future, young villagers were particularly eager to change the land and power 
situation in the village. Further, the shared identity among these young people of being a part of the 
group was strengthened in the Warm-blooded Youth League, which enhanced young protesters’ 
determination and confidence about resisting the former village leaders. Finally, young protesters 
were more familiar with the internet and social media, which they utilised as a way of attracting 
outsiders’ attention and sympathy toward the protest. Therefore, it was the young protesters leaders 
who organised the 13 group petitions toward different level governments during 2009 to 2011 that 
preceded the mass protests. 
The second organising group to form was the “Provisional Directory”. In contrast to the Youth 
League, the Provisional Directory was a formal organisation. It was elected by villagers and 
subsequently authorised by the Municipal Government to be the legal administrative organisation of 
Wukan in the interim period after the departure of the former VC and before the election of a new 
VC. As explained earlier, this directory was elected on the basis of family clans. Some activists, 
such as Yong and Poo, along with older villagers (such as Lam, who once worked in government 
and was regarded as a capable man) were elected as members. As this organisation emerged after 
the first group petition when many of the protesters had already been recruited, its contribution to 
the protest was the provision of effective management. Specifically, it strengthened the 
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communication between protesters, and established the leaders for the protest. 
To begin with, the Provisional Directory intensified communication among villagers. The Directory 
stipulated a drama stage to be the public meeting place. From then on, villagers had an open space 
to communicate with each other, discuss the progress of protest, and talk about strategies to retrieve 
their lands. Yong launched the second group petition from this stage and mobilised more than 4,000 
villagers to attend. Moreover, the Provisional Directory organised daily meetings and speeches after 
Poo’s death. Provisional Directory leaders and activists made speeches on the stage, which aroused 
villagers’ anger and their determination to unite.  
Then, the protest leader was confirmed via the Directory. Lam, a retired man who was formerly in 
the military, was elected to be leader of the Directory. He launched an appeal for donations for those 
who got hurt after the first group petition, took charge of negotiations with higher level 
governments, and ensured the second group petition would be more peaceful. Furthermore, Lam 
guided the negotiations with governments, accepted interviews and won sympathy and support from 
media, and stabilised villagers’ emotion during the protest. Ping, a journalist who followed the 
Wukan protest thoroughly and interviewed Lam several times for a Hong Kong magazine, claimed 
that Lam was an excellent leader: 
One thing I felt special in Wukan’s case was Lam. He has an outstanding leading ability. Not 
only because he had prestige and was trusted by villagers, but also because he had a clear mind. 
He knew well about the strategies to communicate with government officials. What’s more, he 
was good at giving speeches to inspire villagers’ emotion.  
Protest leaders, who normally lead the charge, shape collective claims, recruit activists and mobilise 
the public, play a vital role in a protest (Li & O’Brien, 2008). The exceptional leadership is a 
distinctive factor in Wukan that helped them to develop a large scale and prolonged protest. There 
were three levels of leaders/activists during the protest: Hsing and Hoo represented the young 
protesters who were familiar with ICTs; Yong and Poo were well-connected middle-aged men who 
took charge of communicating with local governments on behalf of protesters; and Lam, who was 
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more experienced and had prestige among villagers, could be seen as the overall director of this 
protest. The extraordinary leadership was deemed to be unique in Chinese rural villages (Liu, 2012), 
and distinguished the Wukan protest from other village protests about land issue. Without leaders 
with a balance of mobilising skills, aggrieved villagers elsewhere did not unite to protest (Choi, 
2016).  
Lam’s leadership, in particular, was one of the principal drivers of the successful protest in Wukan, 
not only because of villagers’ trust in his leadership, but also because he did not yield to pressure 
from local governments who were trying to suppress the protest. The other prestigious elder, Wu, 
who was elected to be the co-leader of the Provisional Directory with Lam in September 2011, was 
not so resolute in the face of subtle threats from the authorities. He resigned from his position after 
a short while because he feared family members who were government employees would suffer 
(Liu, 2012). Lam also had a son working in a government department, but remained resolute. Yet 
Lam was not the only persons who encountered “soft repression” (Deng & O'Brien, 2013, p533) 
during the protest. For example, Hoo, the leader of the Youth League, claimed that the former 
village cadres and local government officials tried to tempt him by offering much money, but he 
rejected the bribe because “I am not only resisting for myself, but also for other villagers” (Hoo). 
Lam and Hoo’s bravery, and resistance to intimidation by village cadres made them excellent 
protest leaders.  
Thus, the individual leaders and the two organising groups, the Warm-blooded Youth League and 
the Provisional Directory, played crucial roles in mobilising and organising the Wukan protest and 
in resisting the attempts at repression by local authorities. These two groups, along with the 
indigenous organisations and the existing social networks on which they were based, offered a 
favourable foundation for collective action in Wukan. 
5.3.3 Cognitive liberation 
Enhanced political opportunities and established indigenous organisations are necessary but 
insufficient factors for collective action, as they are just objective conditions (McAdam, 1982). 
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Potential participants’ consciousness is another crucial element to form a movement by 
transforming aggrieved emotions into actions for resistance or protest. For Piven and Cloward 
(1979), the necessary realisations for people to participate in a movement are threefold:  
…first, people who ordinarily accept the legitimacy of arrangements come to believe these 
arrangements are unjust and wrong; second, people who are ordinarily fatalistic begin to assert 
‘rights’ that imply demands for change; and third, people believe that they have some capacity to 
alter their lot (Piven & Cloward, 1979, p3-4).  
McAdam uses the term “liberation” to describe awareness of this set of conditions because he 
agrees with Piven and Cloward’s argument that “people who are ordinarily fatalistic, who believe 
that existing arrangements are inevitable, … [begin] to demand for change” (Piven & Cloward, 
1979, p4). McAdam argues that expanding political opportunities, combined with the presence of 
indigenous organisations, affords the “structural potential” for successful collective action 
(McAdam, 1982, p51). That potential is, in turn, transformed into actual mass protest by means of 
the crucial intervening process of cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1982). This kind of changing 
consciousness, combined with expanding opportunities and existing organisations, as a means of 
generating protest was observed in Wukan’s case as well.  
Villagers’ changing consciousness about the unacceptable actions of the former VC and the ways 
for them to take action for change was aroused by several activists. Specifically, their awareness of 
the land sales and discontent about former village leaders was increased by receiving more 
information about land acquisition disseminated by the activists. In addition, activists persuaded 
potential participants that there was a good chance they could retrieve their land if they joined the 
protest. In this section, I will analyse the ways activists raised villagers’ consciousness.  
One of the principal goals of the activists was to increase villagers’ dissatisfaction with former 
village cadres and local governments and they achieved this with some success. This began, as 
mentioned above, with Hoo distributing leaflets anonymously on 3rd April 2009. He called on 
villagers to try to retrieve their land and join his online chat room for further discussion. After 
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convening villagers into the online chat room, activists organised the discussion there and shared 
evidence which would arouse members’ discontent. Meanwhile, these Warm-blooded Youth League 
members were encouraged to invite others to join the chat room and the membership grew to 
around 1,000 before the group petition. Some of them, such as Nei, Hsing, and Ching, became 
activists in the Wukan protest. During the public demonstration stage, Hoo and Hsing produced a 
video (which was referred to earlier) and showed it in the public square. In this film, they exhibited 
the former beautiful scenes of Wukan, enumerated the letter petitions and small group petitions 
submitted between 2009 and 2011, recorded the first large group petition on 21st September 2011 
and the clash with policemen on 23rd September. This film was shown publicly for three days, 
attracting villagers’ attention and arousing their anger toward the local government. Hsing 
expressed his pride when recalling this film: 
I edited and produced this film and showed it in the square. It attracted more than 1,000 watchers 
per day. Villagers were touched. They became angry when they saw the policemen beat the 
villagers. Someone applauded when they saw the police car overturned by villagers.  
Meanwhile, a rumour about the potential gains from retrieving land was dispersed among villagers. 
It said that villagers could get 480,000 yuan (AU$80,000) if all the land was retrieved. Lee, who did 
not attend the protest, believed this message was the main reason for some electing to become 
involved: 
Once there was a suggestion that we could get 480,000 yuan if we got our land back. Some of 
the villagers became zealous after they heard that.  
Villagers’ emotion about the protest was also provoked by the activists. However, villagers refused 
to act until they felt safe about doing so. Again, the activists dispelled their worries by convincing 
them that the opportunities to protest successfully were increasing and the likely negative 
repercussions of attending were reducing. They highlighted the huge attending population and 
media at the first mass demonstration to convince potential participants to join subsequent 
collective action.  
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It is to be expected that villagers would be emboldened by a larger group of people becoming 
involved in the protest, not only because this enhances their potential power, but also because it 
becomes more difficult for such action to be repressed. The activists realised this as well. Before 
organising the public group petition, they first convened about 50 villagers by individually 
persuading them to become involved. One of the activists wrote a piece explaining why:  
A common psychology for villagers is: the more people attend, the more likely others will join 
us. Once there are enough participants, you are not a particular one in the group, they won’t be 
afraid. Thus we thought if we could call upon about 50 persons, villagers will join us (Zhang, 
2012, p34). 
There is an old saying in China: “The law won’t punish numerous offenders”, which offers a sense 
of security when acting in a large group. This was echoed by Nei when he stated to me that, “we felt 
much safer as we had so many companions”. After the first letter petition, Hoo and other organisers 
chose to act in a group, believing that the more people they could get to join them, the safer they 
would be because their opponents would be less likely to hurt them. This opinion was rooted in 
Hoo’s mind when he said: 
I dared to oppose Shaw, because I have several brothers and my father has several brothers too. 
My family has many boys so Shaw won’t hurt me. Also, when more villagers take part in the 
protest, the government dare not hurt us.  
Another important instrument in the protest was the media. As argued by other scholars, protesters 
are likely to seek help from the media, thus attracting attention and sympathy from outsiders and 
higher levels of government (O’Brien, 2002; Oi, 1999). The Wukan protest attracted about 30 
media reporters to the village, which increased protesters’ morale significantly. The first journalist 
to travel to Wukan in September 2011 was from the Television Broadcast Limited of Hong Kong. 
The journalist had been invited by activists in advance and reported briefly about the group petition. 
As Wukan is situated not far from Hong Kong, it is relatively convenient for Hong Kong journalists 
to travel to the area to conduct an interview. I chatted with Bang about the media: 
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Sun: how did you invite the Hong Kong media during your first group petition? 
Bang: We have many Wukanese working and living in Hong Kong. We informed them we are 
going to hold a group petition, and asked them to invite media to report our petition. They 
succeeded in doing so. 
Sun: why did you want to invite media? 
Bang: because we wanted to expand our influence. We wanted to get attention from outside and 
help to express our voice.  
Activists tried to draw attention from additional media and achieved this after the second group 
petition on 21st November 2011. Several media, mostly from Hong Kong and abroad, went to the 
village on the second day after they saw photos about the group petition on internet forums. 
Photographs taken by journalists were published on the internet by activists where they displayed 
the large number of attendees (more than 4,000 participants) and their demands on the banners 
(“retrieve our land”, “overturn corrupted cadres” and “ask for an open election”). Ping, a Hong 
Kong journalist who went to Wukan several times and wrote several in-depth articles about the 
Wukan protest, explained her motive to me: 
Ping: I saw the pictures about the [first] group petition on the internet. I was impressed by the 
scale of the demonstration. More than 3,000 villagers attended and they remained organised in 
the picture. But the slogans on the banners were quite direct, and read “oppose dictatorship” and 
so on. I was shocked. You know, that’s an inspiring slogan for us because it was in China. Then I 
contacted Hsing… 
Sun: how did you contact him? 
Ping: his name and contact number were published on the internet. I just called him and 
consulted with him about the situation. He invited me to report their protest, and then I went 
there on the third day. 
Activists organised a re-enactment of the demonstration while the journalists were in the village. By 
doing so, they sent their message to the outside world and sought to expose what they saw as 
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falsehoods reported by the government-run media (for example, the Propaganda of Lufeng City said 
that only 400 villagers attended the demonstration, a small proportion of the villagers).  
Activists not only invited media to report their protest, but also mobilised more villagers to join the 
collective action with the help of media. Activists highlighted and even exaggerated the media’s 
function to the villagers.  
Sun: what was your strategy for mobilising villagers and encouraging them to join your actions? 
Hsing: When there was a journalist asking for an interview, I would guide them for a walk in the 
village, with their photographic equipment. Especially those foreign journalists. Villager would 
realise our influence. Also, I would say to them [the villagers], ‘we are watched by the whole 
world now, and the Central Government will receive our message and resolve the land issue for 
us’.  
Kielbowicz and Scherer (1984) stated that media are beneficial in promoting social protests in at 
least three respects: media can mobilise more potential participants, build connections between the 
activists and other political or social actors, and offer psychological support for participants. In 
contrast to some social protests in developed countries which rely on the media to broadcast their 
event and to recruit participants (Carroll & Hackett, 2006; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993), Chinese 
protesters will often seek media attention to express their demands to the higher government (Göbel 
& Ong, 2012; Lum, 2006). This is because Chinese people, especially rural people, tend to believe 
in the higher authorities (Li, 2006; O’Brien & Li, 2006). They regard the Central Government as the 
representative of their interests, formulating beneficial policies for grassroots people. In contrast, 
local governments are perceived to abuse those policies (Li, 2006; O’Brien & Li, 2006). This was 
true in Wukan where villagers adopted slogans such as “we ask for Central Government’s help” 
during the demonstration.  
Villagers were inspired by the media’s access to the village. For one thing, they felt much safer, 
believing that local government would not dare to suppress them directly and violently while so 
many journalists were watching. Nei highlighted his appreciation of the media: 
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I have to say one reason for Wukan protest’s success was foreign media. We felt much safer after 
they came to the village. We were not afraid of the government and policemen capturing us, 
because their actions would be reported world-wide. 
Furthermore, the media’s attention and reports served to augment villagers’ confidence about 
retrieving their land. Lien, who was a participant in the protest, expressed his optimism about the 
protest: 
We caught so much attention. We were famous in China and even abroad. I think the government 
will solve the land issue for us because they must have pressure. 
In conclusion, activists worked to arouse villagers’ dissatisfaction toward the former village leaders, 
and recruited more villagers to participate in the protest by convincing them of the rising capacities 
for successful action and the declining cost of involvement. This process could be deemed to be the 
“cognitive liberation” which is one crucial element for the emergence of collective action.  
But the various interactions between the protesters and the local governments do not only indicate 
the rising power of protesters, but also the failure of local government to suppress the protest 
activities and the ostensible weakening of traditional local power bases in the face of rising 
cognitive liberation among villagers. As demonstrated earlier, the Municipal and Township 
Governments attempted to repress the protest by employing traditional measures such as sending 
police to disperse villagers who were assembling together to discuss further protest actions (on 22nd 
September 2011) and detaining five protest activists (during early December 2011), but their actions 
failed to end the protest. Some unintended developments contributed to local governments’ failure 
when their overreaction led to injury and death. As illustrated earlier, protesters were injured in the 
clashes with police and Poo died in custody. These incidents strengthened villagers’ collective 
identity as “Wukanese” and their determination to protect other protesters. Moreover, the injuries 
and Poo’s death were publicised by the media, which intensified outside attention and evoked 
outsiders’ sympathy toward protesters and indignation towards Chinese governments. The 
persistence of such a large number of villagers and the continuing media attention placed 
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considerable public pressure on the higher level governments, especially on the former Governor of 
Guangdong Province, Wang Yang, because of his personal ambitions for promotion to the central 
government. As an apparent rebuff of local authorities and triumph of the protesters, in early 2012, 
the Provincial Government sent a working team to the village. These officials of the higher level of 
government showed more constraint in dealing with the villagers and made concessions to the 
protesters. So villagers held out against the repressive actions of local authorities in ways that were 
unusual in China. 
5.4 Conclusion 
By following the protest that occurred in Wukan, we find the crucial elements for the emergence of 
collective action. To begin with, people become angry about their current situation, and seek to 
change it. Then, there exist favourable opportunities to mobilise and organise collective action. 
These two factors, the outrage and the opportunities to mobilise, were evident in Wukan’s protest.  
Villagers became angry because of feelings of deprivation. Villagers’ expectations of benefiting 
from the land rose after 2009 as a result of increasing land values and comparisons they made with 
former village leaders and villagers in other areas. However, after several attempts, the villagers 
challenging the entrenched leadership found their ability to achieve what they anticipated remained 
limited. The disparity between these two sides further aroused feelings of relative deprivation which 
led to collective action (Gurr, 1970). 
Opportunities and resources are required to form a public protest. McAdam (1982) treats the 
formation of collective action as a political process. A complete trajectory could be observed in 
Wukan’s protest as well. Firstly, urbanisation, and the financial crisis as well as the expanding 
access to Information and Communication Technologies strengthened the opposing villagers’ power. 
They invoked the policy of grassroots VC elections to lobby for their rights. Secondly, a dense 
interpersonal network in Wukan facilitated the emergence of collective action. As villagers were 
connected by family clan and religious beliefs it was easier to organise protesters. Thirdly, activists 
from two organising groups applied several strategies to mobilise potential protesters. They 
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increased villagers’ dissatisfaction by advertising the unfair land selling and the potential benefits 
from retrieving land. Moreover, activists highlighted the mass participation and the media’s 
attention to the villagers, which dispelled people’s worries about repercussions if they joined the 
protest. However, questions remain about the outcomes of such collective action and whether it can 
develop into a social movement? My following analysis will answer these questions.  
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Chapter 6  
Local protest as a means of socio-political 
change in rural areas: assessing the outcomes of 
the Wukan protest 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in late 2011, the villagers of Wukan launched a mass protest 
expressing their grievances about what they saw as the "illegal" sale of their land by the former 
Villagers’ Committee. As also outlined in the previous chapter, conditions in the village were ripe 
for the mobilisation of angry villagers at that time. Following McAdam’s Political Process model 
(1982), these conditions included new political opportunities for protesting that had not existed 
before and the presence of indigenous organisations, along with the networks, leaders and resources 
for effective mobilisation. 
By grasping these favourable conditions and employing effective strategies, Wukan’s protest 
leaders organised several collective actions to argue for their demands including one public 
demonstration for which they mobilised more than 6,000 villagers. Having attracted considerable 
media attention, in December 2011, three months after they launched their protest, the Wukan 
protesters finally prompted the Provincial Government’s intervention in the form of promises to 
satisfy their demands. The protest brought many changes for the village and villagers. 
This chapter examines the outcomes of the Wukan protest and the changes that ensued as a result. 
In doing so, it responds to the second research question about the effectiveness of local protest in 
bringing about socio-political change in rural areas. In analysing the outcomes of the collective 
protest action in Wukan, I do not confine the discussion to the changes brought by collective action 
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for the village and villagers, but also explore how various levels of Chinese government sought to 
resolve the protest. 
In this chapter, the definition of “outcome” is not limited to the direct and immediate changes for 
local residents, but extends to include longer-term consequences with a broader scope. The word 
“outcome” is a broad concept that covers short-term and long-term effects for individuals, 
protesting organisations, policy makers, and even society at large. Given this breadth, O’Brien has 
advised care in linking an episode or cycle of contention to any given outcome since “popular 
action is always but one factor in a long chain of events, and showing how reformist elites and 
protesters come together to produce change is always complicated” (O’Brien, 2002, p149). This, he 
argues, is why researchers have paid more attention to the origins and dynamics of contention than 
to its consequences.  
The Wukan protesters have realised a large part of what they asked for. For example they have 
changed cadres; retrieved some land; and obtained some investments in improved infrastructure in 
the village. However, the villagers did not achieve all they were seeking and problems have 
remained in the village after the protest. For instance, more than 3,000 mu (200 hectares) lands 
were not returned to the village and the newly elected village leadership has confronted significant 
challenges.  
By examining the protest from a social movement perspective, this chapter illustrates the reasons 
for the limited achievements of the protest. In addition, by considering the protest in a broader 
context and exploring the possibility of raising a social movement in China, I will answer the third 
research question: “to what extent can local protests be understood as forming part of a broader 
rural social movement in China”. In this chapter, the Wukan protesters’ demands will be illustrated 
in the first section, followed by an assessment of the protest’s achievements. Then, the case will be 
located in a broader context of Chinese rural protest from a social movement perspective.  
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6.2 The demands of the Wukan protest  
As introduced in the previous chapter, the Wukan protesters had multiple demands which were 
evident in a conversation with Hsing, who was one of the leaders of the Youth League and an 
activist of the Wukan protest.  
Sun: What were your aims in the protest? 
Hsing: We were aiming at land in the beginning. We went to the Municipal and Provincial 
Governments to report the illegal land sales in Wukan and wanted our land back. We did not 
think about an election then. But later we realised that if we don’t overturn the [former] village 
leaders, even if we retrieve our land, we still can’t keep it and benefit from it. Moreover, the 
more we knew about the land sales, the angrier we became about those leaders. There was so 
much corruption in their time. We wanted to establish a new leadership in the village who could 
take the benefits for all villagers into consideration.  
Sun: So you intended to hold an open election then? 
Hsing: We did not know how to establish the new leadership at first. But later we read more 
about the law of VC, recognised that the VC should be elected by villagers, and then we decided 
to ask for an election. 
From this conversation, it is evident that protesters were aiming at two changes: to retrieve their 
land, but also to overturn the old village leaders and establish a new elected village leadership. The 
first demand of retrieving land is essentially economic while the latter demand focuses on changing 
the political order in the village. 
As Hsing describes above, land retrieval was the initial goal of the Wukan protest. From the first 
small group petition on 21st June 2009 until after the last petition letter in March 2011, activists 
were aiming at land retrieval. They claimed that their lands had been sold by the former village 
leaders without sharing the benefits. In order to gain a clear understanding of the Wukan villagers’ 
demands for land retrieval, it is first necessary to reiterate some brief detail about Wukan’s land 
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sales situation. Nei, a protest leader, told me that the sale of land in Wukan started in the early 
1980s. Initially, land was sold to Wukan villagers who lacked residential land, although, even then, 
the proceeds were pocketed by the village leaders rather than benefitting all villagers. Then, in 1993 
the former village leaders (including the Party Secretary Shaw and VC leader Yim) established the 
Wukan Harbor Company which worked as a land trading company. It acquired some land from the 
VC and then sold its use rights to other companies for construction. Villagers asserted that, in total, 
more than 6,000 mu (400 hectares) of land were sold over the ensuing decades.  
Another protest leader, Yong, showed parts of various land transaction contracts to me, which 
revealed that 3,000 mu (200 hectares) were sold between 1993 and 1998. The vendor was the 
Wukan village represented by VC leaders Shaw or Yim, while the buyers included the Township 
Government and various companies (not including the Wukan Harbor Company). The price per 
transaction ranged from 10,000 yuan
 
per mu (AU$25,000 per hectare) to 30,000 yuan per mu 
(AU$75,000 per hectare) with block prices totaling between 16,400 yuan (AU$2,523) and 
6,700,000 yuan (AU$1,030,000). Those contracts were witnessed and approved by the Township 
Government officials. For example the Yidazhou Company, a company producing health care 
products and air conditioners, was one of the land acquirers. In the contract (see Figure 6-1), the 
company acquired 85.215 mu of land from Wukan village at the price of 10,000 yuan per mu and a 
total of 852,150 yuan (AU$131,100). In addition to these 3,000 mu, there was another 3,000 mu 
land sold to other companies for which I did not directly observe related documents.  
As reported in the previous chapter, villagers claimed that they had not known about those land 
sales at the time, let alone benefitted from them. They claimed that the land had been sold in an 
illegal way and they prioritised land retrieval in their demands during the protest.  
 
131 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Land transfer contract between Wukan village and Yidazhou Company 
As I have explained, according to the Chinese Constitution and Land Administrative Law, rural 
lands are administered by VCs, but owned collectively by all village residents. Under this system, 
land that is sold is transferred from collectively owned rural land into state-owned urban land which 
allows it to be used for construction, industrial purposes or other development. Any distribution of 
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rural land should be agreed by the Villagers’ Assembly or Villagers’ Representative Assembly 
(VRA): two bodies involving or representing all villagers. Thus, theoretically, it is impossible for 
VC leaders to sell land without villagers’ consent. However, the actual situation was different in 
Wukan. There were two reasons why the land was able to be sold in secret in this village. The first 
is that villagers did not appear to have paid much attention to land management before 2008 and the 
second relates to the particularities of the power structure in this village. The first point has been 
explained in the previous chapter when introducing the land situation in Wukan. In this chapter, I 
will focus on the power structure.  
The old power structure could be described as a closed regime with only a restricted few people 
directing village affairs and no Villagers’ Assembly or VRA really functioning. Prior to the protests, 
few villagers were able to take part in village affairs. It was asserted by many interviewees, for 
example, that Shaw had been the leader of the Party Branch for more than four decades since the 
1970s. During that time, the VC members and village group leaders
24
 were not elected by villagers, 
but according to Hoo, “were chosen by Shaw. Shaw would appoint anyone to any position as he 
wanted”. By selecting and training the influential Party Branch and VC members, and appointing 
others such as village group leaders, Shaw established his own regime in the village. In describing 
the former political order in the village, most interviewees summed up the problematic political 
arrangements through reference to the village being “Shaw’s Kingdom”: 
Shaw has occupied the position of Party Branch leader for more than 40 years. Also, he chose 
Yim as the leader of the VC and Yim also stayed there for more than 40 years. Other VC and 
Party Branch members were mainly Shaw’s relatives or acquaintances, they were listening to 
Shaw. It was Shaw’s Kingdom in the past (Nei).  
Village elections, as legitimised by the Constitutional Law and the Organic Law of Villagers’ 
Committee (OLVC), were deemed to be a sham in the village. “We have never voted for our village 
                                               
24Village group: is a kind of sub-village unit, usually constituted by several families living in close geographic proximity within one 
neighbourhood.  
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leaders in the past”, villagers told me. “Shaw claimed he held elections every year, but we never 
saw the ballot ticket. He collected ballots from his henchmen”. 
Wukan is not a unique case. Indeed, it has been observed by many scholars that, although the 
OLVC has been issued for more than two decades since 1987, open elections are still not occurring 
in every village (He, 2002; O’Brien & Han, 2009; Schubert & Chen, 2007). In most villages, 
especially those in less developed areas, open elections are rarely held and village cadres are 
normally selected by higher level officials (Guo & Bernstein, 2004). In explaining this, scholars 
have shown how the process of village elections has been established by the Central Government, 
but local governments have not been enthusiastic about it. Local officials have traditionally been 
more comfortable making contact with selected village cadres, especially with respect to former 
compulsory duties such as collecting agricultural taxes and fees in rural areas, partly because the 
selected cadres were thought to be more dedicated to executing those duties (Guo & Bernstein, 
2004). Therefore, although village level elections have been promoted throughout China by higher 
levels of government for many years (for instance, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of P.R.C) (O’Brien 
& Han, 2009), local officials would turn to Party Secretaries who were usually selected by the 
township Party Branch leader and who were likely to be more responsive to their township 
superiors (Guo & Bernstein, 2004). Other bodies meant to function at the village level (such as the 
Villagers’ Assembly and VRA) were not active in rural China (Manion, 2006). 
In addition, it has been argued that Chinese rural villagers have not been interested in voting. Oi and 
Rozelle (2000) have suggested that interest in political participation and popular control increases 
only when people perceive it to be related to their interest. Thus in many villages where public 
assets and benefits are minimal, villagers have not been interested in open elections. This partly 
explains why the Wukan villagers did not pay much attention to the village leadership before 2009. 
As I was informed in interviews, Yong was one of the few villagers who advocated for a VC 
election in the days leading up to the protest. Only later did more people, angry at the loss of their 
land, make the connection between the sale of their land and the unelected nature of the village 
leadership. 
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One of the outcomes of the closed exercise of power in Wukan was that it bred autocracy and a 
great divide between the few who held onto local power and the majority who had very little power. 
Nei and Lee, for example, said that the former village leaders were out of reach of villagers’ lives, 
and spent much of their time working in their luxury houses or elsewhere instead of in the office. 
Also, there was a lack of transparency about the decisions leaders made about village issues, and 
villagers had no opportunity for discussion with leaders, which propagated corruption and leaders' 
manipulation of village issues. Land selling was a typical example. Most villagers who were 
interviewed claimed that they had no idea about the land sales in years preceding the protest and 
that compensation fees which belonged to villagers were diverted by corrupt former village cadres. 
Moreover, while the law dictates that the financial reports of the Wukan Harbour Industrial 
Development Company should be made available to the Wukan villagers because it was 
theoretically a village collectively owned company, villagers never received information about the 
income and expenditure of this company, let alone dividends from it. 
For this reason, and as outlined in the earlier quote by Hsing, villagers began to realise that land 
retrieval on its own was insufficient, and that change in the village could only occur through 
dismantling the old power structure. Yong was the first man who had the aspiration to overturn the 
old village cadres and to hold an open election in this village. He narrated his story to me: 
Yong: I came back from Dongguan [a city adjacent to Lufeng] in 2011. I shut down my business 
after the Financial Crisis [which happened in 2008]. I intended to do something in the economic 
sphere [i.e. set up a business], but I had to transfer to the political sphere after the Financial 
Crisis…..I told some old village cadres that the former elections were invalid, we should hold 
elections according to the law [Organic Law of VC]. If villagers vote for you, I can say nothing; 
but if villagers voted for others, then they [old village cadres] should vacate the positions for 
others.  
Sun: So did you expect more change to the leadership and political pattern in the village?  
Yong: Yes that was my opinion. Later I talked with the activists who organised the small group 
resistance [against land acquisition] during 2009 to 2011. Then they agreed with me and thought 
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the old regime should be overturned.  
Yong did not conceal his ambition of being a village cadre. He treated villagers’ dissatisfaction 
toward land acquisition as a favourable opportunity to seek a change in the political order in this 
village. But the other activists and villagers who paid more attention to land retrieval intended to 
overturn the old village cadres because they wanted to “establish a new leadership in the village that 
can take the interests of the average villager into consideration” (Hsing). Thus, most villagers 
wanted more than Yong did since to them, the reason for establishing the new village leadership 
was to change the inequitable distribution of resources in the village rather than to transfer that 
power to a new set of individuals. In terms of the achievements of the Wukan protest, I distinguish 
these two sets of aspirations: first, a change in political leadership, and second a change in the 
political order itself. While Yong intended to replace the people making the decisions; that is, to 
introduce new political leadership in the village; most villagers wanted a change to a new political 
order which would be representative of villagers’ interests instead of governed by a small number 
of village cadres.  
In summary, land retrieval and political change (both in terms of Wukan’s political leadership and 
the political order more fundamentally) were two demands of the Wukan protest. These two 
demands were clearly expressed during the protest and undoubtedly led to a perception of it as a 
relatively “successful” protest since the Wukan villagers achieved some positive outcomes in both 
areas, as I outline below. 
6.3 The achievements of the Wukan protest  
From their relatively successful protest, the Wukan protesters gained some achievements. Generally, 
they retrieved some of their land, received some infrastructural investments, and held an open 
election to gain new leaders. The former two achievements relate to material changes, while the 
latter one refers to change in the political life in the village.   
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6.3.1 Material Changes 
The first achievement of the Wukan villagers was land retrieval. Villagers were successful in 
receiving some of their land back after the Wukan protest. This was proclaimed by a poster 
published on the wall of the new VC building, for example, which said, "the Provincial Government 
decided to return the following land to us...3,396 mu [226.4 hectare] in total". Moreover, I obtained 
an official document issued by the Provincial Government's working team on the Wukan protest 
which was published on 26th April 2012 (some seven weeks after the election and five months after 
the peak of the protests). It reported the results of the Provincial Government’s investigation into 
Wukan's land sales and reveals more details of some of the parcels of land constituting the total land 
returned. According to the document, 4,899 mu (326.6 hectare) of land were sold by the former 
village leaders between 1993 and 2002. Of those, 2,800 mu were converted into state owned, urban 
land and were subsequently built on while the remaining 2,100 mu land had not yet been transferred 
to the state and not developed by construction. Thus, the working team which represented the 
Provincial Government decided to return those 2,100 mu to the Wukan villagers. Another 454 mu 
land which was rented from the VC and had a piggery constructed on it was relinquished to the 
village as well (see Table 6-1). However, the document did not mention any compensation plan 
related to the other, irretrievable, land.  
The disposition of lands acquired by the Yidazhou Company which was not included in Table 6-1 is 
another complicated story and reveals the preoccupation of the Municipal Government with the 
legality of the sale and the desire to progress urban development rather than issues of fairness and 
compensation for villagers. Early in November 2011 in the midst of the protest, the Municipal 
Government released an announcement to respond to protesters' demands. The Municipal 
Government asserted that the processes through which the Yidazhou Company had acquired land 
from Wukan village were legitimate, despite the company not having paid all the required 
compensation fees. In response, the Yidazhou Company resubmitted an additional amount 
(4,320,000 yuan, that is AU$720,000 dollars) to cover the outstanding compensation fees to the 
municipal Land Administration Bureau on 16th December 2011, a week before the Provincial 
Government became involved in the protest on 22nd December 2011. When this happened, the 
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Municipal Government retained the full compensation it had received rather than paying any of it 
back to the village. However, four months after the Provincial Government's decision on how to 
resolve the land issue, on 31st August 2012, the Municipal Government announced the decision to 
return eight pieces of the Yidazhou Company’s land (293 mu in total) to Wukan village. This 
announcement did not mention the legal status of the Yidazhou Company’s land acquisition. The 
land to be returned, however, had already been reclassified as state-owned construction land and the 
use rights had been mortgaged to various banks by the Yidazhou Company to secure a loan. The 
Municipal Government therefore urged those banks to cooperate with the reinstitution by forfeiting 
their claim to this security.  
Table 6-1: Official summary by the Provincial working team of the land use situation and how to 
resolve problems 
 
Land use company 
Acreage (mu) 
(location) 
 
Land use situation 
Provincial 
Government's 
decision  
 
 
 
Township/ 
Municipal 
government 
1,890 (Lucky 
Island) 
175 mu transferred, 1,715 
mu not transferred 
Return 1,715 mu to 
Wukan village 
329 (highway 
No.1) 
110 mu constructed
25
, 96 
mu transferred, 124 mu 
not transferred 
Return 124 mu to 
Wukan village 
181 (highway 
No.2) 
76 mu constructed, 104 
mu not transferred  
Return 104 mu to 
Wukan village 
1,012 
(highway 
No.3) 
853 mu constructed, 159 
mu not transferred 
Return 157 mu to 
Wukan village 
167 (Bingang 
park) 
Transferred  
                                               
25According to the Land Administrative Law in China, land should be transferred from rural, village-owned land into urban, 
state-owned land first before commercial or public construction. Thus, references to "construction", automatically mean that land was 
transferred.  
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Furong knitting 
factory 
37 Rented from Wukan 
Harbour Company 
Return to Wukan 
Harbour Company 
Fengtian piggery 454   Rent from the village and 
constructed 
Return 454 mu to 
Wukan village 
Wukan villagers 830  House construction by 
Wukan villagers 
Let new VC 
resolve this issue 
Total 4,899 1,493 mu constructed, 
438 mu transferred, and 
2,137 mu not transferred 
Return 2,554 mu to 
Wukan village, 37 
mu to Wukan 
Harbour Company 
Exploring the land retrieval process suggests that grassroots activists are more likely to achieve 
their demands once their collective actions obtain higher level governments' attention, sympathy 
and support because the higher authorities are willing to intervene into local governments' action 
toward protesters and their demands. Moreover, higher level governments will not only exert 
pressure on lower level governments but also on commercial bodies and entrepreneurs to change 
their decisions and redress the situation. Three specific actions by the Provincial Government stand 
out as having consequences for the land rights outcomes.  
First, the Provincial Government's intervention changed the lower level government’s attitude 
toward protesters' land demands. For instance, Lucky Island and another 200 mu of land were sold 
to the Township Government. When villagers asked for the return of these lands prior to and during 
the Wukan protest, they obtained negative responses from the local governments at both the 
township and municipal levels. However, the situation changed with the Provincial Government’s 
intervention. The Township Government returned 2,102 mu of un-transferred land (of which 1,715 
mu land was from Lucky Island and 387 mu from elsewhere) to Wukan without preconditions.  
Second, under the Provincial Government’s pressure, the Municipal Government encouraged the 
Yidazhou Company and related banks to give up their rights to undeveloped land. As can be seen 
from Figure 6-1, the Yidazhou Company acquired land from Wukan village legally: the contracts 
were signed by the Wukan VC leader as the designated administrator of village land, under the 
supervision of the township official. Moreover, those lands had been acquired more than ten years 
earlier with full payment of compensation according to the contract. Further, those lands were 
mortgaged to a bank, which means that the bank enjoys priority for compensation if the company 
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violates the loan contract. However, with the Provincial Government's intervention, both the 
company and the bank agreed to abandon their rights to the land, thereby allowing eight pieces of 
land to be returned to the village.  
Third, the Provincial Government intervened in another commercial deal as evidenced in the 
Wukan piggery example. This was built on land reclassified as construction land after it was 
acquired by Wong in 1998. However, protesters treated the piggery as a prime target of their claims, 
partly because it was seen to pollute the environment and partly because Wong was disliked by the 
villagers. Wong, a former Wukanese who left the village during the early 1980s, is a Hong Kong 
business man. He was seen by villagers to be complicit in the land acquisition process because of 
his involvement as a broker in some of the land selling transactions. His piggery was damaged by 
protesters during the first demonstration. However, he did not gain any compensation for the 
sabotage, and indeed was compelled to abandon his piggery after the Provincial working team's 
intervention.  
It seems that throughout 2012, the Provincial Government returned as much undeveloped land as 
possible. In addition, it also initiated economic and infrastructure development in the long-neglected 
area. In this respect, the Wukan case suggests that infrastructure development is another means used 
by governments to appease protesters (at the same time as satisfying higher authorities) that has not 
been highlighted by previous analysts of Chinese protest. In addition to the gains described earlier, 
infrastructure investment resulted from the Wukan protest activities. By August 2013 when I left 
the village, a piped water system was established; three main roads were upgraded into cement 
roads; Wukan harbour was upgraded into a port that could protect more than 1,000 fishing boats 
during a typhoon (Figure 6-2); and an apartment block for teachers was under construction. On 20th 
September 2012, a month after the Yidazhou land announcement and five months after most 
undeveloped land had been reinstated, the Provincial working team published a summary sheet 
listing those investments. It concluded that in the six months after the village elections, more than 
70 million yuan (about AU$11 million) had been invested into development construction in Wukan, 
of which about 60 million yuan (AU$10 million) came from different levels of governments. The 
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other 10 million yuan (AU$1.67 million) was donated by the Charity Foundation of Guangdong 
Province.  
Villagers reported that such a large-scale investment in the village had rarely been seen in the past, 
or indeed in other rural areas. They treated these investments as an extra gain of the Wukan protest. 
One anonymous villager expressed his opinion to me: "the Provincial Government indeed brought 
much investment to us, that greatly enhanced the convenience of our villagers' lives". Yong 
corroborated that these investments were unprecedented and commented that: 
Actually, the Provincial and Local Governments have given Wukan considerable grace. Six 
projects, worth about 60 million yuan [$AU10 million] in total. There are some donations, about 
seven million yuan [about $AU1.17 million dollars], collected from the Provincial Federation of 
Industry and Commerce. And some more benefits. We never gained so many benefits in the past. 
 
Figure 6-2: The newly renovated Wukan harbour. 
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These investments in infrastructure construction and donations from other organisations were 
unanticipated benefits to the villagers, but clearly served to appease protesters and perhaps reduce 
the likelihood that they would continue to agitate for demands not fully met. 
The Wukan protest and the subsequent outcomes offer an excellent example for analysing Chinese 
governments' responses to rural protest because the Wukan protesters experienced both repression 
and concession during the protest. Repression is often the first response of local governments facing 
collective contention. Normally, local Chinese officials will detain protest leaders and try to 
disorganise protests because concession will harm local officials’ interests (Li & O’Brien, 2008). 
Wong and Peng's (2015) interpretation is that local government is more likely to repress collective 
actions when the Central Government places high importance on a “harmonious society”, as was 
the case during Hu Jintao’s tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of 
the People's Republic (2002-2012). During his tenure, the Central Government exerted considerable 
pressure on local governments to resolve grassroots collective actions which might challenge higher 
authorities.  
However, when protesters break through local officials’ obstacles and have their complaint heard by 
a higher level of government, the higher authorities are more likely to tolerate their actions and then 
pass the issues back to local officials for more satisfactory resolution (Li, 2006; Li & O’Brien, 
1996). This is partly because, unlike Tibetan separatists and Falun Gong adherents, grassroots 
collective actions generally do not target the Communist Party’s authority but direct their energy 
towards local and specific demands (Li & O’Brien, 1996). Moreover, when facing pressure brought 
by mass population unrest, or wider media attention, higher level governments are more likely to 
intervene a local protest (Cai, 2010) and appear to show mercy to citizens (Guo, 2001). 
There are other documented examples of higher governments’ tolerance and support being 
associated with a greater likelihood that local officials will concede to protesters. Attempts to meet 
protesters’ demands have been made through reducing tax revenue (Li & O’Brien, 1996), 
suspending land acquisition (Guo, 2001), increasing the level of compensation (Li & Lian, 2008) or 
by blocking some projects which may do harm to the local environment (Deng & Yang, 2013). This 
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tolerance by provincial and central governments in the interest of restoring local stability seems to 
have contributed to the Provincial Government’s intervention in the Wukan case.  
The scale of the population involved and the violent measures applied in the protest helped the 
Wukan villagers gain the Provincial Government's concession. I explained in the previous chapter 
that the Wukan protest developed into a relatively large scale collective action given some 
favourable political opportunities (technological evolution and a changed power structure in the 
village, alongside the Central Government’s tolerant attitude and available legal measures like VC 
elections). During this protest, some of the means villagers employed to express their opposition to 
the local Governments included sabotage of the piggery and destruction of village and police 
property. Undoubtedly, use of those violent strategies, involvement of more than 6,000 villagers 
and close attention from outside media exerted great pressure on the Provincial Government, which 
prompted it to meet protesters’ demands as a way to restore order and deflect international attention.  
Meanwhile, the timing of the Wukan protest (September to November 2011) also helped villagers 
to achieve their demands. Analysts point out that the two years of 2011 and 2012 were significant to 
Wang Yang, the former Governor of Guangdong Province, who was seeking promotion onto the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 
November 2012 (Aase et al., 2012). Since both economic development and political stability are 
important criteria for promotion in Chinese politics (Saich, 2004), Wang Yang sought to appease 
collective protests while maintaining the development of the land already under construction. These 
achievements of the Wukan protest thus verify Cai’s (2010) argument that government makes 
concessions when it is eager to stop contention. 
6.3.2 The change of political leadership 
The changed political leadership is the third achievement of the Wukan protest. Compared to the 
issue of retrieving their land, or even receiving adequate compensation, which remains an 
outstanding problem, the discharging of the former village cadres and the election of new VC 
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members suggests a major change in the political leadership of this village. This change, and the 
nature of the new political leadership in Wukan, is worth exploring. 
After three months of protesting, the Wukan villagers finally received agreement from the 
Provincial Government to hold open village elections. The public election for the Wukan VC was 
held on 3rd and 4th March 2012, but before that, two other elections, which were organised by 
villagers and tolerated by the authorities, were held for preparation. The first one occurred on 1st 
February 2012 and led to the election of 11 members onto an electoral commission: an organisation 
for arranging later elections. Then, the second one was held on 11th February, in which 109 
villagers were elected as representatives on the VRA: an organisation which represents villagers 
and makes important decisions on behalf of the Villagers’ Assembly whenever the full membership 
of the latter cannot be involved.  
The Villagers’ Assembly requires attendance by more than half of all villagers, and it would 
normally be convened annually by the VC on account of the limitation of universal attendance. It is 
stipulated as the authentic political authority of a village because it can deliberate on the VC's 
annual work report, discuss VC members' work, and repeal or alter decisions made by the VC 
(Article 23, OLVC). Prior to the protests, as outlined above, this annual review did not take place in 
Wukan and the VC was not accountable to the Villagers’ Assembly. In fact the Villagers’ Assembly 
was totally disempowered and did not function. VRA is a substitute for the Villagers’ Assembly 
between annual meetings and could be authorised to take charge of the responsibilities of the 
Villagers’ Assembly (Article 23, OLVC). However, similar to the VC which had never been elected 
in the past four decades, the Villagers’ Assembly and the VRA were both impotent bodies in 
Wukan or, at best, token entities. For instance, elections for the VRA had never been held. Thus, 
with the 11th February election of 109 representatives and promises to hold VRA meetings 
regularly throughout the year, villagers saw opportunities for participating in village issues and 
establishing a new political order in this village.  
However, the VC election itself was the main focus of both villagers and outside observers. The 
election followed the principle of “one person, one vote”, which guarantees every adult’s right to 
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vote and was deemed open and public (Restall, 2012). It was open, not only because all adults had 
the right to vote, but also because they were eligible to run as candidates. On 29th February 2012, 
22 villagers who had been nominated to run for election gave their campaign speeches in a public 
forum. On the 3rd and 4 th March 2012, seven of them were elected to be members of the new VC. 
More than 30 members of the media witnessed and reported on this election, which made it very 
“public” (see Figure 6-3).  
 
Figure 6-3: VC election on 3rd March 2012. Photo taken by Liang Xu. 
As a result, both Lam and Yong, the leader and vice-leader of the Provisional Directory (the 
mobilising organisation during the protest), were elected to be the Chairman and Vice-chairman of 
the new VC respectively. The other five members voted onto the VC had also been protest leaders. 
Moreover, Lam (whose leadership qualities had stood out during the protest) was selected by the 
Township Party Branch to be the Party Secretary of Wukan village on 15th January 2012, half a 
month before the election of the electoral commission. This represented a concession from township 
officials, because they abandoned nominating their allies and sought to nominate a candidate with 
popular support. When the subsequent VC election also supported Lam to be the VC leader, the 
Party Branch and the VC achieved consistency in leadership – a point I will return to later. 
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Although the post-protest VC election in Wukan has been described as the first ever free, 
transparent and democratic election in China (Gene, 2012), the conditions leading to this possibility 
had already been in place for many years, at least in legislative terms, if not in practice. As outlined 
earlier, following the legislation in 1987, village elections were introduced in parts of China from 
the early 1990s (O’Brien & Li, 2000), including in Wukan, despite the elections being a sham. Thus, 
the demand for an open election in Wukan was not a system innovation and it did not take much to 
pressure the higher level government to allow it to occur. Wang Yang, the former Governor of 
Guangdong Province, made this clear in a press conference on the issue:  
To be honest, the democratic election that happened in Wukan village was held according to the 
Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee of PRC, it did not represent any innovation. We just 
implemented the law very carefully, and rectified the half-hearted implementation of elections in 
this village (quoted in Yu, 2012). 
The Provincial and Central Governments have thus long been willing to allow open elections to 
take place at the grassroots, or village, level (Kennedy, 2002; O’Brien, 2009b). Indeed, according to 
scholars, open elections at the grassroots level have some advantages for the broader Chinese state. 
To begin with, open elections help to build administrative legitimacy in China, which has been 
shown to be important to the Communist Party (O’Brien & Li, 2000). The grassroots election was 
proudly publicised as a symbol of the Chinese Government's openness and the trend towards 
democratisation (Feng, 2009). Then, VCs function as a pressure valve in grassroots governance. As 
Oi (1999) has pointed out, a popularly elected VC will be subject to pressure from villagers about 
how it executes its administrative responsibilities – as well as to pressures from local governments 
who formerly appointed people to these positions. Moreover, village elections are limited to rural 
areas and do not apply to mass urban populations. The status of VCs is different to that of local 
government in urban areas since it is constituted as an "autonomous organisation" rather than a 
grassroots government, thus distinguishing it from the government and party hierarchy (Article 2, 
OLVC). Because of these factors, promoting village elections was not thought to pose any threat to 
the CCP's autocracy in China (O’Brien, 2008b).  
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Given these political opportunities and the stance of different levels of government, by protesting 
against the local cadres, the Wukan villagers achieved three open elections and established a new 
leadership in this village. The political decision-makers were altered by the VC election which also 
offered some promise of changing the political order as well – something I address later in this 
chapter.  
In being granted the right to hold an open election and retrieve some of their land, as well as being 
provided with some unsolicited material assets, the Wukan villagers achieved their demands to a 
certain extent. This could be viewed as a successful outcome of the Wukan protest if, as scholars 
have suggested, governments’ tolerance and accession to local demands is indicative of successful 
collective action while suppression implies failure (Cai, 2010; O’Brien, 2002).  
6.4 Examining collective action in Wukan from a social movement 
perspective  
These achievements illustrate that dramatic change in economic and political rights is possible at 
the village level without creating political instability on a national scale. It appears that the 
collective action instigated by the villagers in Wukan gained them new political opportunities in the 
form of a democratically elected new cohort of political leaders and material well-being 
(Kuah-Pearce & Guiheux, 2009) without precipitating widespread disruption. In prompting these 
social changes and establishing new leadership in the village, the Wukan protests appear to have 
achieved one of the goals of social movements identified decades ago by Blumer (1951): to 
establish a new order of life. However, while the Wukan protest certainly shows signs of being a 
social movement or developing into a social movement, as I outline below, the status of the Wukan 
protests as a social movement is far more complex and precarious. 
In first identifying the ways the Wukan protest functioned as a social movement, it is worth 
returning to the work of Tilly, as outlined in Chapter Three, who suggests that a social movement 
combines three elements: “campaign, repertoire, and WUNC display” (Tilly, 2005, p5). First, a 
campaign extends beyond any single event. It always links three parties: claimants, objects of 
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claims, and a public of some kind (Tilly, 2005). In a social movement, targets of claims are not 
limited to governmental officials, but also include authorities whose actions significantly affect the 
welfare of many people. Being “public”, the claims are usually openly made through collective 
action. Thus, a campaign means “a sustained, organised public effort making collective claims on 
target audiences” (Tilly, 2005, p5).  
Second, it employs a social movement repertoire, which Tilly defined as a combination of some 
specific forms of political action such as creation of special purpose associations and coalitions, 
public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to 
and in public media, and pamphleteering (Tilly, 2005). While many of these actions are part of 
lawful active citizenship, a latent requirement for being a movement is that the actors involved are 
“challengers” (Tilly 1978, p53). That is, people who lack regular access to institutional 
decision-making processes and claim their demands by collective actions, targeting the insiders 
(including government and other members of the polity) who dominate political action and 
decision-making (Tilly, 1978). In recent years, protest targets are not limited to governments, but 
include transnational corporations in anti-globalisation movements, the powerful financial services 
sectors in the Occupy Wall Street movement (Gautney, 2013), and conservative churches and other 
institutions in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender movements (Smith 1999). In such cases, 
outsiders demand change in the establishment often via non-institutional ways.  
Third, participants' seek to demonstrate their worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment, which 
Tilly called “WUNC” displays (Tilly, 2005, p5). Worthiness means that participants warrant respect 
due to such characteristics as sober demeanour, neat clothing, the presence of clergy, dignitaries and 
mothers with children. Unity among participants is expressed in such ways as displaying matching 
badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing and chanting. Numbers is 
another necessary element for a movement, which can be exhibited by headcounts, signatures on 
petitions, messages from constituents, or large numbers of demonstrators filling streets. Finally, 
commitment can be displayed during campaigns by participants braving bad weather, visible 
participation by the old and handicapped, resistance to repression, ostentatious sacrifice, 
subscription, and/or benefaction.  
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These three elements which define a social movement were evident in the Wukan protest. Firstly, 
the protest could be deemed to be a campaign. In the protest, villagers organised two group 
demonstrations and other mass public actions targeted at the Municipal Government and demanded 
collective claims, specifically around land retrieval and open village elections. Moreover, although 
there were spontaneous actions within the Wukan campaign, the second demonstration in particular 
revealed its well-organised character since it was peaceful and orderly, despite the strength of 
feelings of outrage. In addition, protesters sustained their campaign in a variety of ways for over a 
year in total and for more than three months from the first mass public demonstration to the end of 
protest when they achieved some success.  
Secondly, the repertoire of actions employed by the protesters during the Wukan protest resembles 
the kinds of activities that Tilly sees as characteristic of a movement. In Wukan these included a 
number of collective public actions such as group petitions, demonstrations, public meetings, and 
sit-ins, as well as some modern strategies such as social media messaging and the creation of a 
special purpose “virtual” association – the Warm-blooded Youth League. More specifically, from 
2009 to early 2011, activists approached different levels of government and sent letters petitioning 
for the return of their land. Although these actions occurred during the period of “collective 
resistance” which has been explained as different to outright “protest” (see Chapter One), they were 
group petitions and so represented a form of collective political action by the public. On 21st 
September 2011, activists arranged the first demonstration against the Municipal Government, 
which about 3,000 villagers attended. Then, villagers elected 13 members to form the Provisional 
Directory, an organisation for arranging or directing the later collective actions. On 21st November 
2011, the second demonstration was held with some media invited to witness and record this action. 
Furthermore, following the death of one activist in detention, villagers held daily meetings in a 
public area of the village. These public meetings lasted for more than ten days, and around 6,000 
villagers attended these meetings.  
Thirdly, not only did the protesters employ strategies legitimately described as part of a “social 
movement repertoire”, but these strategies also displayed the four characteristics typical of a social 
movement: worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment. Worthiness was revealed in the diversity 
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of ordinary villagers involved in the protest. Not only did students, elders and juveniles take part in 
the second demonstration, but also respected clan authorities and some people with disabilities. 
They were walking in front of the procession to exhibit the Wukan villagers’ determination and 
how seriously they regarded these issues. By involving such a spectrum of respectable villagers, 
protesters expressed their claims and actions as being worthy. As well protesters brought the flag of 
the zhenxiu immortal to the demonstration signifying divine approval of the cause.  
The Wukan villagers also showed their unity during the protest. During the second demonstration, 
they paraded in orderly lines outside the Municipal Government with badges and banners in their 
hands. Moreover, they had some protesters ride motorcycles beside the marching protesters to 
protect them and maintain order. Flags on those motorcycles displayed the slogans: “retrieve land” 
and “open election”. Also, protesters chanted these slogans during the demonstrations and the 
sit-ins.  
As the analysis in Chapter Five noted, protest leaders mobilised as many villagers as possible to 
participate in the protest as well, knowing the numbers would draw more attention to their demands. 
For instance, the family gongs which are used by long-standing tradition to convene meetings of 
family members were used to mobilise participation by many villagers. As well, the signatures of 
4,000 villagers were collected on a banner to ask for an open election. Protest leaders then 
emphasised the large number of participants in all these actions. These strategies, and especially the 
participation of 6,000 protesters in the second demonstration, made a deep impression on 
governments and the media.  
In other ways too, besides turning out repeatedly in large numbers, the villagers of Wukan 
displayed the strength of their commitment during the protest. Most notably some villagers were 
prepared to go to prison and many risked repression and a backlash from the authorities when the 
police were sent in to quell their actions. By maintaining the barricades on their village for 15 days, 
the villagers likewise displayed both the strength of their feelings and a willingness to be 
inconvenienced in order to progress their claims. This was also evident when a number of villagers 
became involved in the protest that resulted in clashes with police.  
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These displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and committment were part of the organisers’ 
strategies for fostering a “common identity” (which was discussed in Chapter Five). They also show 
the protesters’ commitment to achieving change and making sacrifices by disrupting daily life until 
their demands received attention.  
The parallels outlined above suggest the Wukan protest could be deemed to be a social movement. 
It was sustained for a half year, involved more than 6,000 villagers, and raised collective claims 
toward government publicly, which made it a campaign. It employed a combination of forms of 
social action such as demonstrations, sit-ins, public meetings, and group petitions. Also, protesters 
displayed worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment during the collective action. Assessing the 
process in this way, it seems that the Wukan protest resembles a social movement because it met 
Tilly’s three elements. However, an examination of the outcomes of the collective action from other 
social movement perspectives (Kolb, 2007) shows disparities between the Wukan protest and a 
social movement.  
Generally, achieving structural change is a key outcome of successful social movements insofar as 
they are able to influence the public policy of a state or political culture and bring democracy to a 
country, as well as change for individuals (Giugni, 2008). Kolb, for example, describes changes 
which can be expected to come about from the actions of social movements as “substantive political 
outcomes” (Kolb, 2007, p25). A movement can impact upon five aspects of state policy: its 
“agenda”, “alternatives”, “policies”, “implementation”, and “goods” (Kolb, 2007, pp28-32). If 
protesters’ topics and concerns are taken into consideration by governments, they have an impact on 
the state’s agenda. An extension of this impact is possible whereby the movement influences the 
contents of political proposals and alternatives. Policy impact not only refers to the impacts of 
social movements in achieving the adoption of legislation, but also to success in suppressing or 
blocking unwanted legislation or in other ways influencing political decisions. Influence on 
accelerating, slowing down or stopping the implementation of a policy is called an implementation 
impact. Goods impact is the degree to which a social movement influences the equitable provision 
of collective or public goods, where collective public goods are those shared by all members of a 
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society (Breyman, 2001) and would, in the Wukan case, include the communally-held land for 
instance. 
Besides influencing the formation and implementation of policy in these various ways, social 
movements can also result in procedural and institutional changes and state transformation within a 
country (Kolb, 2007). If the government or a political party recognises the importance of a social 
movement (Gamson, 1990) and begins consulting, negotiating, formally recognising and/or 
legitimising the social movement, it may introduce new procedures and institutions. These can 
include, but are not limited to: the extension of voting rights to formerly excluded groups; 
strengthening parliamentary representation; the creation of governmental agencies to deal with the 
movement goals; and the emergence of new political parties (Kolb, 2007). The process of state 
transformation might involve the emergence of entirely new political sub-institutions and/or 
changes in the structure and distribution of authority among existing ones (Kolb, 2007). All these 
changes can lead to a democratic society.  
Both substantive changes and institutional changes are what Wukan protesters expected. The open 
elections held in Wukan village exemplified “implementation impact” (Kolb, 2007, p32) because 
they represented the operationalisation of the village election policy. Although the Organic Law of 
Villagers’ Committee was published two decades ago, village elections have not been adopted in 
every village. According to media reports not only did the Wukan protest put the law into practice 
by facilitating open elections in the village, but it also encouraged village elections elsewhere in 
China (Zhu, 2012). However, the Wukan protest failed to achieve all the villagers’ specific 
demands such as retrieving all their land and altering the political order in the village, let alone 
change the institutional system or national policies in China.  
6.4.1 A protest that achieved no substantive structural or political change 
Although protesters have achieved their goals to a certain extent, these achievements have been 
limited to a restricted scale, primarily because not all of their demands were, or could be met. For 
example, villagers failed to retrieve all of their land which was sold by former village leaders. 
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It was always unlikely that villagers would get the remaining 3,000 mu (200 hectares) land back 
from higher level governments, because that land had been transferred into non-rural land, and even 
constructed upon. To the authorities and current land users, the land was acquired legally since the 
sales were agreed by the VC leaders and approved by Township or Municipal Government officials. 
Moreover, land users were encouraged to invest and paid compensation fees according to the land 
acquisition contract. A blogger with personal connections to local officials and entrepreneurs 
expressed sympathy for the perspective of developers in the Wukan case: 
The investors who acquired land from Wukan must be very unhappy too. Several years or 
decades ago, the Lufeng Municipal Government officials invited them to invest here and gave 
them preferential policies on land acquisition. Villagers did not express their opposition at that 
time. They [investors] have paid millions or even tens of millions compensation fees as well. 
Their companies were running well before 2011. But [the Wukan] villagers became dissatisfied 
suddenly, claimed that they had no idea about land acquisition, and wanted to reclaim all land 
without conditions. Thus, were those investments wasted? (Yi). 
As explained previously, higher level governments sought to satisfy protesters’ demands in order to 
placate them. However, those governments also had to seek a balance between the interests of 
protesting villagers and current land users. It can be observed that most of the reinstated land has 
not been constructed upon nor transferred, which reveals the Provincial Government's consideration 
of the interests of active land users.  
Moreover, governments welcomed investors to Lufeng city in line with the principle of prioritising 
development of the economy that Chinese authorities established in the late 1970s when the reform 
and opening-up policy was implemented. Reporting on the Government's initiatives on 1st March 
2015, the Mayor of Lufeng city, Jinxiong Qiu, highlighted the city’s investment promotion policy. 
While presenting the plan for the Municipal Government's work in 2015, he pointed out that: 
[We will] improve the effectiveness of the investment promotion policy. [We will] enhance the 
environment for investing, try to perfect our stimulation mechanism, and bring more enterprises 
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into our city. [We will] visit businessmen/women actively, and invite them to investigate and 
invest in Lufeng. [We will also] attract more fellow-townsmen/women who left to work outside 
to come back to our city, thus improving the success rate of our investment promotion policy 
(Jinxiong Qui, 2015 Lufeng Municipal Plan). 
Favourable land use considerations, reduced tax rates and other policy incentives were applied to 
attract investments (Tang, Selvanathan, & Selvanathan, 2008). A regulation about promoting 
investment released by the Lufeng Municipal Government in 2011 stated the intention to: 
Give some concessions on industrial land use: the price for land would be less than 100 yuan per 
square metre. Those who build a factory within two years, could use the land for less than 60 
yuan per square metre (Article 4, Regulation on Promoting Investment in Lufeng City). 
But the land use policies were not decided only by the Municipal Government. As introduced in the 
first chapter, the transfer of rural land into non-rural land needs to be approved and confirmed by 
the Provincial or even the Central Governments.
26
 Since land transfer involves these higher level 
governments it is protected by political authority. Although the Provincial Government intervened 
to appease the Wukan protesters, it was unable to take retrospective action and reverse all of the 
former land transfers. Thus, it was unlikely that the Wukan villagers would retrieve the other 3,000 
mu (200 hectares) lands which have been transferred or constructed upon, making it an unresolved 
problem for Wukan villagers and suggesting that the infrastructure investments provided were a 
kind of compensation, or at least placation, for villagers.  
The problem of irreversible loss of land to development was not the only disappointment to the 
Wukan protesters. The open elections, which once delighted villagers and were celebrated by 
several observers (Gene, 2012), failed to bring about a thorough change of the political order in this 
village and some problems which existed in the old days re-emerged after the open elections. There 
were a number of manifestations of this. Firstly, the new VC was unable to act independently since 
                                               
26Which level of government has responsibility depends on the land’s acreage and whether the land belongs to major grain producing 
areas as designated by the Central Government. 
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the Party Branch and higher level governments continued to exert great influence on village issues. 
Secondly, there was bribery and corruption involving some of the new VC leaders which 
undermined the VC’s legitimacy for managing some village issues. Thirdly, the newly instituted 
VRA could not effectively play its role of guiding the VC because villagers were unused to 
democratic deliberation and unable to reach any consensus in the assembly meetings.  
As I observed during my fieldwork, the Party Branch’s intervention in village issues was evident. 
By appointing Lam as secretary of the Party Branch in Wukan village, the Township Party Branch 
was able to control him more strictly than if he had held a VC position without Party 
responsibilities, as was the case with township or municipal governments and the Municipal Party 
Branch. Han, who was an activist during the protest and was a close friend of Lam told me that Lam 
was under secret surveillance by higher levels of government. This was consistent with my 
experience since Lam received a call several minutes after I entered his house, then he told me that 
he could not continue with my interview anymore because an unnamed official was coming. Also, 
he told me that his decisions were influenced by higher levels of government, “not because I myself 
have something to lose, but my sons, one works in a government department, and one is doing 
business in Guangdong Province” (Lam). 
In contrast, the Vice Secretary of Wukan’s Party Branch, Shen, was appointed by the Township 
Party Branch, but was not elected to the VC and he appeared to experience fewer feelings of 
conflicted loyalties in making decisions about village issues without consulting villagers. Shen has 
a close personal relationship with township officials. As a Wukanese, he facilitated communication 
between protesters and township officials during the protest, and was appointed to be the Vice 
Secretary of the village Party Branch after the protest. During the interview, Shen expressed his 
strong views on proceeding with commercial use of the controversial land: 
I am doing something to develop Wukan. I contacted some of my friends, because I want to sell 
some sand [dredged from Wukan harbour] to them. Also, some land developers came to me and 
discussed about using the returned land [lands which have been sold but returned to Wukan after 
the protest]. I am satisfied with some plans. I think Wukan’s land can be in use in the near future.  
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Land planning issues such as this are expected to be discussed with villagers and then decided by 
the Villagers’ Assembly or VRA. However, in his comment Shen did not mention the villagers, nor 
even the VC leaders. This suggests that the Party Branch continues to exercise significant powers in 
the village and act independently of the VC. This is reminiscent of the exercise of power in the old 
regime when the Party Branch leader, Shaw, in collusion with higher level officials, made decisions 
about land transactions without consulting villagers. Besides its independent actions usurping the 
Village Assembly authority, Yong, who was the Vice-Chairman of the new VC, expressed his 
discontent with the increasing intervention in the VC by the Party Branch: 
Now the Party Branch members are attending our meetings for discussing village issues. We 
have seven persons in our VC, the Party Branch have five persons. Lam is the leader of both the 
VC and Party Branch. After the bribery incident, two of us [VC members] are excluded from the 
regular decision-making process, thus the power goes into their [Party Branch members'] hands. 
Now the Party Branch holds 60 per cent of the power for managing village issues, while the VC 
only holds 40 per cent. It contrasts with the early days when the [elected] VC was just 
established.  
The bribery incident Yong refers to shows that the continuation of corruption was a second problem 
faced in the village. The incident happened in late 2012 when there was a call for bids to build a 
cement road in the village as part of the infrastructure improvements. The project was sponsored by 
the Provincial Government to improve villagers' livelihoods and was overseen by the new VC. It is 
said that one bidder gave 20,000 yuan (about AU$3333) per person to two Vice Chairmen of the 
new VC – Yong and Nei – and asked them to help him obtain this project. But eventually the bidder 
was not awarded the contract and he reported this bribe to the Party Branch leaders. The Vice 
Secretary of the Party Branch, Shen, publicised this scandal at the Wukan's Party members’ 
Assembly in early 2013.  
But VC members insisted they had been treated unjustly. Although Nei avoided talking about 
details of the bribe during my interview, he claimed he was caught into a trap which was set by the 
Township Government, because "the bidder had a close personal relationship with the former 
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village leaders and with township officials". Yong, on the other hand, explained the incident to me.  
I did received 20,000 yuan from a bidder. But I immediately gave 10,000 yuan [about AU$1667] 
to the Wukan middle school, because I was in charge of education then. I gave that money as 
welfare to teachers for the Chinese New Year. The other 10,000 yuan I returned to the bidder 
after the Chinese New Year [after Shen publicised the bribe]. This incident was exposed finally, 
and I am not supervising projects anymore since then.  
Nonetheless, the bribe has negatively influenced the newly elected VC's reputation. Villagers 
criticised these two bribes as evidence that these two VC members had deceived villagers and 
betrayed their trust. Moreover, they became disillusioned about the open elections and the other VC 
members as well. They believed the VC members were still acting to benefit from their positions of 
power and not as representatives acting on behalf of villagers. Lee shared her opinion of the VC 
members with me: 
The VC members have now become "officials". They got so much money for updating the 
infrastructure in Wukan, they can benefit personally from those projects. You can see Nei, he 
must have corruptly obtained much money. And Cheng [another VC member], must have got 
some money as well. He used to be very poor, but this year he installed two air conditioners in 
his house. If not corrupt, how could he buy those air conditioners?  
Obviously Yong and Nei made mistakes in accepting the bribe, regardless of whether they returned 
the money or not. But it is also evident that the Party Branch played an important role in this 
incident. The Vice Secretary of the Party Branch publicised this bribe at the Party Members 
Assembly when Yong and Nei were absent and were unable to defend themselves. This unilateral 
statement absolutely damaged Yong’s and Nei's reputations and, perhaps more significantly, 
weakened the elected VC's prespect and power in the village. At the least, I suggest this reveals the 
level of competition over power and legitimacy between the VC and the Party Branch in the village.  
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The relationship between the VC and the local Party Branch is a topic of considerable interest 
among researchers of Chinese rural politics (Bianco, 2001; Guo & Bernstein, 2004; Magaloni & 
Kricheli, 2010; O’Brien & Li, 2000). The Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee stipulates that the 
VC is the “grassroots autonomous organisation” (Article 2, OLVC) which administers collective 
assets and daily issues in the village, but it also recognises that the Party Branch “holds a leading 
position” (Article 4, OLVC). It does not distinguish between the functions of these two 
organisations, however. Thus, in many cases, VC leaders and Party Branch leaders are contending 
for power, with VC leaders sometimes winning (O’Brien & Li, 2000) and, at other times, Party 
Branch leaders being stronger (Guo & Bernstein, 2004). A frequent solution to the contention is to 
have the same person take charge of both positions (O’Brien & Li, 2000). In the old regime in 
Wukan, Shaw dominated the village power as the Party Secretary while Yim was chosen by him. In 
the new regime, Lam was both elected by villagers as VC leader and chosen by higher level Party 
Branch as Party Secretary. But as can be seen, this solution did not eliminate power contests in 
Wukan.  
Not only was the VC falling short of villagers’ aspirations for a corruption-free, consultative body 
of village leaders, but it was also the case that the VRA, which provided great hope that villagers 
would be able to participate in decision-making processes, was not fulfilling its role either. The 
requirement is that this assembly should be attended by all 109 of its representatives and it should 
be convened by the VC at quarterly intervals or whenever one fifth of the representatives asks for a 
meeting (Article 26, OLVC). However, according to villagers, the VRA had not been held for more 
than half a year. 
The Representative Assembly? I am a representative, I am elected by villagers. But we haven't 
had the assembly this year [2013]. The VC held it three times last year [2012], but not a single 
one this year. Neither did we achieve any agreement in the assembly. The assembly became idle! 
What are the differences between the old days and now? (Lien) 
The VC leaders did not deny the criticism but explained the situation to me. According to Yong and 
Nei, the VC held three assemblies in 2012, but each of them ended in chaos. They said that villagers 
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could not reach agreement on a single issue during the assembly because the representatives were 
not rational when considering the land issue and started quarrelling with each other or with VC 
members soon after the assembly started.  
The assemblies were always ending in a total mess. They [representatives] always criticise us 
once we mentioned the land issue, even while we were still presenting our reports. Then the hall 
would be extremely noisy. I didn’t want to attend the assembly at all. Lam did not attend the 
latter two one. He became disappointed with them [representatives] and was afraid to face them 
[because of their criticism] (Nei). 
There seems to be two main causes for disorder during the VRA. First, the Representative 
Assembly was an inexperienced decision-making body and such meetings had never been held in 
Wukan before. Meetings that occur regularly in Wukan are held by family clans or religious 
committees. As I introduced in the previous chapter, the family clan is an influential social 
organisation in Wukan. Each family clan has its committee to resolve daily issues occurring in the 
family and to convene family meetings regularly or irregularly. Similarly, the Religious Committee 
holds meetings for discussing religious issues. During those meetings, committee members or 
leaders take charge of the discussions and related decisions. Such hosts are usually dignified elders 
with considerable prestige who are able to maintain order and control the agenda of the meeting.  
However, the hosts of the VRA were VC members who, for the most part were relatively young and 
did not hold high status and respect in the village, even though they were leaders during the protest. 
Moreover, while family or religious meetings were convened on the basis of "family lineage" or 
"religious faith", which implies compliance to elders or immortals, the Representative Assemblies 
were held on the basis of "open election" which emphasised voters' equality and authority. As these 
assemblies were never held before in Wukan, hosts and villagers were not familiar with the standard 
procedures for holding a public meeting, especially without outsiders' guidance. Thus, during the 
Representative Assemblies, it was much harder for VC members to maintain order.  
Second, villagers’ primary concerns and expectations during the VRA were to retrieve their land. 
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As described by Nei, villagers became noisy whenever the land issue was raised because it related 
to their direct interests and they were dissatisfied with the VC's achievements on it. Although the 
infrastructure projects brought much convenience to the Wukan villagers, they could not gain direct 
benefits from those projects. But the land issue was different. During the early stages of the protest, 
some activist said that "once all land is retrieved, every villager can obtain 480,000 yuan 
(AU$80,000) for compensation" (Lee). Many villagers were still expecting this. However, the 
reality was not so easy. Besides the fact that not all of the acquired lands could be retrieved, lands 
which had been retrieved could not be transferred into money and distributed equitably among the 
villagers. Village leaders, including the VC and Party Branch members, all agreed that lands should 
not be sold but be used in other sustainable ways to bring long-term returns to the village as a whole, 
such as from leasing or from founding village enterprises. 
It is unlikely we will sell our lands again. We paid our price to retrieve that land. We won't sell it, 
because we have to reserve these treasures for our descendants (Yong). 
But some villagers did not understand this. They placed considerable hope on the protest and the 
ensuing land retrieval as a source of personal enrichment such that, in Lee’s words "some people 
stayed at home after the protest, to wait for the money distribution". Thus, when they listened to the 
VC members' ideas about leasing or building on the land, they became dissatisfied with VC 
members and quarrelled with them. Since the VC members lacked the status to preside over the 
VRA, which villagers understood as mainly established and elected for that purpose, and especially 
when the distribution of benefits from the land in the village failed to materialise, the assemblies 
predictably fell into chaos. 
In summary then, the protest failed to bring institutional changes to Chinese politics, and nor were 
there any changes to specific policies. Villagers retrieved some land from the Township 
Government because of the intervention of the Provincial Government, but this did not require 
policy changes. Land retrieval was a method applied by governments to appease relatively large 
scale protests but there was no desire among the upper tiers of government to change any policy on 
land administration and ownership systems. 
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Thus, unlike successful social movements, the Wukan protest, although relatively successful in 
achieving some specific local targets, failed to bring institutional changes to the society, and could 
not alter the land acquisition situation and political order in the village. For these reasons, the 
protest does not appear to resemble a social movement. 
6.4.2 A protest with specific local targets and aims 
There is another key ingredient of a social movement that was absent in the Wukan protest. 
Although he does not state this explicitly, Tilly suggests that the campaigns and social actions of a 
social movement should be nationwide. Tilly’s observations were based on Europe where, during 
the 18th Century, economic capitalisation and the expansion of the power of the state threatened 
local citizens’ rights and led to mass collective campaigns (Tilly, 2008). These differed from former 
collective actions in that the targets of these contentions were national or even international policies 
and actors with demands being for sweeping public policy changes instead of focusing on localised 
change in the contenders’ personal interests (Tilly, 2008).  
An important aspect of this supra-local focus was that contenders developed and accumulated some 
modes of protest which were appropriate for other contenders to imitate and adopt elsewhere. By 
using similar social actions, protesters are able to align with other contenders and thus gather more 
people in dispersed locations for their collective actions. Moreover, Tilly identified that the direct 
action of disaffected groups in earlier times, such as seizure of grain from their oppressors and the 
collective invasion of fields, have been replaced in contemporary activism whereby protesters adopt 
patterns which are more performative (Tilly, 1986). By this, Tilly means the protesters employ 
various forms of action dramatically, often symbolically, to communicate their demands and 
mobilise followers and unite and align people with a common cause across boundaries of space and 
time. Methods such as holding sit-ins at the heart of New York’s financial district in the Occupy 
movement (Gautney, 2013), holding a colourful mardi grass parade in the gay and lesbian rights 
movements (Smith, 1999), and petitions, processions, sit-ins and strikes employed in social 
movements for women’s rights (Flexner & Fitzpatrick, 1996), anti-nuclear campaigns (Kitschelt, 
1986) and the environment protection movement (Stern et al., 1999), were all nationwide, and even 
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international. Thus, even though “nationwide” was not included in Tilly’s definition of social 
movement, the spread beyond the local cannot be ignored. Tilly’s work and that of other social 
movement theorists implies that both the issues and the actions of a social movement move beyond 
a local focus.  
But the Wukan protest was limited to issues and actions at the local scale, within the village or, at 
most the county. This can be observed in several ways. First the objects of protesters’ concerns 
were local matters of land retrieval and changes in the local political order of the village. They were 
not attuned to a common set of issues across China, nor did they assert that the implementation of 
village democracy should occur nation-wide. After receiving the Provincial Government’s promise 
of resolving their specific land issues and guaranteeing a village election in Wukan, the protesters 
terminated their hostility toward governments.  
Second, the scale of action remained local as protesters refused to ally with other protesters, rather 
than connecting up over space and time. Bang explained villagers’ thoughts to me: 
There were some protesters from Fujian [a neighbouring province] or from Shantou [a city 
beside Lufeng], but we refused to connect with them. Also, residents in the neighbouring 
village wanted to protest against land sales in their village and expressed their intentions to 
combine with us. We refused them as well. We Wukanese are different to them. After the 
second demonstration, many journalists came to our village. We knew they [other protesters] 
were coming because we had the media’s attention here. They [other protesters] wanted to 
share that attention. But we refused.  
Thus, although villagers employed collective actions such as demonstrations, group petitions and 
strikes to express their demands, these actions did not have the characteristic of a “social movement 
repertoire” because the issues and actions of the Wukan protest were limited to the local scale. By 
refusing alliance with other protesters, and seeking only changes in their own village, the Wukan 
villagers rejected the possibility of involving themselves in a broader swell of rural protest, let alone 
of participating in a social movement. 
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Third, the Wukan protesters restricted their target of action to the DonghaiTownship Government, 
Lufeng Municipal Government and local village cadres. Admittedly, media from Hong Kong and 
abroad helped to broadcast the village elections further afield. However, the villagers were not 
protesting against the higher level governments, but their local village cadres and the local 
governments. The group petition held on 21st November 2011 attracted several foreign journalists 
into Wukan village because the demand for an "open election" inspired them. But villagers were 
afraid that journalists might misinterpret their demands as asking for political reform and 
democratisation on a broader scale. In an attempt to clarify this and reassure the central political 
authorities, they put up posters around the walls in the village, which said that "we are not 
protesting against the Central Government. Please do not report improperly" (Zhang, 2011). 
Moreover, villagers expressed their desire for the Central Government’s help by displaying banners 
in the demonstration proclaiming “Please help us, Central Government. We are wrongly treated” 
(see Figure 6-4). 
 
Figure 6-4: A banner displayed in a demonstration (on which villagers asked for the Central 
Government's help). Photo taken by Jiang Yang. 
Different aims and targets distinguish between social movements and collective protests since the 
targets of protests are limited and they are very specific in their thematic concern (Rucht, 1998). 
After the concerns are resolved, protests will end. However in a social movement, people are 
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ultimately calling for a new societal order or opposing an existing one as part of an ongoing 
struggle. 
Yet the limited nature of the Wukan protest cannot be explained simply in terms of the demands 
and actions of the Wukan people themselves. Rather, there are structural impediments to 
widespread collective action in China which also need to be factored in. Indeed, the Wukan case 
was not the only rural protest which was targeted at local authorities and limited to local issues. As 
a matter of fact, rural protests occurring in China overwhelmingly share this feature (Guo, 2001; Li 
& O’Brien, 2008; O’Brien, 2009a). Rural protesters have neither the opportunity nor the intention 
to oppose higher authorities. In the first place, there are few opportunities for protesting against 
higher level government, especially the Central Government. I explained in the previous chapter 
that urbanisation and the development of Information and Communication Technology helped to 
strengthen the challengers’ power, thus changing the power structure in the village and offering an 
opportunity to hold a protest in the village. Meanwhile, the Central Government’s sympathetic 
attitude toward grassroots collective actions so long as they were directed against local officials also 
allowed the outburst of protest in Wukan, especially since the protesters’ demands were provided 
for in law (for example the VC elections and villagers’ agreement to transfer land). However, there 
are limited political opportunities for action at the higher political scale as Chinese authorities will 
not tolerate collective action aimed at the Central Government or fundamental economic institutions 
(such as the land ownership system itself). The most well-known opposition in China to the Central 
Government and agitation for systemic political and economic change happened in May to June 
1989, and that so-called democracy movement was forcibly repressed by the authorities (Zhao, 
2004). 
The capability of the Central Government to repress rural protests is beyond doubt. The Central 
Government and the Party control the National Liberation Army (which has more than two million 
soldiers), the Peoples’ Armed Force (which includes more than 660,000 soldiers), and the Public 
Security Bureau (which has about two million policemen and women). Without a revolt from inside 
the regime, it is impossible for rural protesters to oppose higher level governments successfully. 
Take the Falun Gong as an example. Although the estimated practitioners reached two million, once 
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it stated opposition to the Central Government, the Government repressed it within a single year, 
with thousands of leaders detained and practitioners re-educated. According to the Central 
Government, after re-education, “more than 98 per cent of the two million-plus Falun Gong 
practitioners have recognised the true nature of the cult and relinquished their ties to it” (cited from 
“Government Official Document on the Campaign against Falun Gong”).  
Unlike Falun Gong, rural residents possess very limited resources with which to confront higher 
level governments – fewer even than poor urban residents. While the Central Government has at its 
disposal a large amount of tax revenue (6,226 billion yuan in 2015, equalling more than AU$1,000 
billion) and employs enormous security forces, rural residents are in an inferior position. The annual 
per capita income in rural villages was only about 10,000 yuan (about AU$1,667 per year) in 2015. 
Moreover, they do not have the time, knowledge and experience to oppose the higher level 
governments. Thus, although the narrowing of the discrepancy between protesters and former 
village cadres in the past decade facilitated the Wukan protest, the overall gap between rural 
residents and the Chinese authorities remains. Therefore, it is unlikely that political opportunities to 
form a social movement in rural areas will emerge. 
Chinese rural residents are aware of the obstacles and the impossibility of a village challenging the 
Central Government, no matter how many residents are in the village. Protest in a single village 
poses a threat only to the harmony of local governments and must be addressed by them. Many 
other protests in China are similarly aiming at quite specific demands, such as preventing particular 
land acquisition, dam building, or factories that are seen to pollute the environment. Few of them 
have been targeted at achieving change in the institutions of the Chinese society and higher level 
governments (O’Brien, 2009a; Perry, 2002).  
This directs our attention to the notion of “cognitive liberation” as proposed by McAdam (1982, 
p48) which relates to people’s increased awareness of their rights and the law. In the Wukan protest, 
villagers’ increased awareness, expressed in their sense of grievance, focussed on improprieties and 
injustices as perpetrated by Shaw and those around him on the former VC. Generally, Chinese rural 
residents are not conscious of grievances against the higher level governments.  
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Piven and Cloward’s (1979) model is helpful in analysing the mobilising process. In the beginning, 
people become dissatisfied with, and want to challenge, the system or aspects of the system. Then, 
if they become confident about benefiting from protesting against the target, they are likely to 
participate in the protest. As exhibited in the Wukan protest and some other rural protests in China, 
rural residents neither intend to oppose the Central Government and related institutions (O’Brien, 
2008a), nor have they developed a new political awareness that would make them confident that 
they would benefit from wider changes such as democratisation and law reform. They are satisfied 
with existing laws and working through existing bodies like the VC; they just want to ensure these 
function properly.  
A contrast has been drawn between protests that seek to improve the functioning of the system, 
which are described as exhibiting “rules-consciousness” (Perry, 2008, p38), and those that seek to 
change the system to make it more just – dubbed “rights consciousness” (Li, 2010, p47). Both kinds 
of protest in China are regarded differently by rural residents, depending on whether they are aimed 
at the Central Government or local governments. In the Wukan protest for example, the leaders and 
mobilising organisations focused on common grievances of the villagers in Wukan. Hence there 
was particular intensity around the piggery and it was targeted and damaged during the 
demonstration. But villagers did not treat the Central or Provincial Governments as the targets, but 
looked to them as allies who would provide a solution to their existing problems. Protesters 
believed that higher level governments' intervention could solve "illegal land selling" in the village. 
By displaying banners and posters, protesters expressed their intention of not protesting against the 
Central Government but instead, asking for its support. 
Perry considers these rural protests as indicative of Chinese rural peoples' rules consciousness and 
acceptance of governments as a legitimate authority to the extent they take people's livelihood into 
consideration and follow the legal processes (Perry, 2002; 2009). If the Central Government fails to 
protect people’s welfare, people have the right to overturn the authority and raise a revolution 
(Perry, 2002). At the same time as people are satisfied with the Central Government's authority and 
accept its policies, they may regard local governments or local officials as having neglected 
people’s welfare by not implementing rules or policies. Under such conditions, they would organise 
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local protests to express their grievances and try to overturn local authorities (Perry, 2002). Perry 
notes that this kind of rules consciousness existed in ancient Chinese society, and she sees the rural 
protests emerging in modern China as a continuation of this rather than demands for innovation, or 
new systems, new rights and entitlements (Perry, 2008).  
However, Li and O’Brien (2006) insist that a kind of rights consciousness is growing within 
Chinese rural people. They argue that rural people are not simply protesting about infringement of 
the rules, but are doing so because they are much more aware of their rights and how these are 
being violated and wish to assert broader rights they have not previously experienced. Actually, the 
word "right" (quanli 权利) comes from Western culture and was introduced into China by 
American scholar William Alexander Parsons Martin in the middle of 19th Century. Before that, 
Chinese people did not have a notion of "rights". Li concludes there is an individual dimension to 
rights consciousness encompassing both the right to make "individual claims against the state" (Li, 
2010, p53) and the right “to participate in the rule-making process to seek some benefits for 
themselves” (Li, 2010, p54). After interviewing 1,600 peasants in several villages of three 
provinces, Li believes rights consciousness is developing in rural China (Li, 2010) and suggests this 
consciousness will bring extensive changes among Chinese rural people (Li, 2010; O’Brien & Li, 
2006) and constitute greater cognitive liberation. 
As a student of Chinese rural protest, I do not intend to engage in the discussion of whether the rural 
protesters are protesting because of their "rule consciousness" or "rights consciousness", because it 
is hard to distinguish these two kinds of awareness clearly: on one hand, villagers rely on the 
Central Government to exert pressure on local governments to solve their problems, accepting 
authoritarian power. They have also learned and applied laws to claim their existing rights. On the 
other hand, insistence on entitlements to have a say in a well-functioning village administration 
system with the Village Assembly as ultimate decision-maker and an absence of corrupt 
representatives or interference from the Party or governments, may come close to demanding 
expanded rights and a changed system. Rather, I want to highlight that recent Chinese rural 
protesters’ objectives have been for concrete, local and fairly short-term changes to bring personal, 
often material, benefits instead of eliminating the inequities or unfair institutions which the system 
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imposes on them, such as those inherent in the land ownership system (Cai, 2003), land acquisition 
policies (Chan, 2003; Zhang & Lu, 2011), the house registration system and the social insurance 
system (Cheng & Selden, 1994; Nielsen et al., 2005). This seems likely to remain the case in the 
near future.  
There are systemic reason for straightforward land transfers in that Chinese rural people neither 
have ownership of rural lands – even those they are cultivating – nor the power to negotiate directly 
with governments during land acquisition (Cao et al., 2008). From 1952, when private land 
ownership was abolished, the governments captured ownership of all urban land. Although rural 
land ownership was reserved for each collective, Chinese citizens lost their rights to individually 
own any land. However, land transfers from the collective to the state are quite easy, and this has 
facilitated land acquisition since the late 1990s when urbanisation was adopted as the main driver of 
economic development by the Central Government (Chan & Hu, 2003; Gu & Wu, 2010). Given this 
institutionalisation of land acquisition in rural China, backed by law and economic development 
policy and facilitated by administrative procedures, lands already transferred into state ownership 
are unlikely to be returned to villagers. However the Wukan protest objected to specific sales and 
was limited to the local scale, it did not express any villagers’ demands for changes to institutional 
rules. 
This explains why so much of the former collectively owned land in Wukan could not be retrieved 
by the villagers. Villagers claimed the land acquisition procedure was illegal since the former 
village leaders did not inform them about those transactions. However, the fact that authorised 
signatories signed those land sale contracts means they are deemed legal transactions. The Wukan 
villagers retrieved the un-transferred land with the Provincial Government’s support, but, according 
to the Chinese Constitution and land administrative law, there is no process to return land back to 
collective ownership once it has been transferred to state ownership.  
Similarly, the protest did not change the political order in this one village since it is integrally 
connected to the power structure of China more broadly which has entrenched central state control 
of most dimensions of village life since the decades of Mao Zedong’s rule (from 1940s to late 
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1970s) (Unger, 2002; 2012). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is recognised as the only 
legitimate ruling party across the country and it holds power at every level of administration. As 
outlined in the Introduction chapter, the Chinese Government has a unique power structure under 
the CCP’s leadership with a Party Branch above each level of government. Although the Party and 
government are two independent systems, the Party Branch often plays a leading role in 
policy-making and officials' promotion (Saich, 2004). 
The power structure of rural villages is similar to the higher level authorities, although the VCs are 
not a part of the tiered Chinese government system and they have no direct administrative relation 
with the Township Government. Nevertheless the Party Branch at the village level is supervised by 
the Township Party Branch. Thus, resisting Party Branch cadres' involvement in village issues is 
not only rejecting the village Party Branch's involvement, but the Party per se, including also the 
Township Party Branch's and even the Township Government's power. However, the Party did not 
abandon its influence or control on Wukan. The resistance in Wukan was directed at a specific VC 
and expressly did not target or threaten the influence and control of the Party. 
Although the open elections changed the political leadership in the village, they did not and could 
not eliminate the Party’s intervention in village issues nor undermine its position as the prominent 
power holder in China. Nor did the Wukan protesters dare to oppose intervention by any level of the 
Party. After the protest, Party members participated in village affairs under the instruction of higher 
level Party Branches, which undermines democracy in the village. 
Moreover, strong ideals of participatory democracy did not take root in the political participation 
which took shape during the Wukan protest. Villagers were mobilised by common interest and 
collective identity which prompted them to take part in the demonstrations and village election. As I 
interpreted earlier, most villagers’ demands for an open election and a change of leadership in the 
village were related to their wish to share in the benefits from the land sales. This provided a great 
opportunity to popularise democracy in the village as people are more likely to take part in elections 
when there is concrete interest in the group as a whole (Oi & Rozelle, 2000). However, the strong 
incentive of benefiting from land retrieval accelerated the process of introducing democracy in the 
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village but neglected some necessary preparations for running a democratic system. For instance, 
villagers changed their attitude toward VC members and dared to argue with those cadres, but they 
did not develop an appropriate way to express their opinions peacefully and productively to resolve 
differences of opinion. The lack of rational deliberation revealed that the conditions for operating 
democratically in this village are not yet mature. The Wukan protest, which aimed at specific 
demands and employed direct action methods, did not help to develop the ideals and practices of 
participatory democracy in the village. Given this, only quarrels and chaos ensued during the 
VRAs.  
6.4.3 The absence of professional organisations and broad network foundation 
A third aspect of the Wukan protest also points to its failure to operate as, or start to establish, a 
broader social movement in rural China. According to Tilly, professional organisations play 
necessary roles in a social movement (Tilly, 2005). Professional organisations are organisations that 
seek to implement the goals and agendas of a social movement by hiring professional staff to collect 
and distribute resources, mobilise and recruit members, and organise collective actions that apply 
social movement strategies and repertoires (McCarthy and Zald, 1977a). Although there were 
indigenous organisations that used the close personal relationships within the village to mobilise 
villagers to participate in the collective action, such professional organisations were absent in the 
Wukan protest.  
In the Wukan case, as explained in Chapter Five, the two mobilising groups of the Provisional 
Directory and the Warm-blooded Youth League worked to exploit the close inter-personal networks 
which were based on family clans and neighbourhoods. A common identity of “Wukanness” helped 
encourage villagers to participate in the protest, especially when protest activists or other villagers 
were in danger. Without those organisations or networks, it would likely have been more difficult 
for participants to establish trust with other protesters since solidary incentives are harder to achieve 
when there is a lack of common identity, as occurred between Wukan and other protesting villages. 
The Wukan villagers saw themselves as “Wukanese” and therefore “different to others” (Bang) and 
this claim to a unique identity impeded the escalation of the protest to a larger scale. Although new 
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technology and social media were used to strengthen networks and bolster numbers as a supplement 
to traditional family clan mobilising strategies within the villages, these connections did not spread 
to others beyond the villagers. Without indigenous organisations and established associational 
networks, effective mobilisation in a broader context is much harder than in a village.  
This need not be an impediment however, as social movements with their broader national, even 
international scope, do not necessarily rely on tight personal relationships as a condition of 
mobilisation. Nevertheless, mobilising organisations are essential for launching a movement that 
generates a sense of common identity among strangers and, in the case of modern mass movements, 
these are usually professional organisations. Without those organisations, aggrieved citizens’ 
emotional outrage is hard to sustain and there is a tendency for a movement, or embryonic 
movement to fizzle out (Della Porta & Diani, 2009).  
In Wukan’s case, villagers elected the Provisional Directory as a mobilising organisation for the 
express purpose of organising the protest and administering the village during a time of leadership 
vacuum until their demands were met. However, it was far from a professional organisation for 
promoting a social movement. To begin with, the Provisional Directory was a local organisation 
that was constituted by Wukan villagers. This organisation’s activities were funded by donations 
from within the village, and members were working voluntarily during the protest. Secondly, the 
Directory was a temporary organisation that was dismissed after the VC election. Thirdly, villagers 
established the Directory not only for organising the protest and furthering their goals of retrieving 
their land and holding an open election, but also for administering village issues after the former 
village cadres left the village. Furthermore, although at one stage the Provisional Directory received 
ratification from government to act as an administrative organisation during the protest, it was later 
denied by the authority as an informal administrative organ. For these reasons, it was not a 
professional organisation for organising a movement.  
The other mobilising group, the Warm-blooded Youth League, was further from a professional 
organisation as it only existed in the online-chat room. It was an informal group that facilitated the 
Wukan protest. Although some activists were recognised by villagers, other participants remained 
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anonymous, preferring to limit their involvement to the chat room.  
Not only for the Wukan protest, but also for other rural collective actions, there has been little 
chance for formation and survival of professional organisations with a political change agenda in 
China. According to the Chinese Constitution, Chinese residents have a right to form an association 
(Article 35, Constitution of P.R.C). However, Article Three of the Regulation on Registration and 
Administration of Social Organisations has stipulated that an association should be approved by 
related governmental departments. If not approved, the association should be viewed as an illegal 
organisation, and suppressed by the Chinese Government. Obviously, the Chinese Government 
would not ratify the existence of professional protest organisations. The previously mentioned 
experience of Falun Gong being regarded as an organisation that threatens social stability is 
instructive. As the organisation was regarded as a potential threat due to the number of followers 
and their independence from the state (Schechter, 2001), the Government announced it to be a 
heresy and suppressed it. This would likely be the fate of other embryonic social movements.  
In practice, officially sanctioned NGOs in China are mainly working to protect the environment and 
alleviate poverty and thus are working within the Chinese political system rather than trying to 
change it. Moreover, NGOs have to co-operate with Chinese governments in their work (Ho, 2001; 
Lin, 2007). Hence, while environmentalism is spreading broadly in China and the environmental 
movement is the closest China gets to a social movement, I concur with Stalley and Yang’s (2006) 
assessment that it cannot be treated as a social movement because it is not opposing any 
establishment targets and official policies. Although at least 2000 professional and recognised 
environmental NGOs existed in China in 2004 (Wonacott, 2004) and environmental collective 
actions, including campaigns against dam building and polluting factories, are emerging all over 
China, scholars argue that these environmental collective actions fail to conform to the definition of 
a social movement (Ho, 2001; Stalley & Yang, 2006). On the one hand, those actions lack sustained 
contention and usually target specific projects rather than seeking policy or institutional change. On 
the other hand, NGOs, as professional organisations, are playing a supportive role in China rather 
than mobilising oppositional movements. Most of them remain closely tied to the state and help to 
raise citizens’ consciousness of the need to protect environments, instead of organising 
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confrontational actions.  
6.5 Conclusion 
In the Wukan case, the focus of villagers’ dissatisfaction and demands were parochial issues such as 
retrieving specific plots of acquired land rather than changing the land transfer system. Similarly, 
ousting the individuals dominating the VC – particularly Shaw – was a specific goal rather than a 
general principle of achieving village democracy. This analysis of the outcomes of the Wukan 
protest suggests some insights into Chinese rural protests and governments' attitudes and strategies 
toward those protests. As demonstrated, the villagers gained some achievements after the protest. 
Firstly, villagers retrieved half of the acquired land they claimed, which revealed the governments' 
accession to villagers. By returning the land that had not been legally transferred, the Provincial 
Government showed its influence on lower level governments, companies and even banks. Another 
benefit for the Wukan villagers was investments sponsored by higher level government and other 
organisations in infrastructure construction. These investments could be regarded as compensation 
for collective land lost or as a government strategy to appease rural protesters. Thirdly, the political 
leadership in the village changed with the overturning of the old village cadres, including the 
long-entrenched Party Secretary Shaw, and election of the new VC members. They also gained 
some opportunities to alter the political order in the village by electing villagers' representatives and 
starting the VRA regularly. Villagers' demand for holding open elections could be realised because 
grassroots elections had already been sanctioned by law and supported by the Central Government. 
Thus, the Provincial Government would not prevent villagers from holding such elections. In 
achieving these outcomes, Wukan’s protest demonstrated some elements which marked it as a 
successful Chinese rural protest: the involvement of a large number of people, attention from 
outsiders, breaking through local governments' obstructions and having their voice heard by higher 
level governments, and fortuitous timing in terms of a range of factors including the Provincial 
Governor’s political ambitions. 
Although villagers realised some demands, unresolved problems remained, some of which were 
remnants of the previous situation that prompted the protest. These problems include some 
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un-retrieved land and an essentially unchanged political order in the village. These two problems 
relate to the strong institutions of China: the land ownership system and the political system, along 
with the absence of a consciousness around participatory democracy in the village. I argue that 
these systems and the absence of such a consciousness could not be changed by the Wukan protest, 
as it was limited to a local scale in actions and goals and did not challenge the two institutions and 
Chinese society.  
Further, successful social movements bring changes to policy, political structures and/or persons’ 
opinions of participatory democracy. They will promote democracy in a society. The Wukan protest 
shares characteristics of a movement, as it is a campaign asking for public interests that lasted for 
several months; applied some modern protest repertoires; and displayed worthiness, unity, numbers 
and commitment (Tilly, 2005) during the collective action. However, it is not a movement because 
it was limited to local scale issues, targets and actions and to specific demands. Moreover, 
protesters were bonded by family or neighbourhood relations rather than to wider, anonymous 
networks, and no professional organisation was involved in these actions. Thus, it cannot achieve 
success in altering a state’s policy and political structure or promoting broad democracy.  
Finally, as also demonstrated the Wukan villagers refused to align with other protesters – another 
sign that the protest failed to evolve into a social movement. Indeed, my analysis concludes the 
Wukan protest was neither a social movement in its own right, nor a part of a broader social 
movement happening in China. And indeed that no social movement currently exists in Chinese 
rural areas.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction  
In this thesis, I studied a protest that took place in rural China as an example of the emergence, 
development and outcomes of Chinese rural protests. The case was the Wukan protest which 
occurred in 2011 and involved more than 6,000 participants. In this sense, drawing on Flyvbjerg 
(2006), it is both a typical and an extreme case: typical because it was induced by loss of land and 
initially emerged as a form of resistance, as has occurred in many rural areas across China; and 
extreme because of the unusually large number of people involved in the protest; the disruptive 
public collective actions taken by protesters; and the international attention that the dispute attracted 
as a potential sign of political change taking place in Chinese rural areas. The causes, opportunities, 
resources used and the outcomes of this case of protest were examined. This study’s relevance 
extends beyond a local rural protest to address issues of land acquisition, grassroots democracy and 
the possibility of social movements in rural China. Discussion of these issues was woven into 
answers to three research questions, which this thesis has sought to address. These are: 
1. How can we explain the way local protest in rural China develops and evolves? 
2. How effective is local protest in bringing about socio-political change in rural areas? 
3. To what extent can local protests be understood as forming part of a broader rural social 
movement in China? 
Taking rural protest as the starting point of this analysis, I reviewed literature about local protests, 
including protests in China which were launched and enacted by rural residents (Li, 2006), workers 
(Butollo & Brink, 2012), and students (Wright, 1999), and protests that were induced by land 
acquisition in other countries (for example, Larsen, 2008; Naylor, 1994; Woods, 2003). This review 
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highlighted the common characteristics of resistance, protest and social movements. All of these 
terms refer to public opposition to authorities on contentious political matters that are typically 
expressed in individual or collective action. “Resistance” refers to the moderate, sometimes 
individual and private actions, while “protest” relates to more public and disruptive actions by 
groups of people, sometimes involving violence against property or people. Few scholars employ 
the concept of “social movement” while studying Chinese protests, this being usually understood as 
a sustained, organised and public campaign for institutional change using a defined repertoire of 
actions and involving a broad network of people who are not necessarily personally connected (Li 
& O’Brien, 2008; O’Brien, 2009a; Tilly, 2005). I explain why, with reference to my study of Wukan, 
this continues to be appropriate. 
Data about the Wukan case was collected and analysed using an interpretivist approach which infers 
the meanings behind people’s actions from their own accounts. In order to understand protesters’ 
action from their point of view, I went to Wukan village and stayed there for three months to 
interview persons who were involved in the protest (for example as protesters, targets of protest, 
and members of government) and to become acquainted with the culture in the village. Participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews were the main methods applied during the fieldwork. 
Documentary data were collected, and used, to supplement my fieldwork observations.  
Elements of social movement theory were employed to analyse the development of the Wukan 
protest. For instance, the concept of “relative deprivation” (Gurr, 1970, p37) helped to explain the 
rising grievances among villagers, while Tilly’s “Polity model” (Tilly, 1978, p53) directed attention 
to the claimants; to the objects/targets of claims; and to the general public as distinct parties; as well 
as to the repertoire of protest actions that could display the worthiness, unity, numbers and 
commitment of protesters. McAdam’s “Political Process model” (McAdam, 1982, p36) provided a 
framework to recognise the resources, opportunities and strategies for raising a protest in the village 
by illustrating three requisites for the emergence of a protest: expanding political opportunity, 
indigenous organisational strength and cognitive liberation. Further analysis took into consideration 
the sorts of goals, targets, achievements and impacts typical of social movements (Kolb, 2007; 
Rucht, 1998; Tilly, 2005) as well as distinctions between rules (Perry, 2002) and rights (O’Brien & 
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Li, 2006) consciousness. Rules consciousness involves citizens relying on the government to 
resolve their dissatisfaction, whereas rights consciousness applies to demanding new rights.  
In the two analysis chapters I answered the three research questions by interpreting empirical data 
with the help of these theories. In these chapters, social movement theories were not applied rigidly, 
but with some alterations to understand collective action in the Chinese context. For instance, Tilly 
considers the “polity” to consist of government and “members” (Tilly, 1978, p53) who exert 
impacts on the emergence of a social movement. In the advanced Western industrial nations that 
Tilly studied, the “members” are corporations, financial groups, other political parties or 
independent mass media who hold power and form the power elite. However, I omit “members” 
from my own analysis since they are absent from the authoritarian Chinese polity which is much 
more monolithic, as I explained in Chapter Five. I do, however, recognise peculiarly Chinese social 
relationships of relevance such as Guanxi providing networked relationships within both the ‘polity’ 
and the ‘challengers’ (Tilly, 1978, p53). This concluding chapter will offer a summarising 
discussion of those research questions by outlining some of the key findings of this thesis.  
7.2 Chinese rural protest against land acquisition: aiming at fair 
compensation   
The first key finding relates to the causes of the protest – namely the acquisition of rural land in 
Wukan. While so-called “land grabs” in other developing countries often relate to land acquired by 
foreign investors to produce food for domestic consumption or biofuels for export (Hall, 2011), 
most land acquisition in China is enacted by the Chinese state for urban development (Ding, 2007). 
Similar to most other practices of land acquisition in China (X. Li, 2011), rural land in the village of 
Wukan was sold to support urban expansion, with that land transferred into construction land for 
establishing infrastructure, factories or other commercial operations in line with government 
priorities (Wang, 2001).  
Scholars have previously observed the reasons for discontent about land acquisition in other 
Chinese villages. In those cases, protesters regard the compensation to be too low or less 
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satisfactory than the amounts that have been paid in other villages (X. Li, 2011); believe village 
leaders to have misappropriated their compensation fees (Zhang, 2000); and often clash with 
demolition crews as construction begins before any agreement has been reached about the amount 
of compensation fees (Guo, 2001). As revealed in those cases, protests against land acquisition are 
often motivated by the pursuit of compensation or other material benefits associated with land, 
instead of seeking to retain their land as a source of livelihood or being integral to a rural way of life. 
This is somewhat different from the peasant mobilisation witnessed in developing countries where 
land dwellers have sought to resist the removal of their lands on the basis of lost livelihoods (Issa, 
2007; Lee-Peluso et al., 2008). 
The observation that few Wukanese earned a livelihood from farming and agricultural production is 
important for understanding the motivation for their protest actions. As a coastal village, the 
economic mainstay of Wukan is fishing rather than agriculture. However, similar to villagers in 
other rural areas of China, most Wukan villagers cultivated village land before the 1980s. The 
reform and opening-up policy which has been in place in China since the 1980s was a turning point 
when many villagers abandoned their rural land-based livelihoods as peasants and went to the cities 
to make their living. Villagers’ transformation from peasants to workers or business people reflects 
the urban-rural inequalities: whenever possible, peasants abandon cultivation and embrace an urban 
lifestyle and livelihood with more advantages (Zhang & Song, 2003). In China, 282 million 
villagers work in urban areas as migrant-workers (NBSC, 2017). This means that more than 46 per 
cent of rural residents are making their livelihoods without cultivating the land, and rights to rural 
land are a supplementary asset for them. Thus, when compensation fees satisfy villagers’ 
anticipation, few rural residents reject land acquisition caused by urbanisation because they can find 
alternative means of sustaining a livelihood instead of being a peasant. Similarly, after retrieving 
land which had been sold by the former Villagers’ Committee, the Wukan villagers’ goal was to sell 
the land themselves or lease it to factories or other companies and to distribute the proceeds from 
sales or leases among themselves as they had observed in other villages.  
Villagers’ anticipation of benefiting from the sale of their village land increased after comparing 
their circumstances with others. Having witnessed the riches accrued by the former village cadres 
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who were said to have benefited personally from land transactions, and the payments to villagers in 
other areas who shared land leasing earnings or more compensation fees from land sales, the Wukan 
villagers felt they were being deprived by the former village cadres and this feeling of being 
deprived was the primary step for raising a protest. This, as I stated earlier, is called “relative 
deprivation” by Gurr (1970, p51). Thus, while peasants in countries such as Indonesia and Brazil 
engage in protests aimed at restoring their claim to productive land, rural residents in Wukan and 
many villages in China are asking for fair compensation since they see land as a capital asset rather 
than an essential means of production.  
Moreover, in contrast to some western countries where rural residents have launched protests to 
maintain their traditional way of rural life or rural identity in the face of urban encroachment (Reed, 
2004; Woods, 1998, 2003), villagers in China have not protested to maintain a peasant’s lifestyle or 
a peasant’s identity as they have not been living in an agrarian way. In Wukan for example, 
although a shared collective identity as being a “Wukanese” helped to mobilise villagers to 
participate in the protest, they were not uniting to protect their identity as “peasants”. Thus, most 
rural villagers in China are protesting for material benefits and fair compensation for the land they 
will no longer have access to, rather than for rural livelihood, lifestyle or identity.  
7.3 Changing local power dynamics help to generate a protest 
The land acquisition that prompted the protests was overseen by local authorities and prompted 
dissatisfaction with local cadres and the Township and Municipal Governments. This points to 
changes in recent years in the local power dynamics between these members of the establishment 
and villagers as potential challengers. Tilly’s “Polity model” (Tilly, 1978, p53) argues that a 
decreasing power discrepancy between challengers and members is vital for launching a protest. 
This can be seen to have created opportunities for protest in rural China. Considering the village 
level as a “polity” (Tilly, 1978, p53), village cadres as the power elite or establishment and the 
thousands of village protesters as “challengers” (Tilly, 1978, p53), I noted changes in the power 
balance brought about by legal reforms and access to new resources. Normally, village cadres 
control the majority of resources and experience few checks on their autonomy so individual 
179 
 
villagers cannot oppose them. But the process of urbanisation and social development has brought 
great changes to Chinese rural society and brought villagers more resources and opportunities to 
oppose village cadres.  
Information, experience, money and other material resources helped to generate collective action. 
The development of Information and Communication Technologies was one factor that provided 
challengers with more resources. Scholars have argued that expanded access to the internet will 
promote greater democracy in China by offering new possibilities for citizen participation (Yang, 
2003); offering a new battlefield to influence state politics and policy practices (Zheng & Wu, 2005); 
and increasing individuals’ freedom to information access (Zheng & Wu, 2005). As argued in 
Chapter Five, I found that access to information and means of networking via the internet 
contributed to the public sentiment and organisation of local protest in Wukan. Firstly, the internet 
brings more knowledge about law and rights to rural residents, especially to young villagers who 
use computers and mobile phones frequently. Secondly, by sending messages about their grievances, 
rural residents can obtain attention and sympathy from political commentators and activists outside 
the area, and even internationally, which the Wukan protesters did very successfully. During this 
process, protesters’ strategies such as refraining from sending sensitive information and eluding 
censorship of online material were important for receiving outsiders’ attention. Such strategies have 
previously not been demonstrated in studies of Chinese rural protest movements and this thesis 
contributes new insights in this regard.   
In addition, with changing economic trends in the cities and rural areas some villagers who 
previously worked in urban areas have now returned to their home-town villages with more 
experience and money, and this can also facilitate collective action. Regardless of their reasons for 
returning to the village, whether to look after their elderly parents, or the collapse of a city factory 
or business after the global financial crisis, returners brought more resources back to rural areas. 
Those resources included, but were not limited to, more money, experiences of bargaining with 
government officials, and personal connection with media and other outsiders. In Wukan, returners 
with these resources became activists and leaders during the protest. With such resources, both the 
ability and the confidence of rural villagers to organise or participate in a protest against village 
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cadres were strengthened.  
Another development that contributed to the declining power discrepancy between villagers and the 
authorities was the opportunity created by a more favourable political background and rising 
confidence about villagers’ ability to change the unjust situation in their village, particularly as a 
result of disparities between different levels of governments. The Central Government was regarded 
as relatively “benign” and issuing some policies beneficial to peasants; whereas the local 
governments (i.e. Township and Municipal Governments) were regarded as “malign” authorities 
who failed to implement those policies (Guo, 2001, p435). In many cases, rural residents deployed 
favourable policies issued by Central Government to defy local officials, which was defined as 
“rightful resistance” by O’Brien and Li (2006, p2). In the Wukan protest, the Central Government’s 
grassroots election policy was advantageous for protesters. This policy stipulated that the 
administrative organ of the village, the Villagers’ Committee, should be elected by all adult villagers. 
This law was established by the Central Government two decades ago and provides an opportunity 
for villagers to protest when open elections do not happen in their village. In the case of Wukan, the 
implementation of an open election became one of their chief demands during the protest. As an 
established right, this demand for holding an open election in the village was approved by the 
Provincial Government officials who tolerated this protest.  
Also, the higher level governments (including the Central and Provincial Governments) often show 
more sympathy and tolerance toward local rural protests when rural protests are targeted at local 
level governments and pose little threat to the state authority as is often the case. In contrast, local 
governments seek to suppress oppositional actions quickly to prevent them from developing into a 
larger scale. The Wukan protesters’ strategy, then, was to make their voice heard by higher level 
governments who would tolerate their actions and compel local officials to respond to their 
demands (Cai, 2010; Li, 2006). They realised such possibilities and sought the Central 
Government’s attention by encouraging coverage of their demands by the media. Finally, after 
having been suppressed by the Municipal and Township Governments three times – that is by 
sending police to the village to detain the protest leaders – the Provincial Government intervened on 
the 21st December 2011 in the form of meetings between the protest leader and the Vice-governor 
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of Guangdong Province. It was after that intervention that the Wukan protesters began to feel things 
moving in their direction.  
The study of the Wukan case helps to explain the increasing incidence of protest in rural China 
where many protests have taken place since 2004 (Yu, 2007). Similar to what occurred in the 
Wukan village, the power base in other rural villages is changing and new resources such as access 
to information, social media and materials are available in other villages as well. Likewise, villagers 
in other areas share a common political opportunity with their compatriots in Wukan because of the 
disparities between central and local governments and the favourable rights granted by central 
government policies. With power increased, residents are more capable of taking collective action 
against township and municipal governments and are more confident of their power to change the 
situation (Piven & Cloward, 1979).  
7.4 Organisational strength facilitated a protest through traditional 
resources 
Besides material resources, information and access to social media, as listed above, more traditional 
resources were also utilised in the Wukan protest, which formed some unique features of the protest. 
These traditional resources include closely bound family clan and religious groups among villagers. 
Other scholars have noted the impacts of these indigenous organisations on the Wukan protest. For 
instance, Hou (2012) has pointed out that the divine immortal and religious rites brought solidarity 
and confidence to the Wukan protesters, while He and Xue (2014) have suggested that the family 
clan system helped to restore collective identity and thus facilitate a popular protest in the village.  
Echoing such findings about traditions, the family committees and the Wukan Religious Committee 
were identified as key indigenous organisations in this village. In my research, I examined the 
functioning of networks associated with these two indigenous organisations in terms of the Political 
Process model (McAdam, 1982). This highlighted the importance of established networks to a 
grassroots protest and the ways these indigenous organisations helped to mobilise the rural protest 
by providing channels for recruiting participants and an effective communication network. Family 
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and religious committees also provided stronger incentives for villagers to take part in the protest by 
enabling them to discuss and share knowledge within and between these local organisations. Further, 
they also facilitated the appointment of experienced and respected clan and religious leaders to help 
drive the protest activities.  
Additionally, mobilising groups are vital for accessing resources and opportunities (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977b), and also mobilising participants (McAdam, 1982). In the Wukan protest, two 
mobilising groups worked alongside traditional organisations to play crucial roles in generating the 
protest. The first one was a formal organisation named the Provisional Directory. This group was 
connected with the family clan tradition because its members were elected by each family clan on 
the villagers’ own initiative to organise the protest and administer village issues after the former 
village cadres stood down in disgrace. After its foundation, the Provisional Directory organised a 
demonstration, some sit-ins, some daily meetings and several days of confrontation against the 
Township and/or Municipal Governments. Also, it mobilised participants and raised donations from 
villagers to support the protest. The second mobilising organisation was an informal and more 
ad-hoc group without traditional roots called the Warm-blooded Youth League, which was formed 
by local youths who were strongly opposed to the land sales in the village. This group functioned 
principally as a virtual body, connecting online through chat room discussions. Most members in 
the chat room were young villagers, who worked as activists during the protest. They collected 
information and resources, released messages to outsiders about the protest, which attracted broad 
attention from overseas media, and helped to mobilise villagers by producing and broadcasting 
mobilising videos in the village. Neither of these groups aligned with professional NGOs further 
afield – a point I return to later.  
This case study deepened our understanding of the Political Process model through its application to 
the analysis of Chinese rural protests. In McAdam’s original case of the black civil rights movement 
in the USA, indigenous organisations referred to black colleges, black churches and other 
associations. But in studying Chinese rural protests, few scholars have mentioned the presence of 
comparable existing organisations, instead portraying the mobilising leaders as disconnected 
individuals (Li & O’Brien, 2008) and local civil society organisations as non-existent (Yu, 2004). 
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The Wukan protest offers an example of existing networks and mobilising organisations for Chinese 
rural protests and provides an adaptation of the Political Process model to a Chinese context with 
traditional forms of civil society organisations that are less familiar in modern Western protests 
though using some similar strategies (such as social media), and playing similar roles (such as 
mobilising participants).  
7.5 Distinction between a protest and a social movement: connected 
action targeting central authorities for systemic change 
Perhaps most significantly, Wukan’s case reveals the distinction between a protest and a social 
movement. As a protest, the Wukan incident involved public oppositional actions. For example, 
villagers participated in several demonstrations, sit-ins and public speeches to express their 
demands to authorities. As argued in Chapter Six, these prominent collective actions were 
well-organised and demonstrated the protesters’ worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment. These 
are characteristics that Tilly associates with a “social movement repertoire” (2005, p5).  
Other scholars have suggested further distinguishing features of social movements, some of which 
are absent from Chinese rural protests. For example O’Brien and Li (2006) argued that rightful 
resistance in China does not exhibit the sort of well-organised groups that are characteristic of 
social movements because resistance actions are more episodic than sustained. By saying this, 
O’Brien and Li suggest that a social movement is sustained. Tarrow is another who treats “sustained 
challenges” (Tarrow, 1998, p2) as a characteristic of social movements. However, I consider it is 
hard to define “sustained”. Villagers in Wukan resisted for more than two years and protested for 
more than four months and indeed reignited their public protests in 2016, so it is hard to say the 
Wukan instance was not a “sustained” action.  
However, Chapter Six demonstrates that the Wukan protest cannot be treated as a “social movement” 
since this collective action did not spread widely in Chinese rural society. Similar to other protests 
emerging in rural China (Guo, 2001; O’Brien, 2002), the Wukan protest was limited to the local 
scale. Although villagers from neighbouring towns and cities approached Wukan seeking united 
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action, the Wukan protesters refused their request. Protesters confined their demands to specific 
requirements such as retrieving village lands which were sold by former cadres and holding an open 
election for their own Villagers’ Committee, and avoided making demands for structural change to 
China’s land ownership or election rules. Also, they limited their targets to the former village cadres 
and some inactive township officials rather than accusing higher level governments of facilitating 
their oppression.  
Villagers neither wanted nor dared to oppose the Chinese authorities at a higher level. They were 
aware of the obstacles and risks of protesting against the higher level governments. On one hand, as 
already explained, they regarded the Central Government as benevolent (Guo, 2001). On the other 
hand, they understood the great power disparity between a village and the state, and realised the 
impossibility of opposing the Central Government successfully. Regardless of the reasons for not 
spreading beyond the village, it is certain that without connection with other protesters, Wukan’s 
protest was similar to the localised rural collective actions identified elsewhere in China (Bernstein, 
2004; Li & O’Brien, 1996).  
This contrasts with social movements analysed by other scholars which are widely spread within a 
country, or even link internationally. For example, what is known as “the 1989 Chinese Democracy 
movement” (Kriesi, Della Porta, & Rucht, 1999, p30), was a collective action that emerged in 1989 
in different cities of China and involved both students and workers (Crane, 1994). Protesters were 
connected by media reports and the student associations of various universities (Zhao, 1998). 
Similarly, the Civil Rights movement (Andrews, 1997) and anti-nuclear movement (Meyer, 1993) 
that emerged in the United States of America, along with the anti-war movement (Reitan, 2012) and 
counter-globalisation movement (Ayres et al., 2002) which occurred in diverse countries, were 
networked via professional organisations (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004) and the mass media 
(Downing, 2000). This sort of networking with other protesters provides another difference between 
a protest and a social movement.  
Although some scholars such as Lin (2007) and Otsuka (2009) make reference to an environmental 
“movement” in China, others have queried the idea that environmental collective actions in China 
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constitute a “movement” because there is no situation where related NGOs organise collective 
protests against Chinese authorities (Ho, 2001). Rather, Chinese environmental groups co-operate 
with Chinese authorities and educate citizens in support of government policies (Stalley & Yang, 
2006). Despite appearing to oppose Chinese governments’ involvement in dam building and 
polluting factories, those actions target specific projects and do not connect with each other to seek 
broader change. Thus, although environmentalism is spreading over China and involves collective 
actions demanding environmental changes and provides the closest similarities to a social 
movement, those collective actions are not contentious and have not developed into a social 
movement either.  
The absence of an NGO-mobilised environmental movement is helpful to explain the localisation of 
Chinese rural protests. It shows that organisations, whether indigenous or professional, for 
mobilising a social movement rather than simply a protest, do not currently exist in China. On one 
hand, the indigenous organisations and the related relationship networks that exist on a small scale 
(such as in Wukan village) do not cover rural China more broadly, because there are few 
nation-wide civil society organisations. On the other hand, there is little chance of forming and 
preserving a professional organisation that opposes the Central Government as associations and 
organisations need Central Government approval before establishment and must be constantly 
supervised by governments. Without those organisations, collective actions and protesters struggle 
to connect with each other and mobilise into a movement.  
It seems that the essential defining characteristic of a social movement is neither being a “campaign” 
which is “sustained, organised and public” (Tilly, 2005, p5), nor utilising some specific repertoire of 
actions or a display of “worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment” (Tilly, 2005, p5), but rather 
the connection with widely dispersed protesters for a similar goal of a systemic change. This 
connectivity was wholly absent in Wukan which remains typical of Chinese collective protest action 
more broadly.   
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7.6 A single protest cannot change the institutions of the society 
Protests aiming at specific local demands/grievances and being confined to a local level of 
mobilisation will not lead to the broader changes that are the typical goals of a social movement. 
The Wukan protest offers a salient opportunity to follow the outcomes of a protest. As a relatively 
successful collective action which obtained several compromises from the Provincial Government, 
the Wukan protesters achieved much of what they requested. They retrieved half of the lands which 
the former village cadres had sold, gained a considerable amount of investment in infrastructure 
within the village, and changed the political leadership in the village through an open election. 
These achievements demonstrated the Provincial Government’s strategy and its power to appease 
local protest. However, these achievements were restricted to some degree and the Wukan protesters 
could not satisfy all their demands. Firstly, villagers failed to retrieve all their land and it seems 
impossible for them to retrieve most of the land that was legally transferred and constructed upon. 
Currently in China, land can only be transferred from collectively owned to state owned, but not the 
reverse. All the un-retrieved land has been transferred into state-owned land, and is thus impossible 
to return in principle.  
Secondly, a single protest resulting in an open election is not enough to ensure that the practice of 
democracy is rooted in the national political institutions and cultural context. In Wukan’s case, 
although villagers were enthusiastic about having a village election and held an open election 
witnessed by the media, they failed to realise participatory democracy in the village or change 
entrenched power imbalances. A lack of a full set of democratic institutions and property rights in 
mainland China is the fundamental reason for this failure. Vital issues such as land transfer are 
controlled by governments, and even elected VC members cannot protect villagers’ entitlements 
effectively. Meanwhile, conventions of participating democratically in meeting discussions were not 
established during the protest and the election, which led to chaos in the Villagers’ Representatives 
Assembly and Villagers’ Assembly after the elections, and offered an excuse for village cadres to 
avoid convening those assemblies and revert to less open and more authoritarian processes.  
Growing interest in Chinese grassroots democracy has led most media and scholars to pay attention 
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to the election of the Villagers’ Committee (VC) (Kennedy, 2002; Manion, 2006; O’Brien & Han, 
2009). However, I argue that an open election for a VC is a secondary part of establishing 
democratic institutions, while the Villagers Representative Assembly (VRA) and Villagers’ 
Assembly are the primary elements for implementing grassroots democracy in rural China. Without 
regular VRA and Villagers’ Assembly meetings in which villagers can decide village issues, the 
village cadres who are elected by villagers are likely to break their trust. Thus, a single election 
cannot ensure democracy in a village if the other democratic processes and bodies like the VRA and 
Villagers’ Assembly are not reformed and strengthened as well.  
Scholars have pointed out that popularising grassroots elections does not threaten the Chinese 
authoritarian regime (O’Brien & Li, 2000; Schubert & Chen, 2007). Indeed, if anything, it helps the 
Communist Party of China to gain legitimacy (Oi, 1999) and to alleviate grassroots discontent (Oi 
& Rozelle, 2000; Wang & Yao, 2007). Thus, although unpopular with township officials who regard 
appointed village cadres as more compliant than those who are democratically elected, central 
government leaders have worked hard to promote village elections during the past decades (O’Brien 
& Li, 2000). But Wukan’s case showed that villagers’ passions about participating in grassroots 
election vary with changing situations: if villagers believe that the election can bring them 
immediate benefits, they are likely to take part in the election; in contrast, villagers do not appear 
interested in participating if they are disappointed with the elected VC. This supports Oi and 
Rozelle (2000) in their view that people’s interest in political participation rises when people 
perceive it to matter to their interests and believe there is a likelihood that change will result. 
7.7 Directions for future research  
This study has helped to deepen our understanding of Chinese rural protests in respect of the causes, 
resources applied, opportunities, and outcomes of the protests. However, due to time restrictions 
and the scope of the study, there remain further avenues to explore in subsequent research. For 
instance, the research employed a single case to illustrate the emerging collective actions all around 
rural China, but it found some factors unique to Wukan and acknowledges there will be different 
distinctions for other areas. As well, the study of this protest ended in 2013 when I finished my 
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fieldwork, but the story in Wukan develops after that as briefly discussed below.  
Although the Wukan case can be treated as a typical one to explain Chinese rural protests, it has 
some unique features that cannot be generalised to other regions. For instance, the population 
(13,000 villagers) in Wukan is much larger than that of villages in other rural areas which typically 
have a population of less than 5,000. Wukan villagers are unusual in bearing three to four children 
or more per family, despite the possible penalty for breaching the state’s birth control policy which 
has been in place since the 1980s. The resulting large population helped to attract the foreign 
media’s attention and to exert pressure on governments during the protest. Contrasting the Wukan 
protest and other protests helps to demonstrate how this advantageous population condition 
impacted on the process of protest since numbers are an asset for protesters.  
Moreover, studying other Chinese protests can provide further comprehension of the Political 
Process model and other social movement theories. Although the indigenous organisations played a 
significant role in the Wukan protest, they have been barely mentioned in other research. This offers 
an opportunity to further interrogate the notion of indigenous organisations, and the distinctions 
between indigenous and mobilising organisations. Similarly, the parallels between the collective 
identity of being a Wukanese that emerged during the Wukan protest and that of the “shared identity” 
(Macionis, 2012, p565) which is regarded as a feature of new social movements (Larana, Johnston, 
& Gusfield, 1994) is worth exploring in a future study.  
Besides such insights into the nature of rural protest, the Wukan case provides a wealth of data for 
studying Chinese rural politics. The open election was witnessed by foreign media, and yet the first 
elected VC has progressed toward bribery, detention and in-fighting. Media reports indicate that 
three of the elected VC members were involved in bribery, including the leader and two 
vice-leaders. They were convicted as criminals by the municipal court, and were imprisoned in 
2016 and sentenced in 2017. Another VC member fled to the United States of America in 2015, and 
asked for political asylum there. Moreover, villagers have not been satisfied with the land 
distribution, and many of them have refused to vote for new VC members in the most recent village 
election while others believe their elected leaders have been treated unfairly by government. These 
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further developments make the case an excellent one to study open elections, grassroots democracy, 
and other aspects of Chinese rural politics in future research.  
The Wukan protest proved an outstanding case for studying rural protest, grassroots democracy and 
political institutions in China. The mechanisms that prompted disaffected Wukan villagers to 
overcome anxieties about conflicting with police sent by local governments were revealed in this 
study. It also showed the excitement they experienced about holding open elections after the protest 
given expectations that the elected village cadres would change the political order and bring them 
benefits from land. Although many things changed, there is a disappointing recurrence of some of 
the old VC practices and media reports of re-ignited protests that suggest the temporary euphoria 
has worn off.  Much remains for researchers to explore about the future of Wukan, of the village 
land, the former cadres and the protest leaders and activists as well as about the chances of 
democratisation in rural China.   
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Appendix 1: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Research title: A Study of Rural Protest Induced by Land Acquisition in China 
Organisation: University of Queensland, Australia 
Main investigator: Bin Sun 
 
I am Bin Sun, a PhD student at the University of Queensland, School of Social Science. I am 
conducting this research for my PhD program. This research is about rural protest induced by land 
acquisition in China. The purpose of the research is to track the progress of land acquisition and 
protest about it. By analyzing these protests, I want to deepen the understanding of the 
characteristics, consequences and influences on rural society of protest in China. My research will 
contribute to finding pathways to development that are inclusive of rural villager’s interests.  
 
You are asked to join this research because of your experiences, activities and knowledge of various 
aspects of land acquisition and protest in Wukan village. If you agree to take part in an interview, 
you will be asked to answer a number of questions and discuss with me about the land acquisition 
and protests that have happened in Wukan. I will ask about your perception, feelings, and 
experiences of land acquisition and protest during the interview, which will take approximately 60 
minutes. As well as answering my questions, you are encouraged to express any matters you think 
are related to the topic during the interview. The interview can take place in a place of your choice.  
 
With your permission, the conversation will be recorded. Your name will not be identified to any 
person and will not be included in any written or oral output arising from the research. Instead, you 
will be referred to in generic terms such as ‘villager’ or ‘local official’. In limited cases, there is a 
chance that you may be recognised by others in the village as a result of any distinct role you play 
there, and/or of anything you tell me that only you have knowledge of. If this applies to you, it is 
recommended that you do not share with me anything that might be private, confidential or 
potentially harmful. Also you are free to withdraw at any stage of this activity; in that case, the 
record will be deleted immediately.  
 
A written report of this study will be sent to the village leaders and group leaders from whom you 
can receive feedback. I also hope to give a presentation at the end of field research for those who 
are interested. 
 
This study adheres to the Guidelines of the ethical review process of The University of Queensland, 
Australia. Whilst you are free to discuss your participation in this study with the main investigator, 
if you would like to speak to an officer of the University not involved in the study, you may contact 
Dr Chris Clarkson, the Ethics Officer on +617 3365 3235; or c.clarkson@uq.edu.au. 
We hope you enjoy this conversation, 
 
Bin Sun 
Main investigator 
bin.sun3@uqconnect.edu.au 
A/Prof Lynda Cheshire 
Supervisor 
l.cheshire@uq.edu.au 
Dr Jo-Anne Everingham 
Supervisor 
j.everingham1@uq.edu.au 
 
214 
 
Appendix 2: GROUP PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Research title: A Study of Rural Protest Induced by Land Acquisition in China 
Organisation: University of Queensland, Australia 
Main investigator: Bin Sun 
 
I am Bin Sun, a PhD student at the University of Queensland, School of Social Science. I am 
conducting this research for my PhD program. This research is about rural protest induced by land 
acquisition in China. The purpose of the research is to track the progress of land acquisition and of 
protests about it. By analyzing these protests, I want to deepen the understanding of the 
characteristics, consequences and influences on rural society of protest in China. My research will 
contribute to finding pathways to development that are inclusive of rural villager’s interests.  
I am hoping to attend gatherings of your group as part of this research because I can learn about life 
in Wukan and about your experiences, activities and knowledge of various aspects of land 
acquisition and protest in Wukan village. If you agree to let me take part in the group’s activities, 
meetings and discussions, I will pay close attention during the time I spend with you. The 
conversations I hear may be noted, analysed and reported for my research but I will not name any 
group members.  
The name of the group and the positions of individuals in it will not be identified to any person. 
Also any of the group members are free to let me know that they do not want me to report anything 
about them, even anonymously.  
A short written report of this study will be sent to the village leaders and to your group leader from 
whom you can receive feedback. I also hope to give a presentation at the end of my field research to 
those who are interested. 
This study adheres to the Guidelines of the ethical review process of The University of Queensland, 
Australia. Whilst you are free to discuss your participation in this study with the main investigator, 
if you would like to speak to an officer of the University not involved in the study, you may contact 
Dr Chris Clarkson, the Ethics Officer on +617 3365 3235; or c.clarkson@uq.edu.au. 
We hope you enjoy this conversation, 
Bin Sun 
Main investigator 
Ph.: +61452235632  
bin.sun3@uqconnect.edu.au 
A/Prof Lynda Cheshire 
Supervisor 
l.cheshire@uq.edu.au 
Dr Jo-Anne Everingham 
Supervisor 
j.everingham1@uq.edu.au 
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Appendix 3: RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Research title: A Study of Rural Protest Induced by Land Acquisition in China 
Organisation: University of Queensland, Australia 
Main investigator: Bin Sun 
 
I _______________________________________________hereby agree to be involved in the 
above research project as an interview participant. The researcher has explained the projects to me 
in language I can understand and I have read and/or understood the information is the “Interview 
Participant Information Sheet” and I understand the nature of the research and my role in it. 
I hereby agree to be involved in an interview for the above research project. I have read the research 
information sheet for this project and discussed it with the researcher. I understand that:  
 My participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw without penalty, or not answer any 
question, at any time.  
 My answers will be coded and will contribute to the pooled data of the research team, so no 
individual responses will be made available.  
 The answers I provide and my personal details will be confidential. 
 I will receive no financial benefit for my participation. 
 
 
 
 
Signature of Participant 
 
 
Date 
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Appendix 4: GROUP PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Research title: A Study of Rural Protest Induced by Land Acquisition in China 
Organisation: University of Queensland, Australia 
Main investigator: Bin Sun 
As a representative of                         group I state that we hereby agree to let the 
university researcher Bin Sun participates in our meeting/discussion as part of the above research 
project.   
The researcher has explained in language we can understand and we have read and/or understood 
the information is the “Group Participant Information Sheet” and we understand the nature of the 
research and our role in it. 
I also understand that: 
 That the group’s participation is voluntary and we are free to not discuss any matters, at any 
time.  
 That the information we provide and our personal details will be confidential.  
 All information and notes will be coded and will contribute to the pooled data of the 
researcher, so no private information about any individual will be reported. 
 That we will receive no financial benefit for our participation. 
 
I _______________________________________________hereby agree to my group being 
involved in the above research project.  
 
 
 
Signature of Group Representative 
 
 
Date 
 
 
